net/mlx5: Fix uininitialized pointer read on pointer attr #181
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Currently the error exit path err_free kfree's attr. In the case where
flow and parse_attr failed to be allocated this return path will free
the uninitialized pointer attr, which is not correct. In the other
case where attr fails to allocate attr does not need to be freed. So
in both error exits via err_free attr should not be freed, so remove
it.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Uninitialized pointer read")
Fixes: ff7ea04 ("net/mlx5e: Fix potential null pointer dereference")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
|
Master branch: 67ed375 |
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 19, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 19, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 19, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 20, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 22, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 22, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Reported-by: Jussi Maki <[email protected]> Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 26, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 27, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 27, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 27, 2021
Its possible if a socket is closed and the receive thread is under memory pressure it may have cached a skb. We need to ensure these skbs are free'd along with the normal ingress_skb queue. Before 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") tear down and backlog processing both had sock_lock for the common case of socket close or unhash. So it was not possible to have both running in parrallel so all we would need is the kfree in those kernels. But, latest kernels include the commit 799aa7f98d5e and this requires a bit more work. Without the ingress_lock guarding reading/writing the state->skb case its possible the tear down could run before the state update causing it to leak memory or worse when the backlog reads the state it could potentially run interleaved with the tear down and we might end up free'ing the state->skb from tear down side but already have the reference from backlog side. To resolve such races we wrap accesses in ingress_lock on both sides serializing tear down and backlog case. In both cases this only happens after an EAGAIN error case so having an extra lock in place is likely fine. The normal path will skip the locks. Note, we check state->skb before grabbing lock. This works because we can only enqueue with the mutex we hold already. Avoiding a race on adding state->skb after the check. And if tear down path is running that is also fine if the tear down path then removes state->skb we will simply set skb=NULL and the subsequent goto is skipped. This slight complication avoids locking in normal case. With this fix we no longer see this warning splat from tcp side on socket close when we hit the above case with redirect to ingress self. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 [224913.936083] sock_close+0x14/0x20 Fixes: a136678 ("bpf: sk_msg, zap ingress queue on psock down") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
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Jul 27, 2021
John Fastabend says: ==================== Running stress tests with recent patch to remove an extra lock in sockmap resulted in a couple new issues popping up. It seems only one of them is actually related to the patch: 799aa7f ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()") The other two issues had existed long before, but I guess the timing with the serialization we had before was too tight to get any of our tests or deployments to hit it. With attached series stress testing sockmap+TCP with workloads that create lots of short-lived connections no more splats like below were seen on upstream bpf branch. [224913.935822] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 32100 at net/core/stream.c:208 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935841] Modules linked in: fuse overlay bpf_preload x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_uncore wmi_bmof squashfs sch_fq_codel efivarfs ip_tables x_tables uas xhci_pci ixgbe mdio xfrm_algo xhci_hcd wmi [224913.935897] CPU: 3 PID: 32100 Comm: fgs-bench Tainted: G I 5.14.0-rc1alu+ #181 [224913.935908] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision 5820 Tower/002KVM, BIOS 1.9.2 01/24/2019 [224913.935914] RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x212/0x220 [224913.935923] Code: 8b 83 20 02 00 00 85 c0 75 20 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 89 df e8 2b 11 fe ff eb c3 0f 0b e9 7c ff ff ff 0f 0b eb ce <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 [224913.935932] RSP: 0018:ffff88816271fd38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [224913.935941] RAX: 0000000000000ae8 RBX: ffff88815acd5240 RCX: dffffc0000000000 [224913.935948] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000ae8 RDI: ffff88815acd5460 [224913.935954] RBP: ffff88815acd5460 R08: ffffffff955c0ae8 R09: fffffbfff2e6f543 [224913.935961] R10: ffffffff9737aa17 R11: fffffbfff2e6f542 R12: ffff88815acd5390 [224913.935967] R13: ffff88815acd5480 R14: ffffffff98d0c080 R15: ffffffff96267500 [224913.935974] FS: 00007f86e6bd1700(0000) GS:ffff888451cc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [224913.935981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [224913.935988] CR2: 000000c0008eb000 CR3: 00000001020e0005 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [224913.935994] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [224913.936000] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [224913.936007] Call Trace: [224913.936016] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0xba/0x1f0 [224913.936033] __tcp_close+0x620/0x790 [224913.936047] tcp_close+0x20/0x80 [224913.936056] inet_release+0x8f/0xf0 [224913.936070] __sock_release+0x72/0x120 v3: make sock_drop inline in skmsg.h v2: init skb to null and fix a space/tab issue. Added Jakub's acks. ==================== Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-bot
pushed a commit
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Oct 4, 2022
Add a big batch of selftest to extend test_progs with various tc link, attach ops and old-style tc BPF attachments via libbpf APIs. Also test multi-program attachments including mixing the various attach options: # ./test_progs -t tc_link #179 tc_link_base:OK #180 tc_link_detach:OK #181 tc_link_mix:OK #182 tc_link_opts:OK #183 tc_link_run_base:OK #184 tc_link_run_chain:OK Summary: 6/0 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED All new and existing test cases pass. Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot
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Oct 24, 2023
Running the following command on Juno triggers the warning: $ perf record -e cs_etm// -m ,128M ... ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 412 at mm/page_alloc.c:4453 __alloc_pages+0x334/0x1420 CPU: 1 PID: 412 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #181 Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform, BIOS EDK II Feb 1 2019 pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __alloc_pages+0x334/0x1420 lr : dma_common_alloc_pages+0x108/0x138 sp : ffffffc087fb7440 x29: ffffffc087fb7440 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffffc07e48fba0 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 000000000000000f x24: ffffffc081f24880 x23: 0000000000000cc0 x22: ffffff88012b6f08 x21: 0000000008000000 x20: ffffff8801433000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: ffffffc080316e5c x16: ffffffc07e46406c x15: ffffffc0803af580 x14: ffffffc08036b460 x13: ffffffc080025cbc x12: ffffffb8108c3fc4 x11: 1ffffff8108c3fc3 x10: 1ffffff810ff6eac x9 : 00000000f204f204 x8 : 000000000000f204 x7 : 00000000f2f2f2f2 x6 : 00000000f3f3f3f3 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000cc0 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffc085333000 Call trace: __alloc_pages+0x334/0x1420 dma_common_alloc_pages+0x108/0x138 __dma_alloc_pages+0xf4/0x108 dma_alloc_pages+0x18/0x30 tmc_etr_alloc_flat_buf+0xa0/0x190 [coresight_tmc] tmc_alloc_etr_buf.constprop.0+0x124/0x298 [coresight_tmc] alloc_etr_buf.constprop.0.isra.0+0x88/0xc8 [coresight_tmc] tmc_alloc_etr_buffer+0x164/0x2f0 [coresight_tmc] etm_setup_aux+0x32c/0x520 [coresight] rb_alloc_aux+0x29c/0x3f8 perf_mmap+0x59c/0xce0 mmap_region+0x340/0x10e0 do_mmap+0x48c/0x580 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x160/0x248 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x1e8/0x278 __arm64_sys_mmap+0x8c/0xb8 With the flat mode, we only attempt to allocate large memory if there is an IOMMU connected to the ETR. If the allocation fails, we always have a fallback path and return an error if nothing else worked. So, suppress the warning for flat mode allocations. Cc: Mike Leach <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Clark <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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Pull request for series with
subject: net/mlx5: Fix uininitialized pointer read on pointer attr
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/bpf/list/?series=360461