A SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN CLOUD COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE

International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.5, No.5, September 2013
DOI : 10.5121/ijnsa.2013.5502 11
A SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN CLOUD COMPUTING
INFRASTRUCTURE
Arijit Ukil1
, Debasish Jana2
and Ajanta De Sarkar3
1
Innovation Lab, Tata Consultancy Services, Kolkata, India
2,3
Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra Kolkata Campus, Kolkata, India
ABSTRACT
In a typical cloud computing diverse facilitating components like hardware, software, firmware,
networking, and services integrate to offer different computational facilities, while Internet or a private
network (or VPN) provides the required backbone to deliver the services. The security risks to the cloud
system delimit the benefits of cloud computing like “on-demand, customized resource availability and
performance management”. It is understood that current IT and enterprise security solutions are not
adequate to address the cloud security issues. This paper explores the challenges and issues of security
concerns of cloud computing through different standard and novel solutions. We propose analysis and
architecture for incorporating different security schemes, techniques and protocols for cloud computing,
particularly in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) systems. The proposed
architecture is generic in nature, not dependent on the type of cloud deployment, application agnostic and
is not coupled with the underlying backbone. This would facilitate to manage the cloud system more
effectively and provide the administrator to include the specific solution to counter the threat. We have also
shown using experimental data how a cloud service provider can estimate the charging based on the
security service it provides and security-related cost-benefit analysis can be estimated.
KEYWORDS
Cloud computing, security, PaaS, IaaS& authentication
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing provides a distributed computing environment comprising of heterogeneous
facilitating components like hardware, software, firmware, networking as well as services.
Challenges arise when access through the cloud infrastructure is done from a public domain like
internet. Even when privately held, security challenges prevail. Internet or even a private network
provides the required backbone to deliver the cloud services. Common cloud services are: IaaS,
PaaS, and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Cloud computing is a paradigm shift to traditional
computing technology. It provides on demand storage, application execution, information
processing, data availability, analytics and other services. This kind of model of metered usage of
infrastructure, application, data and services bring about economy of scale, reduced computing
and storage cost. However, without adequate assessment of the capability, benefit, vulnerability
and optimality, cloud computing may pose severe challenges and threats, which can transform the
immense advantages to massive risk and catastrophic loss. Cloud security is such an area which
deals with the concerns and vulnerabilities of cloud computing for ensuring safer computing
environment. The unorthodox architecture and operation of cloud operation bring in different
security and privacy vulnerabilities. The very characteristics of cloud to offer shared
infrastructure, virtualization, and redundancy are key enabler for different security attacks. Cloud

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security helps in delivering the resilience for different attacks to disrupt the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of cloud information and user data. In order to enable the security
primitives in cloud computing systems, both clients and cloud server should act cooperatively and
an efficient architecture should be capable of handling most of the security challenges. It is
understood that traditional blacklist approach is no longer valid and whitelist (trusted) approach
has to be incorporated to mitigate the problems of cloud security. It is worthy to find
trustworthiness of cloud service providers based on some parameters like system update
frequency, mean down time, previous attack history [1]. Cloud security suffers from ‘principal
agent’ problem [2]. Other problem like multiplexing clients’ VMs in a shared physical
infrastructure causes security threats to clients while maximizing revenue to the provider [3]. In
order to create substantially secure cloud computing environment from client’s perspective, it is
required that we should explore the challenges and issues of security in cloud computing like:
• To provide data confidentiality for clients / cloud users.
• To enable cloud information integrity.
• To ensure application independent single sign-on (SSO) kind of authentication.
In this paper, we explore the above-mentioned challenges and issues of security concerns of cloud
computing through different standard and novel solutions. This paper identifies basic security
challenges and enumerates a number of well-known techniques that can be used for improving
security. We propose a security-enabled cloud environment which enforces significant protection
of client’s interest and security concerns over its data. Our proposed architecture is modular in
nature, i.e. we consider the threats individually and seek solution for that. This helps to manage
the cloud system more effectively and provide the administrator to include the specific solution to
counter the threat. For example, in some cases or for some clients, confidentiality is the only
requirement whereas for some clients other primitives are also required. Based on the requirement
like security strength, latency, bandwidth, the administrator can choose the appropriate primitives.
This also helps in mitigating the scalability issues.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work done by several researchers is
documented. In Section 3, we discuss about the security in cloud infrastructure, its key issues and
open challenges. Section 4 depicts proposed architecture for implementing cloud system security,
particularly XACML based authentication and the Security-as-a-Service in a cloud system. We
describe experimental results of secure registration service and the related cost-benefit analysis in
Section 6. Finally, In Section 6 we conclude the paper citing our future work.
2. RELATED WORK
Conner et al [1] have presented an effective reputation management system with associated trust
establishment through multiple scoring functions and implemented the security service on a
realistic application scenario in distributed environments. Friedman and West [2] and Ristenpart
et al [3] have depicted several privacy as well as security issues that arise in a cloud computing
framework. Yan et al [4] had proposed a nice scheme for handling data protection in terms of
confidentiality through amalgamation of identity management with hierarchical identity-based
cryptography for distribution of the key as well as mutual authentication in the cloud
infrastructure. In [21], trust and reputation based scheme in collaborative computing is presented.
Hu et al [23] presented Law-as-a-Service (LaaS) model for automatic enforcing of legal policies
in the super-peer to handle queries for consumers and clients. The law-aware super-peer acts as a
guardian providing data integration as well as protection. Sun et al [22] presented the pay-as-you-
go business model of cloud infrastructure and put forward the urge of providing high security for
cloud computing as this is going over publicly accessible internet domain. Trust needs to be

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established means for better security of cloud platforms. They [22] presented a dynamic multi-
dimensional trust model with time-variant comprehensive evaluation multi-dimensional method.
With this backdrop, we present our proposed architecture and security model towards better
protection of confidentiality, privacy in a public domain cloud infrastructural backbone.
3. SECURITY IN CLOUD COMPUTING
Security is a big challenge in cloud system due to its nature of outsourced computing. Mainly,
confidentiality, integrity and authentication are the primary pain areas. Unless robust security
scheme and user-centric security policy is implemented, cloud system would be vulnerable to
different attacks and susceptible by the users. Below we mention the key issues of ensuring the
cloud security and the open challenges to be addressed for making cloud security system atleast at
the smae level of current IT systems.
3.1. Key Issues
Confidentiality prevents intentional (malicious) or unintentional disclosure of sensitive
information. In cloud systems, confidentiality incorporates data encryption to minimize
vulnerability due to covert channels, traffic analysis, and sensitive inference. Web Service
Security is frequently used by the cloud service provider, where data confidentiality and integrity
are done using XML encryption which is endorsed by X.509 certificate and Kerberos tickets into
SOAP message header [4]. Malicious activities can be defended through a protected hypervisor
through HyperWall architecture using the concept of hardware centric hypervisor-secure
virtualization [20]. For guaranteeing data integrity at rest or storage, particularly in IaaS
and PaaS systems, trusted infrastructure [23] needs to be incorporated. For data integrity in
transit, traditional digital signature can be used. However, for guaranteeing data integrity at rest or
storage, particularly in IaaS and PaaS systems, trusted infrastructure [13] needs to be
incorporated. Traditional security techniques for enterprise and home computing systems cannot
address the cloud server security problems [14]. Currently, authentication, authorization and
access control services are provided using OpenID, OAuth, SAML, XACML types of primitives [
8 -11]. However, XACML has the capability of attribute based access control, which is most
suitable in cloud environment.
3.2. Open Challenges
One of the primary focuses to provide cloud security is to have one integrated solution enabling
the required security primitives like confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Cloud security
cannot be solved using conventional IT security tools as private data is migrated from local
machines to global or distributed systems for storage, processing and computing. It is required to
consider cloud security from a holistic point of view rather than solving the problem requirement
basis. In [2, 17], it is described that cloud specific security solutions like confidentiality-enabled
computing, user-defined authentication and access control, atomic data integrity are the main
issues to be addressed for a sustainable and scalable. In this paper, our approach is to find an
integrated solution for cloud security catering the requirements for confidentiality, integrity and
authentication.
4. PROPOSED SECURITY MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURE
We propose a framework for satisfying cloud security ensuring the main primitives:
confidentiality, integrity and authentication (with access control). Then we integrate the

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individual proposals to provide an integrated cloud security which would be offered as a security
service.
4.1. Confidentiality in Cloud Infrastructure
With the ownership of client’s sensitive data at cloud service provider, it becomes highly unlikely
to protect data from the respective service provider while there are well-established techniques
available to resist the external threats [5]. One of the solutions is to introduce the concept of data
analysis and processing at the provider without the content of client’s data gets revealed.
However, it is difficult to provide services on the encrypted data. Client’s data needs to be
processed and analysed in original or raw form at the cloud to enable meaningful applications.
This defeats the confidentiality of user’s data. In order to retain confidentiality as well as deriving
services out of data by third party application, processing on encryption domain is required. This
is termed as homomorphic encryption in [6 - 7]. Suppose, cloud service provider requires to
compute some arbitrary function f on client’s (one or many in number) data d1, … ,dN. This can
be done two ways:
• ),....,( 21 Ndddf
• ))(),....(),(( 21 NdEdEdEf
Where E is encryption on d.
Homomorphic encryption scheme allows to efficiently compute arbitrary functions over
encrypted data i.e., given encryptions E(d1), …, E(dN) of d1, … , dN for any computable
function f. In order to ensure client data security from cloud service provider where cloud service
provider needs to compute on client data, homomorphic encryption is the only available option.
Though it is in developing stage and incurs high computational cost for sophisticated functions,
we propose the following principle to balance between the security and usability as depicted in
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Confidentiality-usability algorithm

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4.2. Authentication architecture and Policy in Cloud Infrastructure
For providing identity management to warrant authentication and authorization, OpenID and
OAuth standards are defined using cloud specific security and privacy policy. OpenID is an open
standard, which enables users to authenticate in a decentralized manner, eliminating the need for
services to provide their own ad hoc systems and allowing users to consolidate their digital
identities [8]. The most important feature is that it provides unique web identity, very much
suitable for different cloud applications. OAuth (Open Authorization), on the other hand, is an
open standard for authorization. Through OAuth protocol, cloud users can share their data among
different cloud service provider without disclosing the authentication credential [9].
On the other hand, XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language), an OASIS-ratified,
is a declarative access control policy language [1o, 11]. It is general-purpose and XML-based for
security-privacy policy management, implementation and provisioning for access decisions.
Advantage of XACML is its ability to provide support for role based access control service [11].
XCAML is suited for providing policy-based access control and authorization services in cloud
environment. A trusted third party or the cloud service provider hosts the XACML decision
engine consisting of decision implementation by Policy Decision Point (PDP) and policy based
enforcement by Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
The proposed protocol for XACML-based cloud authentication is described below:
• When an user request for a resource at the cloud, a Request.xml file is generated by PEP
at the user side and is sent to cloud.
• Cloud service provider’s PEP intercepts user's access request to a resource.
• Cloud maintains Policy.xml for that resource which can be defined by the resource
owner.
• Cloud maintains PDP module to evaluate and issue authorization decisions and generates
Response.xml from
• Cloud user with PEP may additionally request the admin to update Policy.xml to
customize the access policy.
Following we depict an activity diagram for better understanding of the protocol for XACML
based cloud authentication. In this case, we consider cloud service provider as a reliable (trusted)
third party.
Fig. 2. XACML based cloud authentication protocol

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It is to be noted that Policy.xml is a very sensitive and an important file maintaining the access
and authorization policy for different applications and cloud users. The cost of security breach on
Policy.xml is very high and should be stored in encrypted or hardware-secured method.
Another important requirement is to ensure higher usability such that client users with multiple
application subscription. Cloud accounts should easily access data while security is safeguarded.
One of the striking usability features is to provide Single-Sign-On (SSO) based authentication so
that the user can maintain only single authentication credential for accessing different
applications, even different cloud service providers. The usability of SSO also has a reverse side,
through which security breach is possible as mentioned in [12]. SSO in cloud is to be introduced
after closing the vulnerabilities as stated in [12], where the authors pointed out eight logical flaws
with popular SSOs. However, due to the ease and usability point of view, of late SSO becomes
highly popular [18]. Another implementation for cloud SSO is found in [19], where SaaS
application’s audit and access control for public or private cloud is SSO-based. Following
architecture can be conceptualized as depicted in fig. 3, where a cloud user authenticates through
a cloud SSO hosted by a particular cloud service provider to access other cloud apps, other
(owned) cloud service provider accounts, even authorized data of other cloud user.
Fig. 3. SSO- based cloud authentication
4.3. Integrity architecture and Policy in Cloud Infrastructure
Cloud service is very much prone to non-invasive side channel attacks like software attacks
(malware, virus), statistical attacks (password guess) due to its distributed nature. The most
effective solution to counter this problem is to provide secure execution environment to ensure
protected execution of software and other processing entities including external and internal
memory, which can be offered through secure hardware platform.
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is engaged in formulating a separate layer of hardware security
within cloud infrastructure [15]. This is a hardware-enforced security environment for isolating
code execution process and execution area and incorporating safe storage and integrity checking
during different periods of software execution. Ensuring trusted hardware (like Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) [16]), secure booting, public key based integrity checking along with frequent
system validation and consequent application access control helps to build a trusted cloud
platform as shown in fig. 4. The main objective is to provide secure execution of the application
by employing application access control through software and hardware level security. This kind
of hardware-based security is very much needed in securing storage service in PaaS and IaaS. But
such TPM-enabled environment is computational inefficient, it is design challenge to optimally

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partition the secure and normal execution sections such that only sensitive data parts are executed
at the protected section, where as non-sensitive data can be stored and executed from the normal
(not TPM-enabled) section.
Fig 4. Integrity-ensured trusted cloud computing
It can be observed that through this integrity-ensured trusted cloud, an end-to-end trust (from
hardware layer to application layer) chain of trust can be established. When the client is capable
of moderate processing power and transacting sensitive records like financial data, medical
reports, the proposed trust establishment is necessary to ensure reliability for data at rest.
4.4. Integrated Cloud Security Architecture
In order to make the cloud ecosystem capable of handling the security aspects, discrete
components for countering specific attack may not be manageable. Another interesting and
unique feature of cloud security is that security can be provided as a service like software,
platform or infrastructure. Security-as-a-service has potential because of two reasons. Firstly, due
to continuous and fast shift of IT and enterprise security load through outsourcing and
customization. Secondly for scalability purposes, security solutions require to handle growing
complexity of the underlying processes and to adapt to the paradigm shift to the cloud computing
[17]. The concept of security as a top-up on different applications may not suffice the requirement
of cloud system. An important feature of cloud security is to provide on-demand. This means that
the cloud user or cloud application based on requirement can subscribe the particular security
components and thus introducing security as a service. On the other hand this feature can be
handy to create an adaptive-secure cloud system, where based on applications or users context
certain security primitives or APIs will be called to defend from possible threats. We envision
that architecture as:

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Fig 5. Conceptual cloud service model with security-as-a-service
“Security-as-a-Service” consists of different components like PaaS consists of service, compute
components; IaaS consists of storage, network components. The main components of “Security-
as-a-Service” are:
• Data confidentiality, e.g. homomorphic encryption
• Data integrity, e.g. TPM (at storage), digital signature ( at transit, for data exchange),
SHA-2
• Data authentication, e.g. OpenID, OAuth, XACML
• Network confidentiality, e.g. HTTPS (SSL/ TLS)
• Network integrity, e.g. SHA-2, digital signature
• Network authentication, e.g. Cloud SSO
Based on the requirements, these components can be incorporated on demand basis. For example,
for storage security or data at rest integrity data integrity components with TPM can be used;
cloud users can negotiate with cloud service provider for homomorphic encryption such that
user’s data is processed in encrypted domain. Similarly, this security primitive can be integrated
in a proactive or adaptively to different rendered services for seamless protection against possible
attacks. For example, when SaaS is handling request for financial transactions more security
primitives (like HTTPS, XACML, digital signature) are used while handling request for chat
applications, HTTPS, digital signature are not needed. Table 1.shows a typical requirement of the
primitives of security-as-a-service for other services and stake holders.
Table 1.Security-as-a-service for other cloud services and stakeholders
Services/ Stakeholders Security primitives of
Security-as-a-service
Cloud user Homomorphic encryption,
TPM
Cloud infrastructure TPM, SSO
SaaS OpenID, OAuth, XACML,
HTTPS
PaaS Homomorphic encryption,
OpenID, OAuth, XACML
IaaS TPM

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4.5. Cloud Computing with Security-As-A-Service
Security-as-a-service, as defined earlier is to be availed as a horizontal service in a cloud service
model. In this section, we describe a use case of an e-health system using security-as-a-service.
There are different parties in the e-health system like medical practitioner, patient, hospital,
medicine retailer, nursing staff, insurance agency, medical researcher, so on and so forth
designated as ][ iττ = , i= medical practitioner, patient, medicine retailer, nursing staff, hospital,
insurance agency, medical researcher… The e-health system is hosted in a cloud service provider
C with PaaS model. We denote the sensitive medical record of the patient as D . The patient
intends to share ],[ sp DDD = , where p stands for public, s stands for sensitive. The cloud client
with medical record (patient) D is hosted in C with following security constraints S :
1. For iτ , where i = medical researcher, only aggregated result on sD would be
shared.
2. For iτ , where i= medical retailer only medicine part of sD is to be shared.
3. For iτ , where i= nursing staff, only medicine and some related part of sD is to be
shared.
4. For iτ , where i= insurance agency, cost, primary investigation and medicine part
of sD is to be shared.
5. All iτ is to be authenticated.
6. sD is to be stored securely in C , sD is to be shared to iτ through C in a secure
channel, i.e. i
uredDs
C τ → sec
.
When the cloud client, the owner registers to the cloud C for allowing C to host D , client
patientτ gets registered and authenticates to C using OpenID. When patientτ avails the service of e-
health application, it posts its medical record D to C undersigning with the constraints S . There
can be a negotiation process between patientτ and C such that C accepts a subset of S . For sake
of simplicity, we do not consider the negotiation phase. In fig. 6, we show the initial data hosting
and constraint sharing between patientτ and C .
Fig 6. Registration and security-constraint sharing

After registers in , shares
security requirements as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that
service and business model does also participate as the amount of
pricing of rendering the service.
After patientτ registers in C , shares
requirements S as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that service and
business model does also participate as the amount of
rendering the service.
Let us consider that medical researcher intends to avail some information from
function Q , which can be searching for a piece of data, aggregated result etc. So,
queries C on D for Q . In order to retain secrecy,
homomorphic key exchange, public and private key (
encryption agent (if already not present) on
on D with puK and researchermedical _τ
example, D may consist of medical investigation data of
the investigation data that is higher than reference ran
proposal is to address this issue through functional encryption. However, other cryptographic
primitives can be used.
Fig 7. Functional confidentiality in cloud computing
In order to satisfy other constraints primitives from security
For example, satisfying 6 requires HTTPS channel set up among
for data sharing. For 5, OpenID and OAuth primitives need to be set up.
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We have implemented the registration and security
in a PC with following specification: Intel Core2Duo CPU with speed 3.00 GHz, 2 GB RAM.
The development platform is Python 2.6.1 in Python integrated Developmen
al of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.5, No.5, September 2013
, shares and , it is the responsibility of to ensure the
as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that
l does also participate as the amount of and directly impact the
, shares D and S , it is the responsibility of C to ensure the security
as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that service and
business model does also participate as the amount of D and S directly impact the pricing of
Let us consider that medical researcher intends to avail some information from D through query
, which can be searching for a piece of data, aggregated result etc. So, medicalτ
. In order to retain secrecy, C negotiates with medicalτ
homomorphic key exchange, public and private key ( prpu KK , ) and installing homomorphic
encryption agent (if already not present) on researchermedical _τ . C performshomomorphic encryption
researcher decrypts with prK .The decrypted content is
may consist of medical investigation data of patientτ and Q requires information on
the investigation data that is higher than reference range. We depict the protocol in fig. 7. Our
Fig 7. Functional confidentiality in cloud computing
In order to satisfy other constraints primitives from security-as-a-service needs to be incorporated.
For example, satisfying 6 requires HTTPS channel set up among patientτ , D and medicalτ
for data sharing. For 5, OpenID and OAuth primitives need to be set up.
ESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We have implemented the registration and security-enabled data sharing (as described in Fig. 6)
The development platform is Python 2.6.1 in Python integrated Development Environment
al of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.5, No.5, September 2013
20
to ensure the
as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that
directly impact the
to ensure the security
as per when acknowledgement is made. It is to be mentioned that service and
directly impact the pricing of
through query
researchermedical _
researchermedical _ for
and installing homomorphic
performshomomorphic encryption
.The decrypted content is Q on D . For
requires information on
ge. We depict the protocol in fig. 7. Our
service needs to be incorporated.
researchermedical _
enabled data sharing (as described in Fig. 6)
t Environment

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(IDLE). Instead of, we implemented key based secure-registration service. We experimented with
three types of keys:
Table 2. Key-based secure-registration
Authentication
primitive
Key-length
AES 128
MD5 256
RSA 1024
In cloud computing environment, client device is mostly thin and the cloud system needs to
handle millions of services per second. Service registration and secure data transmission being
integral part of every transaction, the cost of such computation is of utmost importance while
providing Security-As-A-Service, particularly when metering the authentication service. Below is
the latency measurement of different key-based secure-registration mechanisms. In Fig. 8, we
observe that the secure-registration latency using AES- 128 and MD5 is similar while that of
using RSA 1024 costs substantial latency (around 3 times). It is understood that public key based
(RSA 1024) authentication is better [25], but it costs more. So, we can propose that the clients
want RSA-based authentication has to be charged more. This ensures better secure-registration at
the cost of higher charge.
Fig 8. Key-based secure-registration latency
Another important feature needs to be considered is the amount of cloud resources like bandwidth
consumed while performing the security services. Based on that parameter, client is charged.
Under the similar computing environment, we have experimented with fixed data size of 37 Bytes
and found that RSA-based mechanism consumes highest bandwidth as shown in fig. 9.
Based on our experiments conducted, we can conclude that providing security-as-a-service
components like secure-registration service, cost-benefit trade-off and requirement analysis are
required. We propose that when the requirement is for high-level security, then RSA-based

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scheme, which is expensive in terms of both latency and bandwidth consumption is to deployed,
otherwise AES or MD5 based scheme is to be used. Cloud service provider would also charge
incremental for RSA-based scheme over other mechanisms, as we have shown that it is
computationally more expensive. Our analysis eases the burden of cloud service provider to meter
the security service it renders.
Fig 9. Key-based secure-registration bandwidth consumption
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the problem of security in cloud computing. This paper provides
security architecture and necessary support techniques for securing cloud computing
infrastructure. It assumes to address following challenges to provide data confidentiality for
clients / cloud users, to enable cloud information integrity and to ensure application independent
single sign-on (SSO) kind of authentication. We have emphasized the data security with the
assumption that the problem of network security or security of data at transit can be handled by
the present state-of-the-art solution. Our main focus is to describe the problems on data
confidentiality, data integrity and data authentication and our security concern aims at the cloud
user perspective. We envision that in cloud computing, cloud users or clients are most vulnerable
to different security threats. We have provided solutions to counter these threats for securing
cloud user’s data when exchanged with the cloud service provider (and processed at the cloud
service provider), among different cloud service providers and between other cloud users. We
have also used “Security-as-a-Service” as a horizontal service model to support the security
requirements of other service models like IaaS and PaaS. However, it is to be noticeable that,
cloud security research has just started its journey and it is long way to go before ensuring full-
fledged cloud security. For example, computation on encrypted data is very much essential to
provide data confidentiality from cloud security provider while allowing computation. To enable
such feature, homomrphic encryption [6 -7] is a good candidate. However, fully homomrphic
encryption incurs high computational cost and is not feasible with existing state-of-the-art cloud
hardware. There exists immense scope of research to introduce light-weight homomorphic
encryption scheme.

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[22] Hu Y., Wu W., & Cheng D (2012) “Towards law-aware semantic cloud policies with exceptions
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[25] http://support.microsoft.com/kb/257591

24
AUTHORS
Arijit Ukil is currently working in Innovation Labs, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS)
Ltd., Kolkata as a Scientist. He is primarily engaged with the research activity on Internet
of things, security and privacy and wireless networking. Before joining TCS in 2007, he
has worked as Scientist in Deference Research and Development Organization (DRDO)
for four years. He has done his B.Tech in Electronics and Telecommunication
Engineering in 2002 and currently pursuing PhD from Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra. He has
published more than 30 conference and journal papers of national and international repute. He has already
published three book chapters. He has been reviewer of a number of IEEE journals like IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology and conferences like, IEEE
VTC, IEEE WCNC. He has been invited and delivered keynote and tutorials in many international and
national conferences and symposia. He is enlisted in 2010 Marquis’ “Who’s Who” as a renowned
contributor in the field of computer science and information technology.
Debasish Jana, Ph.D. (Computer Science, Jadavpur University), is currently affiliated with
TEOCO Software Pvt Ltd, Kolkata. He obtained his M.Math (CS) degree from the
University of Waterloo, Canada, B.E. (CS) from Jadavpur University, and MBA (Finance)
from IGNOU, New Delhi. He has extensive professional experience of about twenty-six
years in IT industry including PricewaterhouseCoopers, Anshin Software, Techna,
Millenium, BFL Software. He has been serving as Visiting Faculty for more than fifteen
years at premiere institutions such as Jadavpur University, Army Institute of Management, BIT Mesra
Kolkata Campus. A Fellow Member of IETE and IE(I), Senior Member of IEEE, ACM, CSI, Dr. Jana has
authored three popular books on C++, Java and Computer Graphics published by PHI Learning. He has
authored many papers in national and international conferences and journals. He has been actively involved
in Computer Society of India Kolkata Chapter activities in several national and international conferences
including EAIT 2006, CSI-2006, CSI-RDHS 2008, EAIT 2011, EAIT 2012 as spearheading role in
Program Committee and Editorial role in the Proceedings.
Ajanta De Sarkar is working as Associate Professor in the department of Computer
Science and Engineering in Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra. She is having altogether 17
years of experience including 6 years of Industry experience. She had worked with
renowned, pioneer companies like TATA STEEL, Jamshedpur, India and Lexis Nexis Inc.,
Boston, USA as senior programmer and software developer. Having graduated from
Bethune College, University of Calcutta in B.Sc. (Mathematics) in 1993, and obtained
MCA degree in 1996 from Jadavpur University. She has been awarded PhD (Computer Science and
Engineering) from Jadavpur University in 2009. Her field of Specialization is Distributed Computing,
specifically Grid Computing. Her focused research area includes Grid Computing, Cloud Computing and
Wireless Sensor Network. She has published many reputed journal and conference papers and also selected
reviewer of a few reputed conference and journals.

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