Cluster Based Misbehaviour Detection and Authentication Using Threshold Cryptography in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

R. Murugan & A. Shanmugam
International Journal of Computer Science and Security (IJCSS), Volume (6) : Issue (3) : 2012 188
Cluster Based Node Misbehaviour Detection, Isolation and
Authentication Using Threshold Cryptography in Mobile Ad Hoc
Networks
R. Murugan muruganraam75@yahoo.com
Associate Professor / Department of Computer Applications
Bannari Amman Institute of Technology
Sathyamangalam, 638401, INDIA
A. Shanmugam
Professor / Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering
Bannari Amman Institute of Technology
Sathyamangalam, 638401, INDIA
Abstract
In mobile ad hoc networks, the misbehaving nodes can cause dysfunction in the network resulting
in damage of other nodes. In order to establish secure communication with the group members of
a network, use of a shared group key for confidentiality and authentication is required. Distributing
the shares of secret group key to the group members securely is another challenging task in
MANET. In this paper, we propose a Cluster Based Misbehavior Detection and Authentication
scheme using threshold cryptography in MANET. For secure data transmission, when any node
requests a certificate from a cluster head (CH), it utilizes a threshold cryptographic technique to
issue the certificate to the requested node for authentication. The certificate of a node is renewed
or rejected by CH, based on its trust counter value. An acknowledgement scheme is also
included to detect and isolate the misbehaving nodes. By simulation results, we show that the
proposed approach reduces the overhead.
Keywords: Clustering Technique, Misbehaving Nodes, Trust Count, Threshold Cryptography,
Key Share
1. INTRODUCTION
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of dynamic, independent, wireless devices that
groups a communications network, devoid of any backing of a permanent infrastructure. The
eventual goal of designing a MANET is to make available a self-protecting, “dynamic, self-
forming, and self-healing network” for the dynamic and non-predictive topological network [1].
According to the positions and transmission range, every node in MANET acts as a router and
tends to move arbitrary and dynamically connected to form network. The topology of the ad hoc
network is mainly interdependent on two factors; the transmission power of the nodes and the
Mobile Node location, which are never fixed along the time period [2].
Ad hoc networks excel from the traditional networks in many factors like; easy and swift
installation and trouble-free reconfiguration, which transform them into circumstances, where
deployment of a network infrastructure is too expensive or too susceptible [5]. MANETs have
applicability in several areas like in military applications where cadets relaying important data of
situational awareness on the battleground, in corporate houses where employees or associates
sharing information inside the company premises or in a meeting hall; attendees using wireless
gadgets participating in an interactive conference, critical mission programmer for relief matters in
any disaster events like large scale mishaps like war or terrorist attacks, natural disasters and all.
They are also been used up in private area and home networking, “location-based” services,
sensor networks and many more adds up as services based on MANET [4]. The three major

drawback related to the quality of service in MANET are bandwidth limitations, vibrant and non-
predictive topology and the limited processing and minimum storage of mobile nodes [3].
1.1 Misbehaving Nodes in MANETs
The misbehaving nodes or critical nodes are defined as the nodes that cause malfunction in
network and damage other nodes [6].
1. Malfunctioning nodes: These causes hardware failures or software errors in the
network.
2. Selfish nodes: These nodes refuse to forward or drop data packets
The three categories of selfish nodes are:
i) Node will take active participation in the route discovery and route maintenance;
however will refuse to forward data packets in order to save its resources.
ii) Node will not participate in route discovery phase as well as data forwarding phase but
only use their resources for transmission of their own packets.
iii) Nodes behaves in proper manner if its energy level lies between full energy-level and
certain threshold T1. Here, there are two cases.
If energy level lies between T1 and T2, this node performs as type ii
If energy level falls below T2, this node performs as type i.
3. Malicious nodes: The nodes with the help their own resources try to lessen the
strength of other nodes or networks by taking part in all established routes, thus
compelling other node to use a malicious route which is under their control. When they
are selected in requested route, they result in serious attacks by dropping all received
packets similar to black hole attack or by selecting dropping packets in the similar
manner as Gray hole attack [7].
1.2 Threshold Cryptography
The Shamir’s algorithm offers the threshold cryptography technique. In this scheme, the
authentication protocol necessitates a node to get adequate partial signatures from one-
authenticated node to construct a full signature. Initially a node forwards a Certification Request
Message (CREQ) and those nodes that receives the request after processing sends reply as a
partial signature (CREP ). The node that sent the request gathers entire CREP for generating a
legitimate full signature on availability of adequate replies within assured time duration [8].
The means of providing the shared key to the node without key infrastructure assistance is
provided by threshold cryptographic approach and this scheme is appropriate for secret key
sharing in MANET. Though only t or more shares are provided in (n, t) threshold cryptography,
the secret S can be obtained. With the lack of share refresh scheme and with never-ending time
duration, a malicious node can compromise minimum t shares holder nodes to get secret key. In
order to refresh the share in secured manner, a proactive secret sharing scheme (PSS) is
deployed along with the threshold cryptography. This scheme permits refreshment of all shares
by generating new group of shares of the similar secret key from the old shares excluding the
reconstruction of the secret key [9].
1.3 Problem Identification
In [14], a cluster based authentication technique is proposed for mitigating the internal attacks.
The entire network is divided into hierarchical group of clusters. The entire network is divided into
hierarchical group of clusters, each cluster having a fully trusted cluster head. Each node holds a
certificate issued by an offline certificate authority (CA). The Trust Count (TC) for each of the
nodes can be estimated periodically for every trust evaluation interval (TEI), based on their

access policy (AP). The certificate of a node is renewed or rejected by the cluster head, based on
its trust counter value.
In [15], an efficient timer based acknowledgement technique is proposed that allows the detection
and isolation of the misbehavior nodes and can even find a possible alternate route in case of
current route failure. This involves a detection timer and forward counter that help to reduce the
number of acknowledgements thus reducing the delay and overhead. This approach is keenly
focusing on acknowledgement of nodes regarding the misbehaviors so that the source takes the
corresponding action.
In this paper, we propose a new approach called threshold cryptography coupled
acknowledgement scheme for attack detection in MANET.
2. RELATED WORKS
Hitoshi Asaeda et al [9] proposed a Proactive Secret Sharing (PSS) scheme in mobile ad hoc
networks. The proposed scheme is related to threshold cryptography along with the methods to
bootstrap secret group key. In this scheme, all shareholder nodes coordinates the PSS procedure
in a well-managed fashion to maintain the reliability of the protocol.
GSR Emil Selvan et al [10] proposed a compromised node detection scheme in ad hoc networks.
The proposed approach is based on threshold cryptography and Chinese remainder theorem. All
nodes concerned with the transmission process are authenticated. Then, threshold cryptography
is used to share the message and Chinese remainder theorem for routing verification and to
validate whether the node is authenticated or not. The problem of compromised nodes such as
message dropping, message alteration and routing to wrong destination are addressed.
S.M. Sarwarul Islam Rizvi et al [11] proposed a security module based on threshold cryptography
for protecting the mobile agent and agent server in an ad hoc network. The threshold
cryptography is a new environment in the cryptographic world where trust is distributed among
multiple nodes in the network. The proposed approach offers prime security services like
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.
Sanjay Raghani et al [12] proposed the design of distributed CA based on threshold cryptography
for mobile ad hoc networks. The proposed protocol is extended with a set of monitoring protocols
by offering dynamic behavior. The protocol allows the distributed CA to dynamically update the
threshold value by monitoring the average node degree of the network and thus avoiding the
increase in the certification renewal delay.
Keun-ho lee et al [13] proposed authentication protocol based on Hierarchical Clusters in Ad hoc
Networks (AHCAN). The proposed scheme designs an end-to-end authentication protocol that
relies on mutual trust between nodes in other clusters. It uses certificates containing an
asymmetric key using the threshold cryptography scheme. The establishment of secure channels,
the detection of reply attacks, mutual end-to-end authentication, prevention of node identity
fabrication, and secure distribution of provisional session keys are included using shadow key
certification of the threshold key configuration.
3. PROPOSED WORK
3.1 Proactive Secret Sharing Technique
The Threshold cryptography is the technique utilized to share the secret among the nodes. In
order to make the sharing scheme more secured, a proactive secret sharing scheme is deployed
along with the threshold cryptographic approach. This scheme permits refreshment of all shares
by generating a new set of shares for a similar secret key from the old shares exclusive of
renovating the secret key [9].

Let K represent the secret group key and k1, k2…., kn represents the sub-shares.
Let the node Na be the share holder
The proactive secret sharing scheme is described using the following steps.
1) Na randomly generates its sub-shares (ka1, Ka2,… Kan)
2) Every sub-shares kab (b=1, 2,…n) is distributed to node b through secure link.
3) When b receives the sub-shares (k1b, k2b,….. knb), it calculates a new share from
the received sub-shares and old shares using the following equation.
Kb’ = kb + ∑=
n
a
abk
1
- (1)
4) Each shares (k1’, k2’……kn’) is sharing of the secret key K, since
}.,....,1{,0
1
nak
n
b
ab ∈∀=∑=
3.2 Clustering Technique
The complete set of nodes is divided into a number of groups and the nodes inside each group
are subdivided into clusters. Each group has a group leader and cluster is headed by the cluster
head. Specifically, one of the nodes in the clusters is head .A set of clusters form a group and
each group is headed by a group leader. The nodes contained in a cluster are physical
neighbors, and they use contributory key agreement, and they further contribute their shares in
arriving at the group key. When there is change in membership, the neighbor node initiates the
re-keying operation, thus reducing the burden on the cluster head. The group leader selects a
random key to be utilized for encrypting messages exchanged connecting the cluster heads and
the network head. It forwards the key to the group leader that is used for communication among
the group leaders.
3.2.1 Cluster Formation
Step 1: After deployment, the nodes broadcast their id value to their neighbors along with the
HELLO message.
Step 2: When all the nodes have discovered their neighbors, they exchange information about the
number of one hop neighbors. The node which has maximum one hop neighbors is selected as
the cluster head. Other nodes become members of the cluster or local nodes. The nodes update
the status values accordingly.
Step 3: The cluster head broadcasts the message “CLHEAD” so as to know its members.
Step 4: The members reply with the message “CLMEMBER” and in this way clusters are formed
in the network.
Step 5: If a node receives more than one “CLHEAD” messages, it becomes Gateway which acts
as a mediator between two clusters.
In this manner clusters are formed in the network. The cluster heads broadcast the message,
“CLHEAD EXCHANGE” so as to know each other. The cluster head with the least id is chosen
as the leader of the cluster heads which is representative of the group termed as group leader.
Each CH maintains a list of IP addresses of all other CH in the network. The group leaders will be
in contact with other group leaders in similar way, and one among the group leader is selected as
the leader for entire network.

3.2.2 Key Sharing Scheme
Step 1
Each group (G) holds a group key (or secret key) K and respective group leader (GL)
splits K into equal shares which is represented as {k1, k2, k3, …..., kn)
Step 2
G distributes the shares among the clusters in the group and the number of shares
received by the cluster is based on the following condition.
The number of shares received by each cluster =
clustersofnumber
sharesofnumberTotal
__
___
Step 3
Upon receiving the shares, the cluster heads starts distributing the shares to its member
nodes.
Step 4
Every member node that receives the share generates the sub-shares and exchanges
the sub-shares with all other member nodes. Then each node computes the new share
value with the old share and received sub-share.
New share = old share + ∑new sub-share received by the node
Step 5
Every node transmits its new share value to respective CH. Further, CH updates the new
share of its member nodes.
Step 6
When any node requests a certificate from CH, CH broadcasts certification request
(CREQ) message to its neighbor CHs within the group.
Step 7
Every CH that receives the CREQ, replies with certificate reply (CREP) message that
contains the latest group key shares of each member.
Step 8
CH gathers the entire share and if the required amount of share is obtained (using (n, t)
threshold cryptography described in section 1.4), a valid certificate is generated with the
group key and the CH sends it to the requested node.
Figure 1 represents the group G comprising three clusters. G possess the group key K and GL
splits the key into shares as per existing number of cluster within the group. K is split into 12
shares (i.e. n=12) which is represented as {k1, k2, …, k12} and distributed among the clusters as
per following condition.
The number of shares received by each cluster =
clustersofnumber
sharesofnumbertotal
__
___
=
3
12
= 4
Thus each cluster receives 4 key shares, randomly.

----------------> Group Leader
----------------> Cluster Head
----------------> Nodes Holding the Shares
FIGURE1: Key Sharing Scheme
C1 receives 4 key shares i.e k1, k2, k3 and k4. The node 1, 2, 3 and 5 within the C1 receives these
shares and these nodes generate the sub-shares. Table 1 represents the node list and its
corresponding shares and sub-shares.
Node Key shares Sub–shares
Node 1 k1 k11,k12,k13,k15
Node 2 k2 K21,k22,k23,k25
Node 3 k3 K31,k32,k33,k35
Node 5 k4 k51,k52,k53,k55
TABLE 1: Nodes and its Shares
Node 1 exchanges its sub-share with all other share holders and generates a new shares.
GL
N4
N5
N3
N2
N1
CH1
N4
N5
N3
N2
N1
CH2
N4
N5
N3
N2
N1
CH3
C1
C2
C3
G1
GL
CH
N

New share of node 1, k1”= old share + sum of newly received sub-share
= k1 + (k21+ k31+ k51)
Similarly, new share by node 2, 3 and 5 are as follows.
k2” = k2 + (k32+k12+k52)
k3”= k3 + (k13+k23+k53)
k5”= k4 + (k15+k35+k25)
The node 1, 2, 3, and 5 transfers their respective new shares k1”, k2”, k3” and k5” to CH1.
Similarly, the above process is performed in clusters C2 and C3 in the group G.
In case, node 2 requests a certificate from CH1, then CH1 sends the CREQ to its neighbor cluster
heads CH2 and CH3. These CHs reply CH1 with CREP message that contains their respective
shares of the group key K. CH1 collects entire shares obtained from CH2 and CH3 along with its
own shares. If it contains atleast 8 shares out of 12 shares (n, t threshold cryptography), then a
certificate can be generated. CH1 sign the certificate with group key K and it is forwarded to the
requested node 2.
The merit of this approach is that it allows a set of nodes holding shares to refresh all shares by
generating a new set of shares for the same secret key from the old shares without reconstructing
the secret key.
3.3 Packet Transmission
Let S and D be the source and destination node respectively.
Let Ni be the intermediate nodes where i = {1, 2,…. N}
Let DP represent the data packet and it includes packet identifier PI, the IP address of the
destination node (IPD), a certificate Kn, and expiration time t.
We assume TCi to be the initial trust counter for all the nodes with a minimum threshold value
(TCth).
1) On request, S starts transmitting DP towards the destination via intermediate nodes in hop by
hop manner.
It will be in the following form.
S → Transmit: [PI, IPD, kS, t] K Pr
The TCi for all the nodes is estimated periodically for every trust evaluation interval (TEI)
2) When N1 receives DP, it uses S’s public key extracted from the S’s certificate to authenticate
the signature and to validate that S’s certificate has not expired. Else, the node proceeds by
signing the contents of the messages, appends its own certificate, and sends the message to
its next hop. Alterations of data or integrity attacks are prevented by signature.
The DP from Ni is transmitted in the following format.
N1 → Transmit: [[DP, IPD, kS, t] K Pr ] Kpr (N1), kN1
3) Upon receiving the DP, N1’s neighbor N2 validates the signature with the given certificate N2,
and then removes N1’s certificate & signature, records N1 as its predecessor, signs the content of
the message originally sent by S, appends its own certificate and forward the message. N2 then
re-transmits the DP.
N2 → Transmit: [[DP, IPD, kS, t] K Pr ] Kpr (N2), kN2.

4) Each node along the path repeats these steps of validating the previous node’s signature,
removing the previous node’s certificate and signature, recording the previous node’s IP address,
signing the original contents of the message, appending its own certificate and forwards the
message till DP reaches the destination.
5) All the member nodes send their TCi value to its cluster head CH. If the CH detects any node
with TCi less than TCth, then the CH adds the corresponding Ni in its local CRL (Certificate
Revocation List).
6) When CH receives a renewal request from its cluster member Ni, it verifies whether Ni is in
CRL. If it exists, its request is rejected. Otherwise, it sends a certificate renewal reply to Ni with its
signature.
3.4 Detecting the Misbehaving Nodes
Let Nk is the intermediate node with k=3, 6, 9, …
Let NACK and PACK be the negative and positive acknowledgment respectively.
Let FC be the forward count
Let FCTh represent pre-defined threshold value of FC.
1) S starts forwarding the packet upon request.
2) FC gets incremented during the packet entry and gets decremented during the packet exit.
3) When DP reaches Nk, Fc is verified.
4) When FC is below the FCTh, Nk informs S with NACK. If not, S is informed with PACK.
S transfers the data packet on request. When DP reaches node 3, FC is verified.
If FC< FCTh, then
NACK
S Node 3
If FC>FCTh, then
PACK
S Node 3
Similarly, the above process continues for every 3 hops till the packet reaches D.
5) If S receives PACK Then
The route is considered as normal
Else
6) If S receives the NACK, then the following events are carried out
Event 1
The source node counts the NACK sent by every k-hop neighbors,
Event 2
If NACKc>NACKcmax, then the node is considered as misbehaving and this information is
broadcasted to all other nodes in the route.
Event 3
From the broadcast information, the destination node checks the number of misbehaving nodes
along the route and this information is sent as a feedback to the source node.
Event 4
If the source node finds that only limited number of misbehaving nodes (say 2) in the route, then
that particular nodes are marked as rejected and bypass route is established excluding those
nodes.
Event 5
When the number of misbehaving nodes exceeds the minimum count, then the entire route is
treated as misbehaving and an alternate route is established for further transmission, by the
source.

4. SIMULATION RESULTS
4.1 Simulation Model and Parameters
We use Network Simulator (NS2) [16] to simulate our proposed algorithm. In our simulation, the
channel capacity of mobile hosts is set to the same value: 2 Mbps. We use the distributed
coordination function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless LANs as the MAC layer protocol. It has
the functionality to notify the network layer about link breakage.
In our simulation, 100 mobile nodes move in a 1000 meter x 1000 meter region for 50 seconds
simulation time. We assume each node moves independently with the same average speed. All
nodes have the same transmission range of 250 meters. In our simulation, the node speed is 10
m/s. The simulated traffic is Constant Bit Rate (CBR). Our simulation settings and parameters
are summarized in table 2.
No. of Nodes 100
Area Size 1000 X 1000
Mac 802.11
Radio Range 250m
Simulation Time 50 sec
Traffic Source CBR
Packet Size 512
Speed 10m/s
Misbehaving Nodes
along the route
1,2,3,4
TABLE 2: Simulation Settings
4.2 Performance Metrics
We evaluate mainly the performance according to the following metrics.
Control overhead: The control overhead is defined as the total number of routing control packets
normalized by the total number of received data packets.
Average end-to-end delay: The end-to-end-delay is averaged over all surviving data packets
from the sources to the destinations.
Average Packet Delivery Ratio: It is the ratio of the number of packets received successfully
and the total number of packets transmitted.
Average Packet Drop: It is the average number of packets dropped by the misbehaving nodes.
4.3 Results
Case 1
In our first experiment, we have taken a scenario for a given source and destination pair (25, 89).
We gradually increase the number of misbehaving nodes along the established path for this pair.
When the number of misbehaving nodes are more than 2, (minimum count), our proposed
CBMDA scheme determines alternate path and reroutes the entire traffic through that path.

FIGURE 2: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Delay
FIGURE 3: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Delivery Ratio

FIGURE 4: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Drop
FIGURE 5: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Overhead
Figure 2 shows the results of average end-to-end delay for the increasing misbehaving nodes for
both the schemes. We can see that the proposed scheme (CBMDA) has significantly lower delay
compared to without proposed scheme since it exchanges less number of acknowledgment

packets. Hence for the same reason, the control overhead involved is also less in the proposed
CBMDA scheme, when compared to without proposed scheme as in Figure 5.
When the number of misbehaving nodes is more than two, the packet delivery ratio begins to
reduce in case of without proposed scheme, since CBMDA continues the transmission using
alternate route, the delivery ratio is unaffected. From Figure 3, we can see that clearly the
CBMDA scheme outperforms the without scheme by achieving more delivery ratio. For the same
reason, the packet drop is less in CBMDA as shown in figure 4.
Case 2
In our second experiment, we have taken another scenario for a given source and destination
pair (13, 99). We gradually increase the number of misbehaving nodes along the established path
for this pair.
FIGURE 6: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Delay

FIGURE 9: Misbehaving Nodes Vs Drop
As we can see from the figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, the results are similar to our previous experiment.
(ie) CBMDA has more delivery ratio with reduced delay, drop and overhead when compared to
without proposed scheme.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a threshold cryptography coupled acknowledgement scheme
for misbehaving node detection in MANET. Initially clusters are formed in the network and cluster
member with the least id is chosen as the cluster heads (CH). The Threshold cryptography is
deployed along with proactive sharing scheme that permits the cluster members to refresh all
shares by generating a new set of shares for a same secret key from the old shares without
reconstructing the secret key. During data transmission, when any node requests a certificate
from CH, the cryptographic approach offers the certificate to the requested node. The certificate
of a node is renewed or rejected by CH, based on its trust counter value. Apart from the
authentication technique, an acknowledgement scheme is also used to detect and isolate the
misbehaving nodes by checking the number of forwarded packets. By simulation results, we
show that the proposed approach reduces the overhead.
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