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MALWARES
Aditya Gupta
Facebook[dot]com/aditya1391
@adi1391
./whoami
• College Student
• Security Researcher
• NOT an expert
• Grey Hat
Agenda
• Android OS Basics
• Inside the APK
• Android Security Model
• Reversing the codes
• Some case studies
• Making our own malware
• Malware = Money
• Mobile App Pentesting
What is Android
• Software Stack including OS,
middleware and applications
• Developed by Google and
OHA(Open Handset Alliance)
• Largest Market Share, more than
Symbian and IOS.
Why Android
• Everywhere! (TV, phones, tablets)
• Easy to expl0it + Open Source
• Runs on Linux 2.6.x kernel
• Uses SQLite database
• Huge community base
• Official market containing over 4,00,000 apps
ANDROID ARCHITECTURE
Hacking your Android (slides)
Android Applications
• .apk (Android Package)
format
• Nothing more than a zip
file.
• Written exclusively in Java,
with native libraries in
C/C++.
• Composed of components
such as Activities, Services,
Broadcast Recievers, etc.
Android Applications
APK
META-INF res AndroidManifest.xml Classes.dex resources
ACTIVITY
• Screen to let users interact
• Consists of views ( Buttons,
TextView, ImageView, Table
view, List view etc)
• “main” activity presented
on start
• Lifecycle is “LIFO”
ACTIVITY
• Follows the Activity
Lifecycle.
• Activity of one
application can be
accessed by other
application*.
• Permission has to be
granted
SERVICE
• Performs the work in the background
• Doesn’t comes with a UI
• Can be either stated or bound(or both)
• Example – playing music in the bg, network
activities, file i/o operations etc.
Other Components
• Broadcast Reciever
receives and responds to broadcast announcements
Incoming SMS , Screen Off etc.
• Intents
Binds individual components at runtime
• Content Providers
Stores and retrieves the application data
Data stored in an SQLite database
• Preinstalled on all
Android devices
• Contains over 4.5 billion
apps
• Anyone can publish
his/her app
Permissions.. WTF?
• Declared in
AndroidManifest.xml
• XML file containing all
the components and
permissions
• Can only use the
declared permissions
Permissions.. WTF?
• ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
• ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
• BRICK
• CALL_PHONE
• INTERNET
• GET_ACCOUNTS
• PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
• READ_OWNER_DATA
• READ_SMS
• RECEIVE_SMS
• SEND_SMS
• USE_CREDENTIALS
• WRITE_OWNER_DATA
• RECORD_AUDIO
Android Security Model
• Each application is run within a Dalvik Virtual Machine
• With unique UID:GID
• By default no permission is granted
• Permissions required by an application have to be
approved by the user.
• Apk files must be signed with a certificate.
UID : 1000
Application 1
UID : 1001
Application 2
UID : 1003
Application 3
UID : 1004
Application 4
UID : 1005
Application 5
SYSTEM PROCESS ( UID : SYSTEM)
LINUX KERNEL
Dalvik VM Dalvik VM Dalvik VM
Dalvik VM Dalvik VM
Android Security Model
DALVIK VIRTUAL MACHINE(DVM)
Created by Dan Bornstein
DVM vs JVM
Virtual System to run the android apps
Register based instead of stack based
Runs the dex(Dalvik Executable) files
REVERSE ENGINEERING
BREAKING THE CODES
Making of the APK
.java .class .dex .apk
Using dx(dexer) of Android SDK
apkbuilder
REVERSING THE APK
.apk.java .class .dex
REVERSING THE APK
Tools of the trade
Dedexer
Baksmali
Undx
JD-GUI
Dex2JAR
DexDump
APKTool
GETTING OUR HANDS DIRTY
DEMO TIME
ANDROID MALWARES
Special thanks to Mila for his awesome website
http://contagiodump.blogspot.com
Memories of the Past
Some famous Android Malwares
• Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
• Geinimi
• Snake
• DreamDroid
• GGTracker
Trojan-SMS.FakePlayer.a
• Simplest malware till
date.
• Sends SMS to a premium
rated number
• $6-10/sms
• Mainly distributed
through porn/media apps
• Stop watching porn? :O
GEINIMI : THE HOTTEST MALWARE
GEINIMI
• Most sophisticated malware till date.
• Botnet like capabilities
• Multiple variants created on the same device
• Obfuscated code
• Strings decrypted at runtime
• All network data encrypted ( DES with a key - 012345678)
GEINIMI
• Three ways of starting (Using service or Broadcast Receivers
• Makes a connection with C&C server
• Identifies each device with unique IMEI & IMSI
• Can be in 5 states (Start, download, parse, transact, idle)
• Info Stealer
• Infected legitimate apps ( Sex Positions, MonkeyJump2 etc. )
(Another reason for not watching porn on mobile! )
GEINIMI(continued)
• Botnet Command Capabilities :
o call – Call a number
o Email – Send a email
o Smsrecord – Sends all the sms’es to the server
o Install – install an app
o Shell – get a shell
o Contactlist - get the contact list of the victim
o Wallpaper – change the wallpaper etc.
DREAMDROID
• Infected legitimate software
• Hosted at “Android Market”
• Came with exploits namely Exploid ( CVE-2009-1185 ) and
rageagainstthecage(CVE-2010-EASY)
• Multi Staged Payload
• XOR Encrypted data
• Another malware with Botnet capabilities
Creating our own
Android Malware
Agenda
Taking a legitimate app (apk)
Decompile it
Insert our own codes
Repackaging to get a infected APK
PROFIT?
CREATING A MALWARE
Expected Time to be taken < 5 mins
Vulnerable Applications
• GMail App(in <Android v2.1 vuln
to XSS :O
From field: “
onload=window.location=‘http://
google.com’ “@yahoo.com”
(Found by supernothing of
spareclockcycles.org)
• Use this to launch more exploits
such as the Data Stealing Bug or
Free Webkit Exploit
• Steal Emails & SD Card Files
Stored Passwords
• Browser passwords stored in database called
webview.db
• Got r00t?
#adbpull/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/webview.db
#sqlitewebview.db
>SELECT*FROMpassword;
Insecure Data Storage
# cd /data/data/com.evernote
# ls
cache
databases
shared_prefs
lib
# cd shared_prefs
# ls
com.evernote_preferences.xml
# cat com.evernote_preferences.xml
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' standalone='yes' ?>
<map>
<string name="serviceHost"><string
name="username">myusername</string>
<boolean name="ACCOUNT_CHECKED" value="true" />
<string name="password">youcanthackme</string>
<int name="servicePort" value="0" />
<boolean name="NotifyUploadStatus" value="true" />
</map>
#
Is that all?
Webkit and platform vulnerabilities
Android 2.0 ,2.1, 2.1.1 WebKit Use-After-Free Exploit
Android 2.0/2.1 Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution on Webkit
Vulnerabilities in Apps, SQLi, XSS, etc.
Use platform vulns to get root & shell
SD card information leakage
XSSF Framework
ROOTSTRAP
Sniffing the network : )
Try MoshZuk & ANTI
Is that all?
Get the
Android
version
Run
matching
exploits
Install
malicious
app
Spread
Profit
[$]Where is the money?[$]
•Mobile App moolah by Jimmy Shah
•Premium Rates SMSes
•Make malwares for sale
•Click Fraud, BlackHat SEO, Traffic generation, PPC Ads
•Steal Accounts/CCs and sell them
•Get personal information and blackmail the owner
•Sign up to many services with your referral id
•Make a bank phishing app
[$$$]100% Illegal Ways to get rich! [$$$]
Your phone has been hacked!
Transfer $1000 to my account
Or else…….
Acc No : xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[$$]Spread Yourself![$$]
• Forums
• P2P
• Send SMS’es/chat with your download link from the infected user’s phone
• Make a blog of cracked full version of famous android apps!
• Social Network viral scripts
• Android Market
• Amazon App Store
Outlaws vs Angels
The game is over!
• Malware scanners developed for
this platform.
• Lookout(one of the best security
solutions), AVG, Quick Heal,
Kaspersky have come up with
their security solutions.
• Can detect most of the malwares
of this platform.
The game is over!
The game is not over yet!
• Can create a malware not detected by the scanners
• Most of them signature based, so, can easily be bypassed.
• Obfuscating code can bypass most of them.
• Disable the AV
• Encryption for network data.
• Use your own “blackhat” creativity!
MobileApp Pentesting FTW!
MobileApp Pentesting FTW!
• Decompile the apk after pulling it from the phone.
adb pull /data/app(or app-private)/hello.apk
unzip hello.apk
dex2jar classes.dex
jdgui classes2jar.jar
or convert to smali and then analyse the code
adb pull /data/app/hello.apk
unzip hello.apk
java –jar baksmali.jar –o C:pentestapp classes.dex
OR
apktool d hello.apk
MobileApp Pentesting FTW!
• Start Emulator with Proxy
• Install the app in the emulator
• Use Wireshark, Fiddler & Burp Suite to monitor
traffic
• Run the app and check logcat
• WhisperMonitor – Android App to monitor
outgoing traffic
Emulator –avd MYAVD –http-proxy http://127.0.0.1:5001
avd install apptotest.apk
MobileApp Pentesting FTW!
Check the security mechanism and encryption used in a
banking or payment app for network data
Manifest Explorer
Strace for debugging system calls and signals
Check the location where the app stores the login credentials.
THANK YOU!

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Hacking your Android (slides)

  • 2. ./whoami • College Student • Security Researcher • NOT an expert • Grey Hat
  • 3. Agenda • Android OS Basics • Inside the APK • Android Security Model • Reversing the codes • Some case studies • Making our own malware • Malware = Money • Mobile App Pentesting
  • 4. What is Android • Software Stack including OS, middleware and applications • Developed by Google and OHA(Open Handset Alliance) • Largest Market Share, more than Symbian and IOS.
  • 5. Why Android • Everywhere! (TV, phones, tablets) • Easy to expl0it + Open Source • Runs on Linux 2.6.x kernel • Uses SQLite database • Huge community base • Official market containing over 4,00,000 apps
  • 8. Android Applications • .apk (Android Package) format • Nothing more than a zip file. • Written exclusively in Java, with native libraries in C/C++. • Composed of components such as Activities, Services, Broadcast Recievers, etc.
  • 9. Android Applications APK META-INF res AndroidManifest.xml Classes.dex resources
  • 10. ACTIVITY • Screen to let users interact • Consists of views ( Buttons, TextView, ImageView, Table view, List view etc) • “main” activity presented on start • Lifecycle is “LIFO”
  • 11. ACTIVITY • Follows the Activity Lifecycle. • Activity of one application can be accessed by other application*. • Permission has to be granted
  • 12. SERVICE • Performs the work in the background • Doesn’t comes with a UI • Can be either stated or bound(or both) • Example – playing music in the bg, network activities, file i/o operations etc.
  • 13. Other Components • Broadcast Reciever receives and responds to broadcast announcements Incoming SMS , Screen Off etc. • Intents Binds individual components at runtime • Content Providers Stores and retrieves the application data Data stored in an SQLite database
  • 14. • Preinstalled on all Android devices • Contains over 4.5 billion apps • Anyone can publish his/her app
  • 15. Permissions.. WTF? • Declared in AndroidManifest.xml • XML file containing all the components and permissions • Can only use the declared permissions
  • 16. Permissions.. WTF? • ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION • ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION • BRICK • CALL_PHONE • INTERNET • GET_ACCOUNTS • PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS • READ_OWNER_DATA • READ_SMS • RECEIVE_SMS • SEND_SMS • USE_CREDENTIALS • WRITE_OWNER_DATA • RECORD_AUDIO
  • 17. Android Security Model • Each application is run within a Dalvik Virtual Machine • With unique UID:GID • By default no permission is granted • Permissions required by an application have to be approved by the user. • Apk files must be signed with a certificate.
  • 18. UID : 1000 Application 1 UID : 1001 Application 2 UID : 1003 Application 3 UID : 1004 Application 4 UID : 1005 Application 5 SYSTEM PROCESS ( UID : SYSTEM) LINUX KERNEL Dalvik VM Dalvik VM Dalvik VM Dalvik VM Dalvik VM Android Security Model
  • 20. Created by Dan Bornstein DVM vs JVM Virtual System to run the android apps Register based instead of stack based Runs the dex(Dalvik Executable) files
  • 22. Making of the APK .java .class .dex .apk Using dx(dexer) of Android SDK apkbuilder
  • 24. REVERSING THE APK Tools of the trade Dedexer Baksmali Undx JD-GUI Dex2JAR DexDump APKTool
  • 25. GETTING OUR HANDS DIRTY DEMO TIME
  • 26. ANDROID MALWARES Special thanks to Mila for his awesome website http://contagiodump.blogspot.com
  • 27. Memories of the Past Some famous Android Malwares • Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a • Geinimi • Snake • DreamDroid • GGTracker
  • 28. Trojan-SMS.FakePlayer.a • Simplest malware till date. • Sends SMS to a premium rated number • $6-10/sms • Mainly distributed through porn/media apps • Stop watching porn? :O
  • 29. GEINIMI : THE HOTTEST MALWARE
  • 30. GEINIMI • Most sophisticated malware till date. • Botnet like capabilities • Multiple variants created on the same device • Obfuscated code • Strings decrypted at runtime • All network data encrypted ( DES with a key - 012345678)
  • 31. GEINIMI • Three ways of starting (Using service or Broadcast Receivers • Makes a connection with C&C server • Identifies each device with unique IMEI & IMSI • Can be in 5 states (Start, download, parse, transact, idle) • Info Stealer • Infected legitimate apps ( Sex Positions, MonkeyJump2 etc. ) (Another reason for not watching porn on mobile! )
  • 32. GEINIMI(continued) • Botnet Command Capabilities : o call – Call a number o Email – Send a email o Smsrecord – Sends all the sms’es to the server o Install – install an app o Shell – get a shell o Contactlist - get the contact list of the victim o Wallpaper – change the wallpaper etc.
  • 33. DREAMDROID • Infected legitimate software • Hosted at “Android Market” • Came with exploits namely Exploid ( CVE-2009-1185 ) and rageagainstthecage(CVE-2010-EASY) • Multi Staged Payload • XOR Encrypted data • Another malware with Botnet capabilities
  • 35. Agenda Taking a legitimate app (apk) Decompile it Insert our own codes Repackaging to get a infected APK PROFIT?
  • 36. CREATING A MALWARE Expected Time to be taken < 5 mins
  • 37. Vulnerable Applications • GMail App(in <Android v2.1 vuln to XSS :O From field: “ onload=window.location=‘http:// google.com’ “@yahoo.com” (Found by supernothing of spareclockcycles.org) • Use this to launch more exploits such as the Data Stealing Bug or Free Webkit Exploit • Steal Emails & SD Card Files
  • 38. Stored Passwords • Browser passwords stored in database called webview.db • Got r00t? #adbpull/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/webview.db #sqlitewebview.db >SELECT*FROMpassword;
  • 39. Insecure Data Storage # cd /data/data/com.evernote # ls cache databases shared_prefs lib # cd shared_prefs # ls com.evernote_preferences.xml # cat com.evernote_preferences.xml <?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' standalone='yes' ?> <map> <string name="serviceHost"><string name="username">myusername</string> <boolean name="ACCOUNT_CHECKED" value="true" /> <string name="password">youcanthackme</string> <int name="servicePort" value="0" /> <boolean name="NotifyUploadStatus" value="true" /> </map> #
  • 40. Is that all? Webkit and platform vulnerabilities Android 2.0 ,2.1, 2.1.1 WebKit Use-After-Free Exploit Android 2.0/2.1 Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution on Webkit Vulnerabilities in Apps, SQLi, XSS, etc. Use platform vulns to get root & shell SD card information leakage XSSF Framework ROOTSTRAP Sniffing the network : ) Try MoshZuk & ANTI
  • 41. Is that all? Get the Android version Run matching exploits Install malicious app Spread Profit
  • 42. [$]Where is the money?[$] •Mobile App moolah by Jimmy Shah •Premium Rates SMSes •Make malwares for sale •Click Fraud, BlackHat SEO, Traffic generation, PPC Ads •Steal Accounts/CCs and sell them •Get personal information and blackmail the owner •Sign up to many services with your referral id •Make a bank phishing app [$$$]100% Illegal Ways to get rich! [$$$] Your phone has been hacked! Transfer $1000 to my account Or else……. Acc No : xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • 43. [$$]Spread Yourself![$$] • Forums • P2P • Send SMS’es/chat with your download link from the infected user’s phone • Make a blog of cracked full version of famous android apps! • Social Network viral scripts • Android Market • Amazon App Store
  • 45. The game is over! • Malware scanners developed for this platform. • Lookout(one of the best security solutions), AVG, Quick Heal, Kaspersky have come up with their security solutions. • Can detect most of the malwares of this platform.
  • 46. The game is over! The game is not over yet! • Can create a malware not detected by the scanners • Most of them signature based, so, can easily be bypassed. • Obfuscating code can bypass most of them. • Disable the AV • Encryption for network data. • Use your own “blackhat” creativity!
  • 48. MobileApp Pentesting FTW! • Decompile the apk after pulling it from the phone. adb pull /data/app(or app-private)/hello.apk unzip hello.apk dex2jar classes.dex jdgui classes2jar.jar or convert to smali and then analyse the code adb pull /data/app/hello.apk unzip hello.apk java –jar baksmali.jar –o C:pentestapp classes.dex OR apktool d hello.apk
  • 49. MobileApp Pentesting FTW! • Start Emulator with Proxy • Install the app in the emulator • Use Wireshark, Fiddler & Burp Suite to monitor traffic • Run the app and check logcat • WhisperMonitor – Android App to monitor outgoing traffic Emulator –avd MYAVD –http-proxy http://127.0.0.1:5001 avd install apptotest.apk
  • 50. MobileApp Pentesting FTW! Check the security mechanism and encryption used in a banking or payment app for network data Manifest Explorer Strace for debugging system calls and signals Check the location where the app stores the login credentials.