Dissertation_Antony_Musyoka.docx.for presentation

Determining the Aviation Security Threats and Risks to Air Traffic Operations from Use
of Drone Technology in Kenya.
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master
of Science in Aviation Security.
Submission date: 17 January 2023.
(Word count: 15,528)
Antony Kamile Musyoka.
ID22028766.
Master of Science in Aviation Security.
SE705-21SBADL.
Supervisor: Rania Khbais.
I Antony Kamile Musyoka of student ID22028766 declare that this dissertation is my
original work and to the best of my knowledge, it has not been submitted in support of
an award of a degree in any other university or institution of learning, and that I am
aware of the plagiarism policy and I have not contravened it.

i
Acknowledgement
This research forms part of the two years study for a degree award of Master of Science
in Aviation Security at Buckinghamshire New University. I gratefully acknowledge the
course facilitator and supervisor Rania Khbais for relentless effort and encouragement
through the course. I express gratitude to survey participants and interviewees who
accepted to be part of the research for contributing to my education and career
development. The family and friends who encouraged and supported me during the low
moments are highly regarded.
Thank you all.
SE705-21SBADL ID22028766 Determining the Aviation Security Threats and Risks to Air Traffic
Operations from Use of Drone Technology in Kenya.

ii
Abstract
Remotely piloted aerial systems or unmanned aerial systems technology commonly
referred as drones is a proliferating invention in aviation industry. There have been
unauthorised occurrences reported at airports involving drones. These occurrences or
incidents have had severe impacts in air traffic operations at imports to extend of
closures hence raising aviation security concerns. There are inherent threats and risks
associated with drone technology. There have been limited studies conducted about the
emerging drone threats and risks over the world. However, none has ever been
conducted in Kenya. This research was conducted in Kenya to determine the aviation
security threat and risks to air traffic operations from the use of drone technology in
Kenya. The research is to inform the aviation security policies considering the identified
gaps, threats and risks associated with unauthorised operation of drones in Kenya. This
research also enriches the existing drone knowledge. An insightful evaluation into
existing literature informed the research of gaps such as regulations failure, drone
component failure and communication links vulnerability to IoT as concepts of drone
operation. Categorisation of drones, lack of technical guidelines and poor knowledge of
drone operation were revealed in literature analysis as concerns. The research utilised
mixed methods approach to conduct a cross-sectional study among ATC, pilots and
aviation security personnel. A survey of 96 questionnaires and 6 interviews were
conducted. The convergent parallel design of data analysis was performed. The results
indicated drones are widely viewed as both a threat and risk in Kenyan aviation sector.
Most pilot respondents viewed drones as a threat. Hobbyists and commercial users
were unanimously categorised as aviation security risk. Airborne collision with manned
aircraft or other drones was found as a major risk. Bombing aircrafts, spying and
espionage, unlawful interference, delivery of explosives and launching biochemical
weapons were discovered as the threats associated with terrorism utilising drone
capabilities. Results found moderate impact to general aviation and equality between
moderate and greater impact to international and regional air traffic operations.
Respondents considered lack of awareness and training, ignorance and non-
compliance as causal factors in drone unauthorised drone occurrences. The regulations
were considered inadequate. The use of media will assist in drone education. As

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training and awareness increases perceptions change, therefore continuous research
required.
Table of Contents page
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….……...1-5
2. Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………..…
6
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..6-7
2.2 Drone Risks.....................................................................................................…...7-
15
2.3 Drone Threats………………………………………………………………………….15-20
2.4 Kenya in Context of Drones………………………………………………………..….20-
22
2.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………………….23-24
3.0 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………25-29
4.0 Analysis and Finding………………………………………………………………………
30
4.1 Quantitative Analysis…………………………………………………………………..30-
50
4.2 Qualitative Analysis………………………………………………………...………….51-
56
4.3 Finding…………………………………………………………………………………..56-
58
5.0 Discussion……………………………………………..……………………………….59-61
6.0 Challenges and Limitation……………………………………………………………..
….62

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6.1
Challenges………………………………………………………………………………….62
6.2 Limitation……………………………………………………………………………………
62
7.0 Conclusion…………...…………………………………………………………………63-
66
8.0 Recommendation………………………………………………………………………66-
67
9.0 Reference List…………...……………………………………………………………..68-
77
List of Figures
page
Figure 1 FAA reported drone incidences………………………………………………………
8
Figure 2 Drone incidences in Europe for year 2014 to 2020…………………...
…………….9
Figure 3 FAA prediction of drone usage………………………………………………………
9
Figure 4 Drone categorisation and operation in
India……………………………………….10
Figure 5 Drone operations category and associated
risk…………………………………..11

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Figure 6 Drone areas to minimise risks………………………………………………………
14
Figure 7 Drones registered……………………………………………………………………
21
Figure 8 Drone incidences reported within area of interest for research…………………
22
Figure 9 Mixed method data analysis approach applied……………………………………
28
Figure 10 Gender
composition………………………………………………………………..31
Figure 11 Gender composition by
profession……………………………………………….31
Figure 12 Composition per
profession……………………………………………………….32
Figure 13 Professional years of experience…………………………………...
…………….32
Figure 14 Airport of operation…………………………………………………………………
33
Figure 15 Drone awareness at
work………………………………………………………….34
Figure 16 Experienced drone occurrence……………………………………………………
35
Figure 17 Drone visibility……………………………………...
……………………………….36
Figure 18 Common drone
category…………………………………………………………..37

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Figure 19 Drones in aviation security………………………………………………………..38
Figure 20 Level of threat, risk or both……………………………………………………….39
Figure 21 Level of threat, risk or both per profession……………………………………..40
Figure 22 Drone sighting causes aviation security anxiety……………………………….41
Figure 23 Impact level of drone sighting……………………………………………….
…….42
Figure 24 Interfering with lawful drones by malicious people………………………………
43
Figure 25 IoT and drone
threat………………………………………………………………..43
Figure 26 Possibility of terrorist using
drones……………………………………………….44
Figure 27 Hobbyist and commercial drone user category in Avsec………………………
45
Figure 28 Familiarity of drone regulations amongst responders………………………….46
Figure 29 Adequacy of drone regulations……………………………………………………
47
Figure 30 Awareness of regulations to public and drone
users…………………………...48
Figure 31 Adequacy of regulations in training and
certification…………………………….49

vii
List of Tables
page
Table 1 Registered drones in Kenya as at end of June
2022……………………………..21
Table 2 Reported drone incidences over five years…………………………………………
22
Table 3 Professional years of experience……………………………………………………
32
Table 4 Showing results for drone
visibility………………………………………………….35
Table 5 Showing results on common drone categorisation……………………………….36
Table 6 Drones in aviation
security…………………………………………………………..37
Table 7 Level of threat, risk or
both…………………………………………………………..38

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Table 8 Level of threat, risk or both per
profession………………………………………….39
Table 9 Impact level of drone
sighting……………………………………………………….41
Table 10 Categorisation of hobbyists and commercial drone users………………………
45
Table 11 Familiarity of drone regulation amongst
responders…………………………….46
Table 12 Qualitative analysis……………………………………………………………..51-55
10.0 Appendices
List of Appendices
page
Appendix A: Ethics and Checklist
form………………………………………………………..A

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Appendix B: Interview Consent forms…………………………………………………………
A
Appendix C: Questionnaire Consent
form…………………………………………………….A
Appendix D: The Questionnaire……………………………………………………………….A
Appendix E: Semi-structured Interview Guide Questions…………………………………..A
Appendix F: R-software Analysis Codes…………………………………………….
………..A
Appendix G: Micro-soft Excel Sheet for
Analysis…………………………………………….B
Appendix H: Information Sheet………………………………...………………………………
B
Appendix I: Consent Statement
form………………………………………………………….B
Appendix J: Sample of interview text for participant 2 and
3………………………………..B

x
Glossary
AGL Above Ground Level
AIP Aeronautical information Publication
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider
AVSEC Aviation Security
ATC Air Traffic Control
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
DSS Decision Support System
EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EU European Union
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
IATA International Air Transport Association
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KAA Kenya Airports Authority
KCAA Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
KCARs Kenya Civil Aviation Regulations
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense systems
PwC Pricewaterhouse Coopers

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RPAS Remotely Piloted Aerial System
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
SARPs Standards and Recommended Procedures
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
UA Unmanned Aircraft
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK United Kingdom
US United States
UTM UAS Traffic Management
VLOS Visual Line Of Sight

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1.0 Introduction
The existence of humans has been characterised by innovations and technological
developments over centuries. Every day the human mind is actively discovering new
sophisticated developments to assist in making work easier. However, the fast technical
development and innovations may outpace the regulations determining the use of
technological products out of curiosity making drastic changes in modernised society
(Chiper et al., 2022). The technology is moving so fast to keep up with its usage
(DeFrangesco and DeFragensco, 2022). The world has become a socially connected
village, which may be referred to as ‘a global village’ due to utilisation of social platforms
using the newest advanced technological achievement (Lesnikowski, 2021). Information
and trend of events circulate in all parts of the world within seconds (Fox, 2021).
Similarly, Aviation industry that is characterised by sophisticated integrated systems; is
experiencing a technological revolution (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018) in
development of autonomous automated systems commonly referred to as drones
(DeFrangesco and DeFreangesco, 2022).
The word ‘drone’ naturally refers to a male bee whose function is to mate with the
queen bee (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018). The nature considers this a luxurious
work compared to worker bees. Therefore, these bees hover or idle around the queen
bee awaiting mating (DeFrangesco and DeFrangesco, 2022). Using this analogy, the
autonomous technological systems loitering (Cortright et al., 2017) or hovering around a
place while awaiting the right time to execute their task or while performing their tasks
have gained popularity as drones. However, other technical terms such as UAV, UA,
UAS, RPV and RPAS used in different research papers, articles, books and
organisations refer to these autonomous unmanned systems (Chiper et al., 2022;
EASA, 2021; ICAO, 2015). ICAO (2015) adopted the word RPAS to mean, ‘a remotely
piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and control
links and any other components as specified in the type design’. In this paper, the ICAO
definition is adopted and the word drone, RPAS, UAV, UA and UAS are used
interchangeably.

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In history of drones, the use of UA dates back to ancient Greece where Archytas
developed a steam powered mechanical bird that flew for 200 meters and Chinese used
kites and balloons to attack enemies from the air (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018;
DeFrangesco and DeFrangesco, 2022). The history also acknowledges Montgolfier
brothers of Paris for carrying out a free flight of hot air balloon in 1783 (De Miguel-
Molina and Santamarina-Campos, 2018; DeFrangesco and DeFrangesco, 2022).
Through early years, crude UA were used to launch attacks against enemies; for
example, in 1818, a French soldier designed a timed aerial balloon, attack of Venice by
Australians in 1849 and during the American Civil war in 1863 and Charles Perley used
a hot-air balloon with explosives to attack enemies. Douglas Archibald a British
meteorologist took aerial pictures with cameras on balloon in 1887 while in 1898 US
used cameras mounted on kites for reconnaissance during the Spanish-American war
(Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018). Therefore, the idea of UA existed much earlier until
120 years later when the Wright brothers invented a controlled flight in 1903 (De Miguel-
Molina and Santamarina-Campos, 2018). However, it took another 11 years for the first
commercial passenger flight to take-off in 1914. Since then, there has been massive
developments on technology and increased air traffic volumes of manned commercial
flights while UA developed alongside at a much slower rate and only restricted to
military operations (De Miguel-Molina and Santamarina-Campos, 2018). It was after the
9/11 incident when the drone usage gained popularity in the public after weaponising for
targeted killing of terrorists by the US (Cortright et al., 2016).
The drone technology has highly gained use in the 21st
century in different sectors such
as agriculture, transportation and delivery, construction, military, news media and film
production, energy, mining, terrorist groups and hobbyists (Plioutsias et al., 2018;
Anon,2018; Chiper et al., 2022). Therefore, it is crucial to recognise the pioneers of the
present-day drone technology and proliferation. The main feature of a drone is the
ability for remote control by messages transmitted through electromagnetic waves
(Floreano and Wood, 2015; Hodgkinson and Johnstone, 2018). James Clerk Maxwell in
1865 proposed the theory of electromagnetic waves that Heinrich Hertz proved through
experimentation. Oliver Joseph in1894 explored the Herzian waves and realised their
ability to transmit messages. Consequently, in 1895 the first radio-transmitted signals

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were realised by Chandra Bose whereas Guglielmo Marconi achieved over 2.4
kilometres transmission of radio signals in 1896 (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018).
These inventions are the base of modern RPAS.
Initially drone operations were restricted for basic surveillance in military operations
(Cortright, 2017) and their disruptions to operations of manned air traffic remained a
speculation for years (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018). However, with technological
advances there has been proliferation for use in common public (Huttunen, 2019). The
increased use of UAV technology is associated with increasing conflicts between
manned traffic and between drones (Holcombe, 2018). Lesnikowski (2021) while
examining threats from cyberspace realised the use of drone as a rapidly evolving
technological threat to aviation security. Similarly, Plioutsias et al. (2018) explored drone
hazards in which the study indicated increased risk of collision from proliferated drone
use and security challenges. EASA (2021) mirrored drone operations as both a risk and
threat to air traffic operations with massive disruptions. These disruptions are costly to
airlines, citizens, governments, airports and other stakeholders (EASA, 2021; Chiper et
al., 2022). De Miguel-Molina and Santamarina-Campos (2018) considered drone
operations more of a risk to air traffic while Chavez and Swed (2020) as threat where
terrorists have recognised an opportunity. However, Huttunen (2019) remarked drones
as risks and threat with possibility of unlawful interference. Salamh et al. (2019) affirmed
increased use of drones by criminals posing a threat to air traffic operations. Clothier et
al. (2015) referred to UAS as a noticeable emerging risk in aviation security. Therefore,
drone operations are examined as threats and risks by different authors with respect to
aviation security affecting air traffic operations. Cabinet office (2013) explained threat
as an intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse consequences to
human welfare, that is malicious use of drones (Chavez and Swed, 2020), whereas
risks as a potential of emergency assessed from likelihood and impact, that is potential
of emergency (EASA, 2021). Therefore, the threat and risk nature of drone operations
to aviation security affecting air traffic operations is investigated in the research.
Recently, there has been increased drone incidences reported by pilots, airport security
and air traffic operations personnel. These incidences with manned traffic have caused

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uproar in the public about the security of air traffic operations (Plioutsias et al., 2018;
Leskinowki, 2021; EASA, 2021). Chiper et al. (2022) listed some incidences such as; on
17/04/2016, a police UAV collided with Airbus A320 at Heathrow Airport in London UK,
a black hawk helicopter collided with a civilian UAS on 21/09/2017 at Staten Island in
US. At Jean Lesage airport in Canada, a Beach King Air collided with a UAV on
12/10/2017. In Mexico’s Tijuana airport a Boeing 737-800 reported a drone strike on
13/10/2018, in China a young 23-year-old was arrested taking footage with a drone near
landing airplanes at Hangzhou Xiao Shan airport while in New Zeeland Auckland airport
a Boeing 777-200 on final approach was in close proximity to a UAV on 25/03/2018.
The most famous act of drone incidence was the Gatwick UAV invasion in UK on
19/12/2018 (Chiper et al., 2022; EASA, 2021). Terrorists also have gained use of
drones, which is an imminent threat; on 10/02/2021 Yemen, rebels crashed a drone with
explosives on Airbus A320 at Abha airport in Saudi Arabia (DeFrangesco and
DeFrangesco, 2022). These incidences happen across the world posing threats and
risks to air traffic operations.
Some countries have banned use of drones completely in their territories (DeFrangesco
and DeFrangesco, 2022) due to complexity of drone operations and lack of regulations.
Kenya is not an exception; drone operations have been sighted operating without
authorisation.
Triggered by the proliferated incidences of drones and the imminent threats and risks
(EASA, 2021) and guided by Sauder’s research onion (Saunders et al., 2019) this
research paper seeks to determine the aviation security threat and risk to air traffic
operations from the use of drone technology in Kenya. This research will benefit
aviation security and ANSP to develop procedures to integrate drones in airspace with
harmony as well enrich knowledge in drone operations study to mitigate risks and
potential threat to civil aviation (EASA, 2021). Denscombe (2019) emphasised the
importance of an aim and objectives to guide the research. Therefore, the aim of this
research paper is to understand why the proliferated UAV operations are an aviation
security threat and risk to air traffic operations in Kenya. The research paper is guided

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by the following objectives: 1) to evaluate drone threats and risks based on concept of
operation and internet of things in aviation security in context of drone incidences.
2) To analyse the reported drone operations incidences in Kenyan airspace for a period
of five years dated 01/07/2017 to 30/06/2022 to determine their threat and risks to air
traffic operations.
3) To evaluate air traffic personnel, pilots and aviation security personnel views on
threats and risks posed by drone operations by questionnaires and interviews.
Air traffic personnel provide air traffic services that is, flight information service, alerting
service, air traffic advisory and air traffic control services for safe, secure and efficient
operation of flights in the airspace while pilots operate the flights. Aviation security
personnel ensure safe and secure environment by safeguarding aviation against acts of
unlawful interference (ICAO Annex 2, 2005; Annex 17, 2020).

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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Examining the existing literature on the topic under research is an important exercise to
inform the researcher about theories and themes discussed by other authors (Hart,
2005) on which the research is supported. This chapter evaluates the available
literature on drone operations tailored on the subject of the research. Therefore, the
threats and risks associated with drone operations are evaluated with respect to air
traffic operations in the context of aviation security. A threat is simply a malicious intent
to cause harm, destruction or disrupt an operation (Chavez and Swed, 2020) which is
the motive of criminals and terrorist groups targeting aviation sector for impactful
outcome (Prince and Forest, 2016). The technology is versatile giving an opportunity for
exploration by maliciously motivated individuals or groups to use drones for attacks
(Salamh et al., 2019; Lesnikowski, 2021; DeFrangesco and Defrangesco, 2022).
The potential of a drone operation causing an emergency, the probability and impact of
the event is the risk (Cabinet office, 2013; EASA, 2021), which may happen from
oblivious operators (Chiper et al., 2022). Therefore, as Saunders et al. (2019)
highlighted examining literature in themes for criticality in achieving both vertical and
horizontal validation of the research, this chapter discusses the risks followed by threats
in drone operations as themes appearing in secondary sources. The concept of
operations which refers to the technologies in control and collision avoidance, missions
and applications, the links of communication, human operator ability and onboard
equipment for autonomy that is IoT and categorisation in risk of operation are discussed
as well (Weibel and Hansman, 2005; Hussain et al, 2021). Incidences involving drones
are illustratively used for emphasis in the discussion of threats and risks. During the
secondary research, a combination of different words such as drone and threat, UAV,
RPAS, UAS, UA, drone risk and drone incidences were utilised to access peer-reviewed
journals, books, conference proceedings and available government laws and

7
regulations. Databases such as BNU online library, Wiley online library, PubMed,
Google scholar, Research gate and other academic databases were explored for
secondary materials. Besides, a relative comparison of Kenya in the context of drone
operations such as regulations, registration and incidences with other countries
appears. The inclusion-required sources written in English language while exclusion
involved secondary sources less than ten years old in publication since drone
proliferation has been observed for last decade and recent years (Huttunen, 2019;
Chiper et al, 2022). However, few sources found relevant to the research and older than
ten years have been cited. The discussion is exclusive of military drone applications
since they operate off civilian traffic (Vachtsevanos and Valananis, 2014). Although,
they are the genesis of revolution in current drone technology (Cortright, 2017). The
civilian and non-state group users of drones are focused in the evaluation since they are
majorly the subjects or risks and threats. There was no specific continent preferred for
source information since drone is a new technology universally challenging aviation
security in airports and air traffic operations (Wendt et al., 2020). The evaluation is
therefore, not subjective but objective to the research topic and concerns in aviation
security for its development.
2.2 Drone Risks
The world operates in a global information community that is surrounded by a climate of
uncertainties, challenges and risks (Lesnikowski, 2021). As the older challenges persist,
Fox (2021) argued that there is ceaseless development of new provocations that
intensify risks especially in aviation security. Vachtsevanos and Valavanis (2014)
observed that the year 2013 marked revolution in the use of UA amongst civilians
thereby increasing risks to manned aircraft operations. Clothier et al. (2015) remarked
drone operations as an emerging risk to manned aircraft operations. Regulators view
RPAS as an air traffic risk with operators yelling at aviation authorities for approvals and
prompt feedbacks (Hodgkinson and Johnson, 2018). DeFrangesco and DeFrangesco
(2022) affirmed the continued drone operations taking aviation into storms of disruptions
in air traffic operations because of increased civilian use.

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The US reported increased number of UAS usage with 865,505 registered as of March
31, 2022 (FAA, 2022) receiving approximately 100 incidences a month (Huttunen,
2019). Germany reported an upward trend in drone incidences from 2015 at 14 to
cumulatively 158 in 2018 (Wendt et al., 2020; Huttunen, 2019). This represents a three-
year period with active drone usage posing risks. Similarly, PWC (2022) observed
increasing trend in drone usage among civilians with estimated 900,000 drone
operations in the UK by 2030 where the CAA report (2022) indicated 500,000-drone
registration by April 2022.
Figure 1: FAA reported drone incidences (Lykou et al, 2020)
This is an indication of proliferation of drones even in other countries within civilian
population that increases the risks to air traffic (Clothier et al., 2015). The technological
advancement in production of small sized, affordable and more capacitated UAVs has
gained popularity in sectors such as recreation and commercial uses (Feller, 2022;
Chavez and Swed, 2020; Bunse and Plotz, 2018). These technological devices find
themselves in hands of oblivious operators. For this reason, EASA (2021) report on
drone incident management at vicinity of airports examined causes of drone incidences
and pointed three principal classes of offenders that is; those with criminal or terrorist
motive, gross negligence and non-criminal incentive. The non-criminal offenders
comprise of clueless and careless drone users that is; completely oblivious individuals
and those aware of regulation but breach without intent of harm or disruption of air

9
traffic operations. The gross negligence violations involve reckless and activists or
protesters who disrupt air traffic operations for selfish gain without intention of
endangering lives. However, criminal or terrorists’ intent and plan to utilise drone to
cause destruction of property and loss of live with maximum impact (Chiper et al., 2022;
EASA, 2021). Regardless of the offender category, it is practically difficult to identify a
drone due to its size (Holcombe, 2018) and more arduous to ascertain the motive or
intention of the drone operator during an incident (EASA, 2021) which is a perplexing
aviation security risk occurrence. Consequently, different aviation authorities have
developed restrictive procedures to mitigate risks. For instance, KCARs Legal Notice.42
(2020) prohibits negligence and recklessness in drone operation where these are
described as operations endangering other aircraft, property, persons, or around
prohibited and restricted areas published in AIP, around tactic installations such as air
navigation facilities, communication masts and cables, prisons, courts, schools,
hospitals etc.
Figure 2: Drone incidences in Europe for year 2014 to 2020 (EASA, 2021)

10
Figure 3: FAA prediction of drone usage (Hatfield et al., 2020)
Under the UAS concept of operation, aviation authorities categorise drones differently to
determine their risk (De Miguel-Molina and Santamarina-Campos, 2018).
Regulation EU 2019/947 (2022) identifies the open, specific and certified category. The
open category is associated with low risk, specific category with higher risk while
certified category equates to manned traffic risk in operations. On the other hand,
KCARs Legal Notice.42 (2020) categorised drone operations into category A, B and C,
in which A is associated with low or minimal risks, B attributed to medium or regulated
lower risk and C high-risk equivalent of manned traffic to other traffic operations. The
classification is similar broadly to three with identical risk grouping as well as limitation
of operations set at not above 400ft AGL within 50 meters at VLOS and maximum
weight of 25 Kg for Open or A category. These regulations are as well, mirrored in New
Zealand (Hunderson, 2022).
Figure 4: Drone categorisation and operation in India (Chamuah and Singh, 2021)
However, KCARs Legal Notice.42 (2020) requires all operators to have a certificate of
operation and prior approvals for operation whereas EU 2019/947 (2022) does not
require approval for Open category. De Miguel-Molina and Santamarina-Campos (2018)
observed differences in weight categorisation of drones in different countries and

11
advocated for risk consideration rather than weight in solving drone problems.
Notwithstanding regulations, drone incidences have previously caused major air traffic
disruptions (Chiper et al., 2022) with risk of collisions and near misses (Clothier et al.,
2015). The swift evolution in drones technology and their multiplicity is a provocation in
their regulation to risk assessors, air space users and procedure designers (Hodgkinson
and Johnson, 2018). The incidences call for continuous aviation security risk reviews
and regulations for inclusivity of drones within air traffic operations to minimise
incidences and security challenges (Holcombe, 2018).
Figure 5: Drone operations category and associated risk (EASA, 2021)
Feller (2022) argued that as the complexity and capability of drone technology
diversifies the vulnerabilities for security risks to air traffic operations are bound to
increase. Clothier et al. (2015) examined risk perceptions of drones where they were
associated with risk of colliding with manned traffic thereby harming people on-board or
crashing on a populated area such as an airport that may cause traffic disruption.
Further, Clothier et al. (2015) established poor knowledge of procedures in drone
technology operation among public. This explains proliferated drone incidences as
indicated in EASA (2021) report prior to Covid-19. Generally, the public perceived

12
drones as a risk especially to security compared to conventional manned traffic (Clothier
et al., 2015) which spans to aviation since they operate in airspace. Hodgkinson and
Johnson (2018) argued the recreational drone operators as the most probable risk
sources for manned air traffic since they are generally not trained. For instance; the
January 2017 incident at Hangzhou airport where a 23-year-old operator flew drones
near landing traffic and New Zeeland March 25, 2018 a drone flew 5 meters close to a
Boeing 777-200 on final approach at Auckland Airport (Chiper et al., 2022). These serve
as examples in which risk of collision was imminent due to negligence or obliviousness
to aviation security. Aviation security has been characterised by incidences that invoke
reactive measures that Price and Forrest (2016) discouraged in favour of proactive
approach. Panter (2019) discussing various incidences that mark evolution of aviation
security including the famous 9/11 as the wakeup call in aviation security,
acknowledged new challenges keep evolving. Therefore, in the wake of new
technological challenges, drones are irritant worldwide (Wendt et al., 2020) to airports
and air traffic operations security. An incident at Gatwick airport in the UK in December
2018 brought attention to public about drone disruptions in which the airport was closed
for air traffic operations affecting over 140,000 passengers by cancellation of over 1,000
flights within 33 hours of closure (EASA, 2021; Wendt et al., 2020). Comparably, on
February 3, 2020 Madrid Barajas closed three runways out of four leading to diversion
of 26 flights due to drone spotting while Frankfurt airport suspension of air traffic
operations on February 8 and March 2, 2020 was due to a drone sighting (EASA, 2021).
Frighteningly, in 2020 at Andrews Air force base a drone nearly collided with Air Force
one while landing; the operator was never traced (DeFragesco and Defrangesco, 2022).
Similarly, Newark airport in US suspended flights on January 22, 2019 due to a drone
sighting (Klenka, 2019). Comparable near misses are on rise (Huttunen, 2019) and
would be disastrous in the event of collision with possible loss of lives and traffic
disruptions that is an aviation security anxiety. However, airlines and airports due to
cancellations and investigations incur financial implications. For example, the Gatwick
incidence estimated cost of €64 million (EASA, 2021) while Wendt et al. (2020) reported
€55.8 million and referred it as business risk affecting aviation security.

13
Wendt et al. (2020) evaluated the impact of drone incident on airport operations using
Frankfurt simulations analogous to 2018 Gatwick drone incidence. The evaluation
indicated major air traffic disruptions with airport closures and aviation security
violations (Plioutsias et al., 2018). Since technology is developing, Wendt et al. (2020)
endorsed investing in counter-UAV technology as viable compared to implications.
However, Holcombe (2018) on examining conflicts prevention between drones and
manned aircrafts suggested a risk mitigation through review of regulations and drone
components and structuring. Installing TCAS and ADS-B on drones will help in
integrating in the airspace with minimal incidences (Holcombe, 2018). Integrating drone
to airspace usage requires precisely defined procedures with support system (Avanzini
and Corallo, 2019).
In exploring environment for operation of drones, Avanzini and Corallo (2019) proposed
a flight planner and DSS that can map the route of the drone using mathematical
computations to determine the path, location and risk of a drone at actual time to avoid
endangering manned traffic operation. However, Bunse and Plotz (2018) examining the
security of communication protocol of drones highlighted the physical risk of drones to
aircrafts since their communication link in vulnerable to interference. Hobbyist and
amateur drone operators are susceptible to attacks in which the control is transferred to
a different user where it can be crashed on aircrafts (Bunse and Plotz, 2018;
LaFlamme, 2018; Ludwig, 2018) since some have capacity of transporting dangerous
payload (Rani et al., 2016). Wild et al. (2016; 2017) analysed 152 accidents and
incidents involving drones; 64% corresponded to loss of control due to equipment failure
posing a risk to other air traffic with human error being insignificant. The system
component failure defines the operation of RPAS that is concept of operations and
regardless of the size a drone poses serious risk to other traffic security (Wield et
al.,2016; 2017). Therefore, the technology is on development and lacks reliability
(Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018). The proliferation congests airspace hence increasing
risk of collision (Poikonen and Campbell, 2021) with aircrafts that may cause fire
explosion due to batteries’ composition. The high risk of air traffic is majorly in
metropolitan airports (Zhang et al., 2018) when an aircraft is at vicinity during take-off or
landing (Fox, 2021) due to extensive access of drones in cities that create security risk

14
and regulatory violations (Ravich, 2009). There is further risk if drone operator is
untraceable (Fox, 2017). Comstock et al. (2013) involved pilots, UAS pilots and ATC in
analysing drone impacts in airspace. The study found that they are too small to
recognise and operation in a sustained area rather than point to point increases the risk
and overwhelming workload to ATC. Therefore, using bright colours, TCAS or ADSB
can enhance the risk avoidance to air traffic. However, Hatfield et al. (2020) noted the
significant disruptions to air traffic have a solution in UTM. The UTM will support
integration of drones in the airspace with safe operation similar to ATM managing
conflicts in real time (Lin et al., 2020; Capitan et al., 2021). Comparably, Loh et al.
(2009) explained UAV as dangerous civilian undertaking that require risk management
by holistically describing a system, identifying hazards, analysing the risks and
assessing them then controlling; that is UTM. Similarly, Lykou et al. (2020) applauded
risk management with resilient plan due to proliferated UAV incidents at airports causing
aviation security challenges. Further, Lykou et al. (2020) examined counter drone
systems and recommended sensors such as visual, radar, acoustics, radio frequency
detection and electronic interdiction as helpful mitigation methods. Comparably, Sheu et
al., (2019) appraised laser and electromagnetic attacks due to increased non-
professional drones. Nevertheless, Regulation EU 2019/947 (2022) revision on easy
access for UA advocated proper planning and mapping of airspace for drone operations
to minimise risks in fulfilment of ICAO Annex 2 (2005, sec 3.1.9). The operator should
consider operational capacity of the drone and errors to define: flight geography-where
drone operates under normal procedures mapped on earth surface as flight geography
area, contingency volume mapped on earth surface as contingency area-where
contingency measures are initiated for unusual situations. The flight geography
combined with contingency volume constitutes operation volume in which drone position
in space is determined in 4D that is latitude, longitude, height and time. When the UAS
exits the operational area, it is expected to impact or crash on ground risk buffer. These
operational areas help keep track of drone and reduce aviation security risks.

15
Figure 6: Drone areas to minimize risks (Regulation EU 2019/947 EAR for UAS, 2022)
Comparably, KCARs Legal Notice.42 (2020) requires drone operators to comply with
rules of the air (KCARs Legal Notice.124, 2018), make ATC aware of their position and
operate at least 10 kilometres from aerodrome reference point of code C, D, E, F and at
least 7 kilometres from code A and B aerodromes. Aerodrome categories (ICAO Annex
14, 2018).
2.3 Drone Threat
Safeguarding aviation against acts of unlawful interference is the main objective of
ICAO Annex 17 to the Chicago convention of 1944. The objective is attainable by a
combination of measures, material and human resources (ICAO Annex 17, 2020). The
document is evolving by inclusion of measures to new threats such as cyber threat.
However, the document is yet to cover drone threat measures! Hodgkinson and
Johnston (2018) observed lack of international guidance on handling drone threat
leading to differential state measures in each airspace, which may be a loophole for
criminals and terrorist exploit. Prince and Forrest (2013, p.5) remarked, ‘In aviation
security, we must not stop moving forward in implementing proactive forms of security –
our foes are committed to their cause and we must be exceedingly committed to ours’.
EASA (2021) remarked lack of exclusive regulatory framework for unauthorised drones
in EU. Similarly, KCARs Legal. Notice 42 (2020) lacks a dedicated document for

16
unauthorised drone threats as seen with manuals for other threats such as bombs or
hijack. A drone is unauthorised when operating in disregard of regulations and violating
rules and procedures (EASA, 2021) in this case with intent of harming. Rassler (2016)
analysis explained drone as terror threat to aviation security with possible target of air
traffic dating back to decades ago when a Japan based Aum Shinrikyo group used a
drone to disperse sarin gas in Tokyo subway. Chiper et al. (2022) remarked the shifting
attention to drones as aviation security threat while Fox (2021) explained due to their
extensive utilisation and vulnerability to cyber-attacks; drones pose an emerging threat
and possibility of paralysing air traffic operations globally. The operational concept of a
commercial or recreational drone that is; size-small to detect by radar and difficult to
see, the capability for carrying payload, the vulnerability of their communication links to
interference are exploitable by malicious persons as launching tools to attack aircraft at
proximity (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018).
For example, IATA (2022) reported unlawful use of drone as aviation security threat
giving an example with January 2022 incident in UAE. Equally, in 2015 a drone almost
hit Marcel Hirscher a champion skier during skiing competition in Australia that was
believed to be under control by a malicious operator (Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018).
A comparative study of 19 small drone operations indicated their availability to civilians
is depended on price that most hobbyist can acquire while compromising embedded
security that turns to be a threat while operating due interference by malicious people
(Plioutsias et al., 2018). Air traffic is not an exception of such attempts since terrorists
have gained access to drones and explore the technology and opportunity (Chavez and
Swed, 2020), modify them to transport explosives, jammers and weapons as well as
execute attacks (Lesnikowski, 2021; Rassler, 2016). This is exemplified by a terrorist
attack on January 10, 2018 where thirteen modified drones loaded with explosives
attacked Russian bases (Lesnikowski, 2021). While studying threats from the cyber
space, Lesnikowski (2021) argued that despite their benefits drones are posing growing
threat to aviation security where non-state actors can utilise them to cause extensive
offenses such as targeted attack on landing and taking off airplanes with substantial
number of passengers. The possibility of attacking airports and airlines using drone is a
matter of time. Chiper et al. (2022) listed incidences where drone have been used

17
maliciously for a targeted killing such as; a drone landing on top of Japan’s prime
rooftop with radioactive materials in April, 2015. As well, the assassination of
Venezuelan president in August 2018 with bombs loaded on drones and assassination
of Iranians in Syria by ISIL drone of small size in October 2016. Analogously, in aviation
security context, these are incites and insights by criminals and terror groups to
actualise an attack on airlines and airports thereby disrupting air traffic operations.
Chavez and Swed (2020) examined drone threat from non-state actors such as ISIL
and Hezbollah categorised as international terror groups with interest in aviation
operations. Of course, aviation is lucrative for such groups for a massive push of their
agenda (Prince and Forrest, 2016). Analysing al-Qaeda, ISIL and Hezbollah operations,
Chavez and Swed (2020) found activities of weaponised drones used to conduct
attacks such as Rezwan Ferdaus plans to explode drones over pentagon house.
Remarkably, Hezbollah conducted several drone surveillances in Israel airspace. In
2017, ISIL reported to have conducted approximately 60-100 weaponised drone
attacks. Aramco oil facility in Saudi Arabia attacked by use of a drone in September
2019 demonstrates the threat and impact a drone is posing to critical structures such as
airports and air traffic operations (Chavez and Swed, 2020). In context of aviation
security and air traffic operations, non-state actors have realised an opportunity to
paralyse air traffic operations using Commercial UAV to extend of shutting down
airports.
Chavez and Swed (2020) reported such plans unearthed by intelligence such as
Germany and Spain. Moreover, many drones do not have security encryption thus can
be used as attack line (Feller, 2022). Hobbyist drone under interference by malicious
people may be used to catalyse incidents such as engine failures by directing them to
aircraft engine (Chavez and Swed, 2020). Analogously, Shvetsov and Shvetsova (2017)
examined bomb-carrying UAV against high-speed rail transport. In the course of
examination, MI5 and Russian special service reported terrorist high technical sub-
division exploring the use of bomb-carrying drones as attack tools. The division exploits
the inexpensiveness, the internet ordering and obscurity of such devices from camera
surveillance (Shvetsov and Shvetsova, 2017). Therefore, air traffic is not different from
high-speed rail transport for such a threat method to apply from malicious actors.

18
Rassler (2016) comparative investigation into drone threat revealed extensive
ownership of drone technology among terror groups and criminally motivated persons.
Motivation from different ideologies such as irredentism, right wing or apocalyptic
explore the use of drone to push their ideas. Despite the challenge of payload,
endurance and range of small commercial drones due to battery constraints (Rojas et
al., 2021), the non-state and criminal groups utilise their availability and structural
modifiability to achieve their objective of weaponising them. A drone offers a penetrative
method from traditional barriers such as screening since it can be operated remotely
even with smart phones, ability of launching from places such as oceanic platforms and
hovering over-time awaiting the opportunistic moment (Rassler, 2016). Additionally,
through internet of drones many are integrable for a specific mission (Allouch et al.,
2021; Gharibi et al., 2016). Illustratively, Rassler (2016) examined fifteen different cases
of drones under non-state actors in which drones have been experimented and yielded,
which is an indication of a time bomb for aviation security by attack on air traffic. A
harmless demonstration of the capability of a drone by one person requires only a little
imagination of a criminal or terror group to utilise it for threatening motive. For example,
a tired farmer in Japan converted the remotely controlled helicopter to a crop duster. If
this concept is utilised by a malicious person to spray deadly agent at an airport all
operations will shut down with casualties. Comparably, 900g of weaponised anthrax a
payload a drone can lift may infect approximately 1.5 million people with 100,000
casualties if dropped from 100 meters upwind of a city! (Rassler, 2016; Huttunen, 2019).
This assents the Shvetsov and Shvetsova (2017) evaluation of bomb –carrying drones
that may be used as attack vectors (Feller, 2022). This makes drones the most current
overwhelming challenge to aviation security (Zaleski, 2018) referred as threat from
above (Wild et al., 2016; 2017).
Huttunen (2019) argued the subjectivity of drones to unlawful interference as they
proliferate which is considered aviation security threat. Salamh et al. (2019) attributed
such interference to the operational concept of drone relying on vulnerable
communications links. Criminals may infiltrate even authorised airport drones to cause
harm to aviation operations (Lesnokowski, 2021; Huttunen, 2019; Fox, 2017). According
to Barbeau et al. (2022), drone technology is multifaceted in its use. Needless of their

19
benefits, they are dangerous threat to aviation security under malicious operator who
may attack airports in proximity. Therefore, Barbeau et al. (2022) opined countering the
threats through spot and follow- to determine the infringement point, size, the structural
appearance that assist to determine the intentions of the operator. The riposte to assist
in determining the response measures. However, in case of swarm drones the response
is more challenging and may be equipped with adaptive sensors (Barbeau et al., 2022).
The susceptibility of spoofing attacks on drones may be resolved by use of camera
sensors able to detect any attack and rely a message to the operator (Davidovich et al.,
2022). Sadly, such a feature enables malicious drone operators to detect when under
surveillance thus persistence of the threat. However, Khan et al. (2022) examined a
sensor fusion method as hybrid of the single detection methods such as acoustics,
radar, radio frequency detection and visual since single method is not exhaustive. A
combination of these are considered to increase reliability and robustness of the
system. While many researchers examined the operational concept vulnerability of
drone threat, Altawy and Youssef (2016) included the physical vulnerability such as
theft. Such an act exposes the device to criminals who modify them for a malicious act.
Additionally, the information collected from a stolen drone if is a security operative drone
around the airport may be used to study the loopholes for an attack by criminals
(Hussain et al., 2021).
The internet of Things (IoT) exposes commercial users and hobbyists to jamming,
spoofing, key logging and malicious information gathering by criminals and non-state
actors (Hussain et al., 2021). Consequently, Hussain et al. (2021) examined the elliptic
curve cryptography to secure operations from non-state infiltration that would possibly
be used to attack air traffic operating in vicinity. The three-element method involves
integration of the user mobile, biometrics and password authentication (Hussain et al.,
2021). On the hand, Jamil et al. (2022) examined a method to detect malicious drones
to avoid attack to critical infrastructure such as airports. The vision transformer is based
on machine learning and computer vision. The use deep learning enables vision
transformer to differentiated images of malicious drones from birds, other drones and
airplanes with accuracy of 98.3%. Compared to existing diffusion-convolutional neutral
networks with a score of 93.5%, the vision transformer proves better to diffuse drone

20
threat (Jamil et al., 2022). For bomb-carrying drones, Shvetsov and Shvetsova (2017)
proposed the use of jammers installed on prospective target that protect against radio-
activated explosives and drone signals. Israel for example, experiencing frequent drone
threat incursions in the airspace has developed a strong anti-drone system such as the
Iron Domes (Chavez and Swed, 2020) and precautions due to past attempts of shoot
down such as the November 28,2002 Mombasa incident against Israeli Arkia airline
(Sweet, 2008; Klenka, 2019) currently may be launched from a drone. Notably, since
the December 2018 Gatwick incidence of drone threat and stalling of air traffic
operations, drone detection and defense systems have been on the rise (Chiper et al.,
2022). Various methods against drone threat such as Geofencing, spoofing-imitative
signals, lasers to blind cameras, jamming, magnetic and electromagnetic pulse to
destroy drone communication links, missiles, acoustics, radar, Radio Frequency
detection, water cannons, guns, shooting nets, prey birds to attack drones and
interceptor drones to cause a forced landing have been utilised at airports (Chiper et al.,
2022; Lykou et al., 2020; Klenka, 2019). However, Holcombe (2018) proposed
establishing free flight rules, equipping drones with transponders, ADS-B and traffic
avoidance systems while Lesnowski (2021) suggested airstrips within airports for
security operating drones. However, a single counter measure is incomplete for
exhaustive drone threat diffusion (Khan et al., 2022). Although the absence of common
standards for counter measures offers varied reliability and effectiveness (Lykou et al.,
2020), a mixed counter measure (Chiper et al, 2022) referred as hybrid or sensor fusion
method (Khan et al., 2022) involving a combination of drone detection methods is
plausible to maximise the neutralisation. Klenka (2019) remarked that a safer security
measure against a threat involves a combination of methods.
2.4 Kenya in Context of Drones
Kenya is an East African country and a member of ICAO as a signatory to the Chicago
convention of 1944 wherein it hosts the East African and South African regional office
(ICAO, 2022). Aviation in the country is growing and faces challenges like any other
state. For example, a remarkable incidence in the country’s aviation occurred on 28

21
November 2002 when an attempt to shoot down an Israeli bound commercial airliner
with 271 passengers from Mombasa Moi international airport by use of shoulder-
launched MANPADS failed (Sweet, 2008; Prince and Forrest, 2016; Klenka, 2019). In
the wake of drone technology, such an attempt launched from a drone is a possibility
(Klenka, 2019; Lesnikowski, 2021) and cannot be over-looked. Therefore, the Civil
Aviation Authority established the KCARs Legal Notice No.42 in 2020 to assist in
regulating and guiding the operations of drones in its airspace. Defrangesco and
Defrangesco (2022) observed that some countries banned drone within their airspace
due to threats and risks involved and lack of regulations, this was the case for Kenya
until 2020 when regulations were established. The registration of drone commenced
April 2020 and as at June 2022, 260 drones were registered while others were on
registration process, 10 UA training organisations, 12 remote air operator certificates
and 9 UAS approved resellers and distributors (KCAA, 2022).
Period Drone registered
April –December 2020 70
January –December 2021 120
January –June 2022 70
Table 1: Registered drones in Kenya as at end of June 2022.
Figure 7: Drones registered.

22
However, many hobbyist and small entertainment enterprises obliviously operate
without registration. Consequently, unauthorised incidences have been reported as
early as May 1, 2017 when a drone was sighted within four nautical miles of final
approach at Jomo Kenyatta international airport (KCAA, 2022) at the time drone
operation was illegal. Others reported within Wilson and Jomo Kenyatta airports are
tabulated below. Other airports such as Malindi and Diani in Kenya reported two
incidences each in the years 2022 and 2021 respectively resulting to 12 incidences for
five years. However, none of the operators has ever been arrested or drone impounded
due to difficulty of locating them (EASA, 2021).
Year Airport incidence reported
Wilson Jomo Kenyatta Total
2017/2018 0 1 1
2018/2019 0 1 1
2019/2020 1 0 1
2020/2021 2 2 4
2021/2022 1 0 1
Total reported
incidences
4 4 8
Table 2: Reported drone incidences over five years.

23
Figure 8: Drone incidences reported within area of interest for research.
The data shows an upsurge of registration after establishment of regulations in 2020,
which explains the number of incidences in the year 2020/2021. Kenya does not
produce drones; therefore, the drone activity is lower compared to developed states and
due restrictions for importation of such technology. However, there is indication of
significant unauthorised drone activity in vicinity of airports, which is an aviation security
threat and risk to air traffic operations. These airports are within Nairobi city and aligns
with Zhang et al. (2018) observation where airports near cities experience more aviation
security violations by drones.
2.5 Summary
The literature has evaluated drones as threat and risk to aviation security precisely as
disruption to air traffic operations. Different authors differ in evaluations where some
consider drone as a risk while others as a threat. However, some authors such as
Lesnikowsiki (2021), Fox (2021), and EASA (2021) among many others consider drone
both as a risk and as threat. From the literature, many materials in 2018 explore drone
as an attack vector through cyber interference due to their operational concept; that is
the vulnerability of the interface between UAS pilot and the UAS exploitable by

24
malicious persons to commit a crime. IoT exposes the link of communication for
interference and component failures associate to most incidences. Moreover, the
incidences involving drone as aviation security threat and risk emerged mostly in 2018
from which a lot of literature is written triggered by the December 2018 Gatwick
incidence which in the phase of technology is analogous to 9/11 turn of events.
Consequently, the literature evaluation considered risks as well as threats separately
followed by Kenyan experience with drones.
Across the world, there has been upward surge in registration of drones that has
witnessed increased incidences. The manufacturing of small and cheap drones with
compromised security features makes them available to many interested people. ICAO
annex 17 lacks guideline and recognition of drone threat and risk to aviation operations.
Therefore, lack of robust regulations for drones leading to ban of drones in some
countries. However, some such as UK, EU, US, India and Kenya managed to have
regulations during the proliferation. Although, there is ununiformed categorisation of
drones cutting across regulating authorities. Therefore, a loophole and limitation for
international drone use. For example, the Kenyan categorisation groups drones to A, B
and C while EU categorises them as open, specific and certified each category
associated with low, medium and higher risks. However, other states such US consider
25kg drone insignificant weight while in Kenya any drone regardless of weight qualifies
registration. There is need for uniformity such as the one used for categorising manned
aircraft. The drone owners and operators are oblivious especially hobbyists and small
commercially engaged drones lacking awareness. These offenders are either due to
gross negligence, non-criminal incentives or criminally or terrorist instigated due to
capabilities and invisibleness of drones. Therefore, it is definitive that as the older
challenges in aviation security persist, new ones come with advancing technology as
adversaries explore every novel method to disrupt aviation operations. Many examples
have been cited that indicate aviation security risk and threat in existence. The ability of
drones to bypass the traditional barriers to security especially in airports is a concern to
aviation security that in the event of occurrence, massive disruptions of air traffic flow by
shutting down airports, costs to passengers and stakeholders would be severe.
Additionally, possible use of drones by non-state actors and criminals as launching tools

25
has been explored. The ISIL, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda among others demonstrate
knowledge with weaponising drones which is a major emergent threat to aviation
operations owing to the operational capability of a drone. The Saudi Arabia attack on oil
facilities and use of modified drones to bomb Russian bases in Syria is a demonstration
of how well drones can attack airports and air traffic facilities. Consequently, many
security experts suggest anti-drone measures such as equipping them with TCAS and
ADS-B, jamming, spoofing, anti-drone domes, geo-fencing, radar, acoustic and radio
frequency detection among others. However, a single method is not exhaustive.
Therefore, for robustness, a hybridised method coupled with continuous review of
regulations and UTM is plausible for drone to integrate in airspace.
3.0 Methodology
A method entails the techniques and procedures utilised to collect and analyse data,
and present the finding of the study such as a questionnaire, interview or observation
while the principles of how a research should be undertaken is the methodology
(Saunders et al., 2019). Therefore, this section comprises of the structure of the
research process. The choice of an appropriate method is depended on the philosophy
and approach of the study as well as the research question pursued as guided in
Saunders’s research onion (Saunders et al., 2019). The consideration of the research

26
assumptions while formulating the question is important for the choice of the method
used since it influences the interpretations of findings (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, the
academic validity and credibility of the study is dependent on acceptable methods while
considering admissible ethics during the research (Denscombe, 2019). Hence, the
section outlines the inquiry logic, the setting and participants of the research, data
collection methods and procedures, data analysis and ethical issues.
A researcher while commencing a study either consciously or unconsciously makes
assumptions on the study, which forms the research philosophy (Burrell and Morgan,
2017). The philosophy encompasses the beliefs and any assumptions in developing the
knowledge (Saunders et al., 2012). Therefore, through epistemologically assuming the
knowledge held within human experience is reachable (Burrell and Morgan, 2017) to
solve practical problems, a pragmatic philosophy fitted the research applying
Saunders’s research onion (Saunders et al., 2019). Drone technology is considered an
emerging threat and a risk (Holcombe, 2018) whose real events occur universally in
different regions. In determining the threats and risks to air traffic operations,
pragmatism is centred on realistic outcome of ideas and valuing existing knowledge
within professionals for successful actions contributing to empirical solutions that advise
ensuing practices perceived going wrong or out of hand (Saunders et al., 2019). An
inductive inquiry is applied based on available small sample of targeted population and
research question that seeks to answer the drone threat and risks. Under inductive
approach either quantitative or qualitative method may be explored. However, Hart
(2005) appraised quantitative method where there exists comparison of variables with
large data using questionnaires while Saunders et al. (2019), appraised qualitative
method when exploring a small population using interviews. Nevertheless, there exists
simplicity when a research is identified as qualitative or quantitative (Saunders et al.,
2019; Hart, 2005). Notwithstanding a single method approach, Zina (2017) explored
mixed method approach that overcomes limitations and partiality immanent in an
individual method. Mixed method involves adding qualitative muscle onto quantitative
structure making a researcher holistic in worldview about the subject under investigation
(Zina, 2017). Comparably, Creswell (2013) exploring a mixed methods research
appraised the incorporation of both quantitative and qualitative concepts and techniques

27
for an in-depth understanding where there is small population. Informed by these
authors the research adopts a mixed method approach due to nature of the population
available. Additionally, the necessity of getting varied individual viewpoint to confirm and
explain the quantitative outcome with qualitative result informed the choice of mixed
methods (Creswell, 2013).
A research is adapted to answering a question or solving an existing problem (Saunders
and Tosey, 2013). Therefore, having the appropriate research setting and group of
participants that enable achievement of results and extensive application of findings is
paramount (Zina, 2017). The research involves drone operations as a threat and risk to
air traffic operations security within Jomo Kenyatta international airport and Wilson
airport located within Nairobi city. Wilson airport operations involve mostly general
aviation while Jomo Kenyatta airport involves most scheduled international and regional
air carrier operations (KAA, 2022). Airports and its operations are considered critical
infrastructure and security restricted whose access is limited (Huttunen, 2019).
However, the drone is by passing the conventional security barriers posing security
threat to aviation (Lesnikowski, 2021) causing massive and costly disruptions (Wendt et
al., 2020) especially to airports located within the cities where the population is high and
more opportunities of drone activity (Zhang et al., 2018) hence the choice of the two
airports. The ATC, pilots and aviation security personnel are forefront with firsthand
information during drone sighting in line of duty. This group of professionals take the
first action in case of a drone intrusion bearing in mind the probable damage (Chavez
and Swed, 2020). According to Comstock et al. (2013), ATC and pilots provide the most
relevant information about drones as well as aviation security personnel. Therefore, the
focus group of participants comprises pilots, ATC and aviation security personnel
operating in Jomo Kenyatta and Wilson airports. However, their population is small
which justifies mixed method approach (Creswell, 2013). Drone technology is an
emerging real-world problem requiring a solution by determining its operation threat and
risk (Clothier et al., 2015). To perform such a research, it requires application of action
research strategy where there is collaborative action of participants and researcher
whose origin is Kurt Lewin in 1946 (Zina, 2017). The action research seeks to change or
improve a practice or a programme, inform policies or add to knowledge of the subject

28
while addressing actual world issue (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al., 2019) which forms the
significance of the research. A research also is based on time horizon depending on
length and population involved which may either be successive independent samples
(Longitudinal) or cross-sectional (Bell and Bryman, 2022; Saunders et al., 2019). Since
this research involves a section of population for one time, it is a cross-sectional
research in time horizon (Setia, 2016).
A research is expressly defined by the primary data for its currency and ownership by
the researcher while targeting the topic under exploration (Zina, 2017). Therefore, the
methods and data collection procedures applied are crucial dependent on the
methodology applied (Saunders et al, 2019). Commonly surveys and interviews are
used in collecting primary data where quantitative and qualitative methods are in
practice respectively (Zina, 2017). However, this research utilises a mixed method
approach. Therefore, survey inform of questionnaires and interviews are adopted to
bring in both quantitative and qualitative perspective to complement each other
(Creswell, 2013; Zina, 2017, Saunders et al., 2019). The questionnaire involves a set of
questions pre-determined by the researcher for each participating respondent (Zina,
2017; Saunders et al., 2019). The questionnaires are self-completed in English
language administered in delivery and collection method due to researcher’s
accessibility to respondents (Saunders et al., 2019). A population of approximately 100
participants by questionnaires and 6 interviews are targeted. The questions are
designed informed by the literature review, utilising Lickert and Guttman scales with
open and closed questions as well as instructions with explanation where a technical
term exists (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al., 2019). Qualitatively, semi structured interviews
will be conducted in English language involving audio recording and note taking to help
in capturing opinions, experiences and viewpoints of the interviewee for plentiful
explanation (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al., 2019). In research context, an interview
involves a determined discussion between two or more people through which the
interviewer asks brief and explicit questions in simple understandable language and
keenly listens to interviewee responding (Saunders et al., 2019).

29
Data collected either through quantitative or qualitative method cannot tell anything
about the research until it goes through a structured process of interrogating and
interpreting the raw data into a meaningful information referred to as data analysis
(Zina, 2017). This reflective process involves organising and sorting the raw data,
coding and entering data to analysable format, analysing, presenting the data, and
drawing the meaning as per the research question, aim and objectives (Zina, 2017;
Saunders et al., 2019). Application of mixed methods convergent parallel analysis
design is utilised in which qualitative and quantitative results are merged for comparison
and interpretation (Creswell, 2013; Saunders et al., 2019). The R software and
Microsoft excel are used to analyse the data in which descriptive statistics and bar
graphs for quantitative data will be utilized (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al., 2019).
Figure 9: Mixed method data analysis approach applied (Creswell, 2013)
Qualitative data collected through interview is mostly verbal and text from notes during
the interview (Saunders et al., 2019). Thematic analysis is applied to identify patterns
and themes from the raw data through coding (Zina, 2019; Saunders et al., 2019). Since
words in qualitative data are powerful, a focused analysis of the content during and after
interviews (Zina, 2017) applied. However, a combination of methods such as narrative
and conversation analysis are included for comprehensives. The data is presented in
Pseudo-quantitative methods such as ratios (Zina, 2017).
A research requires handling with maximum care ensuring responsibility and integrity at
every stage (Zina, 2017). Therefore, ethics are upheld throughout the study by ensuring

30
the truth is captured without biasness while protecting the rights and well-being of the
participants (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al., 2019). Throughout the research, avoiding
illegal activities ensures legal obligation and moral obligation by observing honest,
equity and conscientiousness to participants. Informed consent from participants that
ensures competency, autonomy, anonymity and confidentiality of participants and that
participation is voluntarily without deception, coercion or inducement with the right of
discontinuing. Safety of participants by ensuring no emotional, physical or psychological
harm (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al, 2019). The research observes compliance to Data
protection regulations, Legal notice.263 (2021) of Kenya for security of participants.
The methodology section has outlined the process of the research by discussing the
enquiry logic used, setting of the research and participants included, data collection
methods and procedures, data analysis and ethical obligation of the researcher.
Inclusively, Saunders research onion as the guiding principle in choosing the method,
philosophy and approach of the research is applied. Epistemological assumptions as
the basis of pragmatic philosophy in relation to drone technology as a universal problem
to the world leading to choice of an inductive approach applies. Mixed method as a
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods within inductive approach is
discussed as appropriate due to small population available for the research as well as
its in-depth identity. The scope of the research as airports within the city is discussed
as applicable due to proliferation of drone activities near or within cities. ATC and pilots
form the participant group due to first-hand information with drone incidents as
discussed. The section features data collection methods such as questionnaires and
interviews, method of administration and conduct as well as presentation and analysis.
Ethics as a crucial part of research and a researcher’s obligation is included for integrity
and credibility of the research.
4.0 Analysis and Finding
This section involves data management from collection, recording, screening, data
cleaning and entry for analysis to meaningful information (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al.,
2019). Creswell (2013) recommendation on mixed methods was utilised in the research
where questionnaires were administered and interviews conducted for data collection.

31
Therefore, the section involves quantitative and qualitative data analysis and
representations. The research administered one hundred questionnaires of which, four
were disqualified for incompleteness during data screening and cleaning. Qualitatively,
six interviews were conducted involving two ATC personnel from each airport, a pilot
and three aviation security personnel each from regulatory department, training
department and quality control department of the airport’s authority. Descriptive
statistics and content analysis is used in analysing the quantitative data. Bar graphs, pie
charts and histograms with percentages and number values are used in data
representation and comparisons. The R-studio software is utilised in analsying the data
together with Microsoft excel. Where R-software analysis is used, the codes are
attached at the appendix section for reference. Qualitative data collected on audio
recording and note taking is analysed through narrative and conversation analysis to
identify the patterns and themes. This will compare to quantitative data confirmation
through grounded reference (Zina, 2017). Transcribed audio will be attached as
appendix for reference. Ratios will be used to represent qualitative data. The analysis
employs convergent parallel design of mixed methods approach in which, qualitative
and quantitative data is analysed separately, and results merged for comparison
(Creswell, 2013). Therefore, this section is subdivided into quantitative analysis,
qualitative analysis and findings.
4.1 Quantitative Analysis
The questionnaires were administered at Wilson and Jomo Kenyatta airports. A sample
of 96 questionnaires were analysed. Section A of the questionnaire collected
information on composition of the respondents with respect to gender, profession, years
of experience and airport of operation as described below.

32
Men Female Other
60 36 0
Figure 10: Gender composition
Figure 11: Gender composition by profession

33
Pilot ATC AVSEC
29 50 17
Figure 12: Composition per profession.
Years range 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 30+
People 21 23 25 8 8 7 4
Average= 13.71 Variance=78.57 Standard deviation=8.86
Table 3: Professional years of experience
Figure 13. Professional years of experience

34
Figure 14. Airport of operation
The data collected indicates more male gender in aviation industry with 62%
representing over half of the sample population. ATC formed a greater percentage of
the respondents with 52% while pilots and Avsec personnel contributed 30% and 18%
respectively. However, Avsec personnel showed almost equal gender with 9 males and
8 females. The airports shared almost equal respondents as seen in figure 12. The
years of experience has an average of 13.7 years. The variance of 78.57 and standard
deviation 8.86 explains how far other values are far from the average. Therefore, a
skewed data around average as figure 11 indicates.
Section B of the questionnaires sought to find out about drone experiences and views
with respect to aviation security and air traffic operations disruptions. The responses
and views are analysed below.
A question of whether the participants have ever heard or had drone operations showed
77.1% yes and 22.9% No with 74 and 22 responds respectively as figure 13 indicates.

35
Figure 15. Drone awareness at work
An open question about the feeling associated with knowledge of drone operating
during work time was responded with explanations. Analysing the content, keywords
such as risk, threat, increased workload and alertness, traffic disruptions and collisions,
undirected movement and intentions appeared repeatedly as indicated in Hodgkinson
and Johnston (2018). Most respondents expressed feeling of being in risk=30,
increased workload and alertness=26 and threat appearing 14 times while intentions of
drone occurred 11 times. Collisions appeared 8 times while air traffic disruption and
undirected manoeuvres appeared each 5 times. Therefore, anytime drone an aviation
professional is alerted of drone operation, there is increased risk, more workloads and
threat to operations (Clothier et al., 2015). A question on those participants who had
drone incidences or occurrence at work received 35.4% yes and 64.6% No equivalent
to 34 and 62 responses respectively. Figure 14 illustrates.

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Figure 16. Experienced drone occurrence
The 34 participants were required to state the action they took after having a drone
occurrence. The 34 who experienced drone occurrence, 18 were ATC, 9 pilots and 8
Avsec personnel. Analysing the actions, 14 ATC wrote a report of the incidence,
advised pilots and security agents, while one took no action. One suspended operations
while 2 others informed RPAS operation control. The 9 pilots, 6 reported to ATC and
advised other pilots while 2 pilots took avoiding action and one changed take-off
runway. The Avsec personnel have a common operation where all alerted colleagues
and security agents to initiate a search of the drone.
The possibility of sighting a drone either during the day or at night due to small size is
difficult (EASA, 2021; Hodgkinson and Johnston, 2018). Therefore, a question to find
the possibility was included the questionnaire. The results are illustrated in figure 15.
At Night During the Day
Yes No Yes No
38 58 81 15
Table 4. Showing results for drone visibility

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Figure 17. Drone visibility
The answer No received 58 and 15 responses for the night and day respectively. Those
that indicated a No, were required to give a suggestion to enhance visibility.
Consequently, 40 participants highlighted equipping drones with better navigation lights,
17 participants pointed transponders, ADS-B, TCAS, GSM and UTM enabling while
seven participants expressed brighter colours as good for visibility. States were found to
have different categorisation of drones for instance Kenya and Europe (KCARs Legal
Notice.42, 2020; EU Regulations 2019/947, 2022). Therefore, a question on common
categorisation of drones was included. The results are as below in figure 16 with 74%
as Yes and 26% as No. The values are 71 and 25 for a Yes and No respectively.
Yes 71
No 25
Total 96
Table 5. Showing results on common drone categorisation.

38
Figure 18. Common drone category
The responders were requested to give a reason or their answer whether Yes or No.
The 25 respondents for a No answer, 10 indicated states have different regulations and
requirements, 8 stated different sizes of drone have different uses, 3 explained some
drones such as toys are low risk while 4 participants indicated the use operational
capacity to categorise drones. Coincidentally, all the 71 respondents for a Yes answer
agreed on uniformity for common standards and recommended practices by ICAO to
harmonize drone operations globally. The research inquired respondents about drone
categorisation as threat, risk or a threat and risk in aviation security that may have
impact to air traffic operations. The results were as below and illustrated in figure 17.
Threat Risk Both Threat and Risk Total
10 25 61 96
Table 6. Drones in aviation security

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Figure 19. Drones in aviation security
To determine the threat, risk or both threat and risk levels, the respondents were
required to scale their answers to high, medium or low represented in red, yellow and
green colours respectively. The results are in the table below and represented in figure
18.
Level/Category Threat Risk Both Threat and Risk Total
Red =High 5 5 25 35
Yellow= Medium 5 18 34 57
Green=Low 0 2 2 4
Total respondents 10 25 61 96
Table 7. Level of threat, risk or both
Most of the respondents expressed a drone as both a threat and risk with 61 scores,
while risk followed with less than a half of the scores of threat and risk that is 25 scores.
Similarly, threat scores less than half of the risk scores. Comparatively, the view of a

40
drone as both threat and risk is six times more than threat, and two times more than
risk.
Figure 20. Level of threat, risk of both
Similarly, the results were analysed based on each professional view about drone
threat, risk or both threat and risk. The table below indicates the results represented in
figure 19.
Category ATC Pilots Avsec personnel Total
Threat 3 5 2 10
Risk 13 8 4 25
Both Threat and
Risk
34 16 11 61
Total Respondents 50 29 17 96
Table 8. Level of threat, risk or both per profession

41
The results indicate that most pilots view drone as a threat since out of the10 scores of
threat, half of them are pilots. However, the results for risk and both threat and risk are
relative to their numbers for each profession.
Figure 21. Level of threat, risk of both per profession
The respondents were requested to state some aviation risks and threats posed by
UAS. The following appeared in the answers; aircraft collisions resulting to accidents,
terrorism such as weaponising drone to shoot or launch explosives and missiles, bomb
carrying or biochemical weapon detonation, unlawful interference to cause air traffic
disruptions, spying and espionage as well as jamming.
Drones have been reported to cause air traffic disruptions and even airports being
closed (EASA, 2021; Chiper et al., 2022). To find out about drone sighting near airports
and their effects in Kenya, a question on drone sighting was included and the impact
level. The results are represented below in figure 20 and figure 21.

42
Figure 22. Drone sighting causes aviation security anxiety
Level/Airport Wilson Jomo Kenyatta Both Airports Total
3 15 19 4 38
2 20 18 6 45
1 6 3 2 10
Total 41 40 12 93
Table 9. Impact level of drone sighting
The answers for a No were 3, where one explained drones are mostly on remote places
than cities, while another explained drones fly at low altitude than can be avoided while
the other explained where apprehension exists no threat or risk.

43
Figure 23. Impact level of drone sighting
Value 1 indicates minor effect where operations continue but with caution, while value 2
describes a moderate effect, that operations not stopped but continue with difficulties
such as increased workload to pilots and ATC. Value 3 is a greater effect where
significantly affects operations by a complete stop. Wilson airport operates general
aviation and the responders felt a moderate effect for a drone sighting while Jomo
Kenyatta airport operating international and regional commercial flights indicated with
equality for moderate and greater effect. Those operating in both airports expressed a
moderate effect in case a drone in sighted within the airport.
The possibility of malicious people interfering with a lawful drone to cause aviation
security threat with a purpose of disrupting air traffic operations was answered ordinal
scale represented in figure 24. Most respondents agreed on the possible interference of
lawful drones for malicious gain.

44
Figure 24. Interfering with lawful drones by malicious people
Similarly, the utilisation of the operation link of drones through IoT was agreed as
vulnerability in drone operations that affects aviation security (Hussain et al., 2021).
Figure 25 illustrates.
Figure 25. IoT and drone threat

45
The explanations for the answers for IoT and drones, approximately 90% of a Yes
expressed the vulnerability of the new technology since it is still underdevelopment,
others that appeared are lack of security encryptions, ease of manipulation of drone
software and GPS spoofing and jamming communication links (Hussain et al.,2021).
The No answers explained UAS operate within line of sight and some are security
encrypted. Comparably, figure 26 represents the results for the possibility of terrorist
using a drone for an attack in Kenyan aviation.
Figure 26. Possibility of terrorist using drones
The research inquired the aviation security measures for a Yes answer in figure 24. The
solutions listed include;
Controlled drone licensing and maintain robust database system for quick reference
Geo-fencing of airports and installing sensors that disable drones
Continuously reviewing the regulations and create awareness among interested parties
in drones and public about UAS impacts
Background checks during vetting for drone operators
Continuous training for law enforcement and Avsec on emerging drone advancement
Designating airspace for drone operations with landing areas, routes and times of
operation.

46
Ensuring stringent law enforcement
Ensuring al drone imported to the county have serviceable transponder that is integral
with the ATC equipment
To address the hobbyists and small commercial users of drones, the responders were
required to categorise their view of either as threat or risk to aviation security and give a
reason. The results in table10 are represented in figure 27.
Category/
profession
ATC Pilots Avsec personnel Total
Threat 12 4 3 19
Risk 38 25 14 77
Total response 50 29 17 96
Table 10. Hobbyist and commercial drone user category in Avsec
Figure 27. Hobbyist and commercial drone user category in Avsec

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Therefore, from the figure hobbyist and small commercial users are a risk to aviation
security. The reasons from responders include; lack of awareness in aviation sector and
obliviousness, negligence, non-compliance to regulations and lack of training (EASA,
2021; Chiper et al., 2022).
Section C of the questionnaire inquired about UAS regulations, certification and training,
and any suggestions for integration of drones in future. The familiarity of the regulations
amongst responders, the adequacy of regulations and improvement on regulation if not
adequate was inquired. The results are as represented in figures below.
Option Response
Yes 80
No 16
Total 96
Table 11. Familiarity of drone regulations amongst responders.
Figure 28. Familiarity of drone regulations amongst responders.

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Only 17% acknowledged unawareness about the drone regulations while 83% indicated
aware of the existed of the regulations. The 17% represented a value 16, where 8 were
pilots and 8 ATC personnel.
Figure 29. Adequacy of drone regulations
The responders, who indicated a No for adequacy of regulations, were requested to
give suggestions on making them better. The answers include,
More reviews of the drones’ regulations, training, and stakeholder participation,
Training of drone operation for all airspace users,
To make sure that sensitisation and awareness campaigns are held to ensure that
every ATC and pilot is aware,
More sensitisation and regulations enforcement,
Too restrictive to operate drones in Kenya. They not practical thus may people may fly
with disregard to rules,
More regulatory awareness to any drone owners and interested parties,
Reduce charges for drones and bureaucracy for acceptability,

49
KCAA, Security organs and government agents should have a common and robust
approach with public participation,
Many grey areas, therefore more reviews and robust system available to public is
required.
An inquiry on the awareness of regulations to drone users and public yielded the results
in figure 30.
Figure 30. Awareness of regulations to public and drone users
The next question was addressing the 79% responses. The suggestions were analysed
and summarised. Notably, in every suggestion the word awareness appeared. These
are,
Do a news programme interview to discuss drones, distribute one page drones
awareness paper when ATC, pilots and drone users renew licenses, include drone in
Avsec training and crew members that must complete each year.
Awareness and sensitisation campaigns through different media platforms including
advertisements in different languages.
Free exhibitions with drone users and interested parties.
Training at subsidized fee to increased affordability

50
Security forums about drones and their impacts.
The adequacy of drones training and certification in Kenya was assessed amongst
responders whose results appear in figure 31 below.
Figure 31. Adequacy of regulations in training and certification
The 60 respondents represent a 62.5% of the sample population. Therefore, the
question that followed inquired suggestions from this population on enhancing UAS
certification and training. The summarised answers included,
Establishing enough training schools, equip them and subsidise training charges to
encourage more people.
Continuous auditing, reviews and assessments in drone training organisations.
Establishing a standardised curriculum and syllabus for RPAS training.
Creating awareness to public about drone risks, threats and consequences of non –
compliance to regulations.
Ensure competent trainers and examiners in drone operations and enough staffing
since drone technology is growing faster than existing expertise and regulations.

51
Ensure forums on secure drone operations, self-responsibility and just culture in
security emphasizing on aviation security and safety.
The questionnaire closed by inquiring about future measures to ensure safe operations
and integration of drones in airspace. A summary of the responses includes,
Designating drone operating areas and procedures, routes, landing areas, drone flight
planning systems and duration of operation.
Extensive training, awareness campaigns of regulations to both drone users, interested
parties and public to assist in reporting cases and training on aviation operations and
procedures.
Establish equipped institutions, design a standard curriculum and employ enough staff
for drone training and certification.
Reducing or subsidising drone training fee and service charges to accord affordability
and facilitate general awareness.
Sensitise all airport workers about drone operations, risks and threats to encourage
reporting incidences.
Frequent review of manuals, regulations and keeping drone occurrence records to
determine major causal factors and nature of occurrences for assessment.
Frequent audits of training organisations, certification and licensing departments to
determine their efficient and capacity.
Adopting UTM/ATM integration, ensuring all drones are equipped with transponders,
ADS-B and TCAS to identify them and include all aviation stakeholders to achieve it.
Stringent law enforcement, training law enforcers about drone technology and
regulations applied to ensure compliance.

52
4.2 Qualitative Analysis
Six semi-structured interviews were conducted between 05/12/2022 and 18/12/2022.
The interviewees included a pilot, ATC each from the airport identified, aviation security
personnel from airport authority, aviation security personnel from regulations authority
and aviation security training. The analysis is as structured below for each question.
Questio
n
Theme Description Ratio in
Response(Total=6)
2 Profession Concerned training for which the
respondent has undergone.
Pilot=1,ATC=2,Avsec=3
1:2:3, female=3, male=3.
3 Experience
at work
Concerned the years one has worked
since employment.
Pilot=4,ATC=13,24,
Avsec=12,18,19
Average years=15,
standard deviation =6.928,
variance=48
4 Airport Concerned the airport in which one
operates.
Wilson=2,Jomo
Kenyatta=2,
KCAA Avsec
regulation department=1
,KCAA Training
department=1
5 Drone
operations
Concerned any awareness of drone
operating while at work.
Yes=4, No=2
Emotive Concerned the feeling of becoming
aware of a drone operating while on
duty and emotional responses such as;
they make me feel scared, alert or
more cautious, they are great.
2
Security Concerned expression of misuse, lack
of law to indict, surveillance, conflict,
incidences and possibility of terrorism
5

53
(e.g unlawful interference, delivery of
explosives).
6 Knowledge Concerned general knowledge of the
technology, any interests, the uses and
capabilities.
6
Economy Comments about economic impact
such as job creation or loss in different
industries.
3
Safety Concerned comments related to
hazard to flights, loss of separation
and policies for airspace use.
2
Regulations Concerned comments about lack of
enough regulatory framework and law
2
Capability Concerned the comments about the
size of the drones and their abilities,
navigation such as GPS and ADS-B,
difficult to see and cost of purchasing.
2
7 Incidence
or
occurrence
Concerned comments of encountering
unauthorised drone or reported
Yes=3
(Reported=2,Incidence=1)
No=3
Training Concerned comment on awareness of
handling drone incidences when
reported to law enforcement
personnel.
1
8 Emerging
threat
Concerned comments relating to a
possibility to use drone to attack
airports, critical aviation installations
and airports. Unlawful interference, air
traffic disruption and difficulty to see
and locate.
4

54
Security
and privacy
Concerned comments on
compromising aviation security even
when the airport closes at night, may
be used to survey or intention of the
drone.
1
Risk Included comments on airborne
collisions with aircrafts.
2
9 Air traffic
disruption
Concerned reactions to a drone
sighted within airport such as a lot of
security anxiety, suspend operations,
maneuvers unknown. Level of airport
disruption (e.g. closure of airport,
moderate or minor effect), others cited
Gatwick incidence.
6(closure=4,Moderate=1,
Minor=1)
Threat Concerned comments such as threat
and unknown intentions
3
Procedures
and
regulations
Covered comments regarding lack of
stringent emphasis at national level
and airports level.
1
10 Cyber
interference
and IoT
Concerned comments on hacking the
communication link of lawful drones
through internet connectivity and
motivating factors(e.g. remoteness,
malice, publicity)
Very possible=5
Not sure=1
Insider
threat
Concerned comment of sharing the
credentials of lawful drones to outsider
for personal gain
1
11 Capability Concerned the reaction to drones
being used to launch attacks to
airports(e.g. use IEDs, missiles, bad
uses)
Possible=2,very
possible=4

55
Concerned comment on being used as
a low risk approach by terrorists and
criminals
1
12 Risk Concerned comments about hobbyist
and commercial drone users(e.g. Lack
of knowledge, miss-use, lack
awareness, risk, lack training,
ignorance)
Appearance( risk=3,aware
ness=3
training=2,lack
knowledge=4,ignorance=2)
Comment concerning categorising
drones according to risk.
2
13 Regulations Concerned comments about
regulations awareness and
adequacy(e.g. yes, aware, others not
aware, public unaware)
aware of regulations=6
Not aware to public=5
No comment=1
Adequacy(Not sure=4,No
comment=2
14 Training
And
certification
Concerned comments about adequacy
of drone training and certification and
recommendation to enhance(e.g.
sufficient, training, training, awareness,
insufficient, more staff,)
Sufficient=2
Insufficient=3
No comment=1
More awareness and
training=6
More enabled staff=1
15 Recomme-
ndations
Concerned comments and suggestions
to mitigate future drone incidences and
smooth integration to airspace such
as; sensitisation through different
media, develop procedure manuals,
Continuous regulations review, uniform
drone category for easy SARPs,
Continuous risk assessment, develop
Sensitation, awareness
and training appeared in all
participants(6/6)

56
course module about drones, security
awareness campaigns about drones
threats and risks with stakeholder
engagement, create awareness of
consequences for ignorance, public
awareness about the new technology
and requirements, develop procedures
for drone operations and designate
areas to operate and time specific,
train ATC and pilots on drone
emergencies, install security guards at
critical points at airports(final approach
and take-off path),use geo-fencing and
anti-drone technology.
Table 12. Qualitative analysis
A qualitative content analysis combined with narrative and conversation analysis was
performed to identify themes and re-current theme among the questions. The data was
coded manually as appears in table12 above. The interviewees were in aviation industry
with significance experience with 15 years average; therefore, each provided a valid
response. Occasionally, a participant’s comments could decompose to different themes.
Given that the number of interviewees was small, a ratio was used to express the
responses. The 6 interviewed, 4 acknowledged having heard of drones operating while
at work. Two of them expressed fear and scare when a drone operation is notified while
at work. In thematic content, threat, risk, security and regulations appeared common in
responses. Drone capability, regulations, procedures, and safety were also mentioned
occasionally. However, sensitisation, awareness and training appeared in almost every
response for each interviewee. Therefore, it is imperative for the aviation security in
Kenya to emphasize on sensitisation, training and awareness for empowerment and
reduce RPAS related occurrences. Drone was categorised as an emerging threat by 4
out of 6, while risk received 2 accolades hence ratio Threat: Risk=2.1. Consequently,
four of the participants agreed drone sighting may cause a closure of operations, while

57
one indicated moderate effect and the other minor. There was unanimous appraisal of
hobbyist and commercial users as a risk in aviation security. Regulations were deemed
unknown to public by 5 out of 6, while training and certification was considered
insufficient. That explains the frequent occurrence of awareness, training and
sensitisation among interviewees. The capability of drone was considered a potential for
use by terrorist while vulnerability could be exploited through IoT. Similarly, capability
and size relate to misuse of drone that may explain the half who encountered drone
occurrence during work.
4.3 Finding
The response from the survey indicates high male population in aviation industry.
However, the interview balanced gender to avoid biasness in ideas. The highest
population in Kenyan aviation industry have experience between 11-15 years. Both the
survey and interviews have an average of years that falls between the range with 13.7
years and 15 years respectively. The standard deviation from both data is almost equal
which indicates a high variation of experience in years from the majority. Both data
indicate that majority have heard drone operations while on duty. There is common
feeling of risk or threat associated with the awareness of drone operations during work
time from both data. However, a third of the survey population encountered a drone
occurrence compared to half the interview population. Comparably, the two data sets
indicate a significant drone occurrence within Kenyan airspace. The inadequacy of
regulations, training and lack of awareness in drone operations point to these
occurrences. Therefore, the frequent appearance of training, awareness and
sensitisation as suggestion from both data to solve the menace.
The results indicated that all Avsec personnel have a common method of responding to
drone occurrence while pilots and ATC have a common method too. Apparently, there
was no written manual to respond to drone occurrence, the existing method is an
establishment through normal work routine. It was found that most respondents
indicated a drone as invisible during the night compared to day. Therefore, equipping
drones with navigations lights, TCAS, transponders, GSM, UTM and brighter colours

58
was appraised as a remedy. On drone categorisation, common drone categorisation
was appraised in the survey. Similarly, the qualitative approach appraised common
categorisation.
Risk based categorisation was highly recommended as compared to using size and
weight. To have common SARPs among states and uniformity comparable to
conventional airplane was unanimous agreement among the respondents. In
determining drone categorisation in context of risk or threat, the survey showed higher
rating for both threat and risk while at interviews indicated drone as an emerging threat.
However, categorisation by threat followed closely in the survey. Additionally, it was
found most pilots categorised drones as a threat. The data indicated that threat and risk
is six times more than the threat and two times more than risk in response rating.
Combining threat and risk that is 10+25=35 scores, indicates 26 scores less than both
threat and risk. Therefore, drones appeared more as both a threat and risk and as an
imminent emerging threat in aviation security. Both data indicated similar threats and
risk such as terrorism, airborne collision, spying and espionage, weaponising, bombing
and as launch tools. Approximately 96.9% in the survey acknowledged air traffic
disruptions when drone is sighted within the airport while all the six interviewees agreed
on disruptions. The impact level for both data was moderate and greater. Wilson airport
was expressed to experience moderate effect while Jomo Kenyatta moderate and
greater showed equal values. This is attributable to the nature of operations in the
airports; while Wilson is general aviation, Jomo Kenyatta is commercial international
and regional operations. Both data results indicated with approximate 84.3% in
interviews and 75% to 44% in survey for interference with lawful drones and
communication links using IoT. The communication links and drone technology due to
its novelty was identified as a vulnerability in qualitative and quantitative approach.
There was unanimous agreement of over 90% in both data of using drone capability to
launch attacks on airports and critical aviation installations. Similarly, both groups of
participants categorised hobbyist and commercial drone users as a risk in aviation
security citing ignorance, lack of training and awareness as well as non-compliance as
major cause of incidences from such a group of operators. However, it was a finding
that among the professionals; some indicated unaware of the existing drone regulations.

59
The 16 who reported unaware of the drone regulations, eight were pilots and eight ATC,
which indicates awareness and training gap. Both participants 2 and 3 pointed out the
existence of a gap in training, awareness and sensitising about drone handling
especially in law enforcement. A direct quote of participant 2, “they don’t understand
operations of drones” while referring to law enforcement.
This section presented the results of the research through convergent parallel design
analysis recommended for mixed method approach research (Creswell, 2013).
Quantitative and qualitative analysis were conducted separately and later; results
combined for a finding. Descriptive statistics such as percentages, averages and
standard deviation have been used for analysis in the survey while content analysis and
manual coding was performed for open-ended questions (Zina, 2017; Saunders et al.,
2019). The analysis followed the questions as they appear in the questionnaire and
where questions are leading to another, a combined analysis was conducted. In data
presentation, bar charts, histograms and pie charts with different colour coding for quick
reference have been utilised. The colours used to refer to threat or risk level and scale
for impact levels are adopted from manual on threat assessment and risk management
methodology (Aviation Security and Facilitation Regional Group NAM/CAR/SAM, 2011).
Qualitative analysis through narrative and conversation methods was conducted.
Manual data coding and recording was summarised in table 12 for each question and
thematic areas. The questions were analysed each separately to compare the re-
current themes. The ratio representation in qualitative analysis was utilised owing to the
small number of participants as opposed to percentages (Saunders et al., 2019). The
data indicated high male professionals in aviation compared to females each with a
significant experience in their profession. Despite the fact, that few professionals
indicated unaware of the drone regulations, most of them indicated awareness in the
drone general knowledge and their regulations. Most respondents referred drones as
both a threat and risk in the survey while the interviews indicated drone as an emerging
threat. Hobbyists and commercial users are unanimously categorised as risk in aviation
security. Therefore, drones are determined threat and risk in aviation security due to
their capability and size explorable by terrorists and criminals. All through, awareness,

60
training and sensitisation identified as a deficiency in drone technology from both survey
and interviews.
5.0 Discussion
The results of the research indicate male gender populates the Kenyan aviation sector
almost doubling the females. However, all have professional qualification with respect to
this research and all responses treated with equality. Therefore, the results are neutral
to gender population. The research population indicated an average of 14 years work
experience for both groups, which is considered adequate for valid and candid
responses.
The results from the survey indicate that a third of the respondents encountered a drone
occurrence while half of the interviewees experienced the same. The occurrences were
noted to have been during the take-off or landing phase of the flight. Most occurrences
were reported for from landing phase. Notably, pilots are more observant during the
approach for a landing. However, there is possibility of more drone activity especially
during the take-off phase that are not noted since pilots tend to be very busy with
aircraft equipment and departure procedures. The occurrences are associated with
feeling of risk such as collision that may result to a serious accident as well as threats
such as bombing of an aircraft. Therefore, the reason why most pilots considered drone
a threat. Additionally, not knowing the intentions of the operator substantiates
categorising them as threat amongst pilots. The reported unauthorised drone
occurrences may be associated with poor knowledge existing in the public about drone
operations, their capability and impact to aviation security. The inadequacy of
regulations, lack of training and awareness even among the professionals and drone
users is a challenge identified that substantiates incident occurrence within Kenyan
airspace. Notwithstanding the size that make them difficult to see, poor handling of
drone occurrences by law enforcement agencies make it difficult to trace the operator of
unauthorised drone. As a result, none has ever been charged for a drone crime or
drone confiscated for investigation. The visibility of drone was reported poor at night
compared to daytime. Therefore, most likely to have a drone incidence at night. The

61
requirement of registered done to have navigation lights is a measure to mitigate such a
deficiency that may necessitate criminal or terrorism acts. Additionally, equipping UAS
with TCAS capability, ADS-B and transponders makes them visible to pilots and ATC
equipment for status awareness and action. The results indicated terrorists might use
drone to launch attacks against airports in Kenya. According to interview participant 3,
“drones are an emerging threat that can be used to target aviation installations, aircrafts
and airports”. Therefore, the aviation professionals deem a background check of the
operators important during registration and certification process.
The research survey determined drones as both a threat and risk. The theme threat and
risk re-occurred in almost every question about drones in qualitative approach. Threats
such as terrorism, unlawful interference, spying and espionage, bombing explosive
delivery were identified while airborne collision was identified as risk that may be threat
oriented. The vulnerability of the UAS technology was rated high due to its operational
conceptualisation. The component failures during flight that may result to drone
crushing onto aircrafts or airports and ease of accessing the communication links
through IoT is regarded as security risk. The vulnerability is associated with the novelty
and easy modifiability of drone software. Therefore, terrorist explore such technology for
an attack for a maximum impact with least exposure risk. Security encryption of drones
is paramount to ensure communication links are safe as well as strengthening the
component reliability through manufacturer engagement. However, hobbyists and small
commercial users continue to use the cheap available UAS that are security deficient.
Therefore, the research results consider them a security risk. Consequently, ignorance,
lack of training and awareness as well as obliviousness were associated with the risks.
The security risk is an indication of illegal drone uses possibly due to high charges in
drone training and certification hence little or no awareness about the regulations as the
research found. Therefore, different media platforms, subsidising training and
certification charges may encourage awareness. On the other hand, establishing
equipped training schools and a standardised curriculum with continuous audits will
ensure quality in training and eliminate subjective training. Moreover, different media
platforms may play a crucial role in creating awareness about drone operations to
interested parties and the public for a secure integration in the airspace.

62
The research results indicate possibility of using IoT to cause unlawful interference. The
risk associated with hobbyists, commercial users as well as terrorists’ threat of drones’
attack to airports. When these possibilities exist, sighting a drone infringing airport
airspace is conceivable. In the event of occurrence, the research indicated moderate
impact level of airport operations at Wilson while moderate and greater impact levels
equated at Jomo Kenyatta airport. These levels may be associated with the nature of
operations in each of the airport. Wilson airport involves general aviation where most
airplanes are light and medium flying visually while Jomo Kenyatta involves international
and regional commercial operations with heavy and medium airplanes that fly
instrumentally. Therefore, a drone incident at Jomo Kenyatta is likely to get worldwide
recognition comparable to Gatwick incidence of December 2018 hence higher impact
level. However, the location of drone sighting within the airport determines the impact
level in relation to runway and restricted areas. Consequently, installation of drone
sensors, geo-fencing, GSM in drones and transponders in drones identify them in
proximity of airports and interceptive measures deployed. Moreover, based on risk
categorisation of drone as the research results indicate; the impact levels depend on
category either low, medium or high risk. The majority of research population expressed
the feeling of having a common drone categorisation around the world comparable to
conventional airplane category. Common categorisation necessitates achieving
uniformity in establishing ICAO standards and recommended procedures for drones and
seamless drone operations across states. However, the law for each state to apply
appropriately.
UAS technology is fast growing and inevitable. The inherent threats and risks are
imminent only requiring aviation security proactive imagination. Therefore, integrating
them in aviation airspace is not an option but a requirement. In this regard, adopting
UTM, designing drone operational procedures and manuals, drone landing areas and
routes with specific time of operations, stringent law enforcement and reviews on
regulations, establishing equipped schools with standard curriculum, frequent audits
and assessments are essential. Done aviation security is achievable with awareness.
Therefore, media utilisation for awareness is unavoidable for its wide influence and
coverage.

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6.0 Challenges and Limitation
6.1 Challenges
The research targeted a population of 100 participants in the survey. However, only 96
questionnaires had analysable information that were included for results. The other four
were barely responded to leading to disqualification. Additionally, some respondents
misplaced questionnaires leading to re-issuing. Interviews faced rescheduling of
meeting with different participants more than three times due to unavailability of the
participant. Therefore, the data collection period lasted for one week longer than
expected time of three weeks.
6.2 Limitation
The research was done in Kenya relating the drone effects to aviation security. Aviation
professionals such as pilots, ATC and Avsec personnel were involved for airports
located within Nairobi city. The perceptions of drones as threats, risks or both threat and
risk may change depending on different states among professionals and level of
knowledge about the technology. The impact levels achieved related to operational
capacity of the airports and nature of operations. The study was designed to determine
the current view of drones in context of aviation security in Kenya. The perceptions are
subject to change with time and probably with more awareness of drones. Similar
periodical studies would provide more insights as the technology grows. Moreover, a
controlled longitudinal study could lay out more insight into drone integration in the
airspace. The study involved aviation professionals only, therefore a study involving the
public could give different information.

64
7.0 Conclusion
This research sought to determine the aviation security threats and risks to air traffic
operations from the use of drone technology in Kenya. The technology has been
proliferating wildly with inherent threats and risks. The proliferation forced different
states to ban drone usage in the airspace due to lack of procedures and regulations
while other states especially those associated with robust aviation industry such as
Australia, US and EU struggled to develop bare minimum regulations and rules to
control the operations. However, drone proliferation has been faster than the regulations
development. Regulators consider the technology a risk to air traffic operations and they
have been facing a crisis with more UAS users clamouring for approvals. Therefore, the
research benefits aviation security and ANSP in developing procedures to integrate
drones in airspace with harmony as well enrich knowledge in drone operations. The
study finding may be used to correct existing failures for mitigation of risks and potential
threats to civil aviation for improvement on drone practices in the airspace.
The research provided an evaluation of drone perception from different authors in
different countries since it is an emerging global concern. In consideration of the
technological advances, almost every country has experienced an occurrence of
unauthorised drone operation. In this regard, drone incidences in different countries
sighted in vicinity of the airports have been cited to illustrate their operational and
economic impact to aviation industry such as the famous Gatwick incidence of
December 2018 that revolutinalised the technology awareness to aviation security
concerns. Some other occurrences have been utilised to emphasise on the capability of
drones especially in the hands of terrorists to form an imagination in aviation security.
The evaluative insight identified drone as a risk and emerging threat in aviation security
context of operations. The ability to bypass the conventional security barriers is a

65
concern that qualifies it as a threat from the sky. On the contrary, some authors
exemplified drone as both a threat and risk. Thematically, risks and threats have been
evaluated separately. Airborne collision with other aircraft resulting from loss of control
due to failure of communication links and hardware component is a major risk
associated with drones. Threats such as terrorism, spying, jamming and spoofing and
acts of unlawful interference through IoT were identified. The ability to weaponize a
drone to deliver bombs, explosives and biochemical weapons appeared very feasible in
aviation industry since terrorist are still exploring the technology. The Kenyan context is
not different from the global trend of drone proliferation. Occurrences were reported at
time when drones were prohibited in the country owing to lack of regulations. The
incidences increased when regulations were established and the ban lifted hoping for
compliance. Globally, the occurrences are associated with negligence, gross negligence
and terrorist or criminal incentives. The analysis discovered such occurrences are
elicited by failure of regulations and manuals addressing drones security threats and
risks, poor knowledge of drone operation in the public and users, component and
communication link failures referred as concept of operation, possible interference by
use of IoT and different categorisation of drones leading to specification discrepancies.
However, terrorism and criminal incentives may not fall into these contributory elements
but they necessitate the possibility of malicious intents. The states develop standards
and regulations focusing on the end user without addressing the manufacturer
designing and certification especially small drones. Therefore, their security features are
compromised hence exposing them to risk of interference and modification.
Consequently, they become a threat to aviation security. In this regard, each state
should endeavour to involve manufacturers and dealers in specification of the
acceptable security features in their respective territories with respect to national
security level assessments and aviation security regulations. At the time of the
research, Annex 17, 2020 lacked inclusion of guidance on drone threats and risks. This
ICAO document is a guiding reference of many signatory states, Kenya inclusive. As a
result, different states develop their regulations based on national security interventions
or reference from another state that used its national assessment. For that this reason,
a technical guidance document will assist states to adapt for their suitability .Control

66
measures such as equipping drones with ADS-B, transponders, installing sensors and
geo-fencing appeared common in most studies.
A primary research was performed in Kenyan airspace among aviation professionals to
validate the secondary sources in the context of aviation security in Kenya. Drones
being a practical menace in aviation security and air traffic operations, required
pragmatic philosophy coupled with inductive approach to improve on the practices.
Therefore, this action research was necessary. The cross-sectional study involved
practical experiences through a survey and interviews. Mixed method approach applied
ensured both quantitative and qualitative data confirm to each other’s findings during
analysis by convergent parallel design. The results indicated majority of the participants
as male. However, that did not have any influence on the research results. The results
indicated awareness of drone operation among the respondents with only few unaware.
The 16 of the 96 can be qualified as the unbothered professionals. The occurrences
reported in Kenya fetched a third of the professionals involved. Drones were determined
as both a threat and a risk in this research survey while interviews considered them as
emerging threat. Therefore, a risk that may turn to be a threat. Moreover, the
professionals qualified ignorance, lack of training, compliance and awareness as major
contributing factor in drone incidences. The result categorised hobbyists and
commercial drone users as aviation security risks. Regulations were considered scantly
known to operators, with inadequate certification and drone training as a contributing
factor. Similarly, the analysis in the identified the shortcoming in drone technology.
Majorly, collision of drones with manned aircraft and crushing onto airports was
identified in the research. The main reason associated with such occurrences is the
failure of communication link that leads to loss of control. Threats such as terrorism,
spying and bombing appeared almost in every response. It is therefore, an indication
that aviation security should imagine such threats as a possibility in due time since
terrorists are exploring the technology and its capabilities. Since aviation security has
been characterised by reactive approach, these insights and exploration of different
uses and capabilities of drones should elicit proactivity in security measures. The finding
that drones are barely visible especially at night is a strength explorable by terrorists.

67
Therefore, when coupled with remoteness and effect of IoT, there are chances that
drones may be used with minimum or no risk to terrorists. The research indicated a
possibility of drones being used to launch airport attacks. Therefore, sighting a drone
near an airport whose intentions are not known, sets in security anxiety. Airports may
close or operations continue with difficulties. In the research, such occurrence results to
moderate effect in general aviation while internal and commercial operations may stop.
The regulations should ensure during importation and registration of all the drones are
equipped with serviceable navigation lights, ADS-B, TCAS and transponders to ensure
their visibility to pilots and ATC. Enhancing physical acuity by brighter colours may also
assist locating drones. Additionally, geo-fencing, drone sensors and security encryption
will protect airports and drone communication links respectively. However, applying a
single measure is not effective. States should collaborate in securing aviation industry
by sharing intelligence involving technological threats; ensuring borders are secured
and endeavour to establish nature of any drone activity in their territories. This
technology benefits the malicious person by its capability of remote launching and use
of different media of control including internet. The aviation security requires a
combination of measures to achieve secure environment and smooth running of air
traffic operations and general aviation business.
8.0 Recommendation
The research identified a common gap especially in the training and awareness about
drones. There is no standard curriculum developed to train drone pilots for certification,
as well manuals of handling drone incidences are lacking. The research recommends
establishment of drone training schools and development of standardised curriculum for
all institutions to achieve professionalism in the technology and manage occurrences.
The regulations require continuous reviews to keep up with the fast developing drone
technology. Additionally, frequent auditing and assessments will ensure quality training.
Reducing the training charges and subsidising drone service charges make them
affordable hence curbing illegal use. The utilisation of various media platforms using
different languages since Kenya is multi-lingual to create awareness is highly

68
recommended. Media influence is vast and can educate the public on best practices
and requirements when needed to operate. Moreover, increasing staff capacity and
developing drone-operating procedures, routes and landing areas with specified time of
operations may assist to integrate them in the airspace.
This research focused on aviation professionals. In future, a research on public or the
drone operators may yield a different finding. Additionally, to determine the quality of
training about drones, research on training practices within the institutions in Kenya is
paramount to assist in identifying the knowledge gaps. The research attention was on
aviation security with respect to drone technology and air traffic operations. Safety
appeared as a theme in interviews, therefore; research on drone safety is worthwhile.

69
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A
10.0 Appendices
Appendix A: Ethics and Checklist form.
Appendix B: Interview Consent forms.
Appendix C: Questionnaire Consent form.
Appendix D: The Questionnaire.
Appendix E: Semi-structured Interview Guide Questions.
Appendix F: R-Software Analysis Codes.

B
Appendix G: Microsoft Excel Sheet for Analysis.
Appendix H: Information Sheet.
Appendix I: Consent Statement form.
Appendix J: Sample of interview text for participant 2 and 3.

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