Reactive Routing approach for preventing wormhole attack using hybridized WHOP

IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering (IOSR-JCE)
e-ISSN: 2278-0661, p- ISSN: 2278-8727Volume 13, Issue 3 (Jul. - Aug. 2013), PP 87-95
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Reactive Routing approach for preventing wormhole attack using
hybridized WHOP
Miss Neha Jain1
, Associate Prof. Ashish Kr. Shrivastava2
1
(M. Tech Scholar, Dept. of Computer Science Engineering, NIIST, Bhopal, India)
2
(Head PG Dept. of Computer Science Engineering, NIIST, Bhopal, India)
Abstract : Mobile Ad-hoc network is additionally a network that is self-organized and adaptive in nature. As a
results of lack of centralized infrastructure several security problems are arises and malicious activity
performed by offender. Here we've got an inclination to tend to denote specific attack referred to as wormhole
attack , throughout that the degree offender with the help of malicious node to record packets at one location
among the network and transmit to a distinct location by a secrete tunnel and retransmits them into the network.
In previous research work have got process delay time is a lot of as compare to traditional process delay time
because of some suspicious activity of wormhole attack. The aim of this research work is to reduce the process
delay time, using the idea of hybridize WHOP protocol with time synchronization mechanism. The proposed
approach provides efficient results to secure data packet transmission and reduce the process delay time while
not use of any expensive hardware. We are going to work with DSR routing protocol that simulates the behavior
of wormhole attack using network simulator NS-2.
Keywords: Ad Hoc Networks, DSR (Dynamic Source Routing), Malicious Node attacks, Wormhole attack,
WHOP
I. Introduction
A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) includes nodes that are organized and maintained in a
distributed manner while not a fixed infrastructure. These nodes, like wireless phones, have a restricted
transmission range. Hence, every node has the flexibility to communicate directly with another node and
forward messages to neighbors till the messages reach the destination nodes i.e. the nodes act as both host and
router at constant time, i.e., every node within the network may be independent. Since the transmission between
two nodes should rely on relay nodes, several routing protocols [1, 2, 3, and 4] have been proposed for ad hoc
networks. For basic infrastructure of MANET consider “Fig 1”.
Figure1. Basic Infrastructure of MANET
In case of wormhole attack, attackers “tunnel” packets to a different area of the network bypassing
traditional routes as shown in “Fig 2”. The ensuing route through the wormhole could have a higher metric, i.e.,
a lower hop-count than traditional routes. With this leverage, attackers using wormholes will simply manipulate
the routing priority in MANET to perform eavesdropping, packet modification or perform a DoS (Denial of
Service) attack. The complete routing system in MANET will even be brought down using this attack. Its
severity and influence has been analyzed [5].

Reactive Routing approach for preventing wormhole attack using hybridized WHOP
Figure 2.Wormhole attack in Ad-hoc Network
In wireless network many types of attacks are often initiated however most of them are relative simple
to find because of their property of dramatically altering the network statistics however one completely different
kind of attack we consider during this thesis. It's very important when considering security problems with
network, is wormhole attack, that is tough to discover & will damage by leading important data to unauthorized
nodes. Throughout the route discovery method, a wormhole will relay route request and response messages
between distant nodes, making the appearance of shorter routes to destinations. Since the wormhole are often
anyplace along a route, a source ought to discover its existence somewhere along the route when a node sets up
the route (on-demand).
This paper is categorized as follows. Section 2 describes Problem Definition and section 3 presents
related works concerning wormhole attacks. Section 4 presents proposed work. Section 5 provides evaluation of
simulation results and analysis. At the end conclusion is provided in Section 6.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Figure 3a. Data transmission in Normal Network. Figure 3b. Data transmission when Network
under the effect of Wormhole attack
Ad-hoc or spontaneous wireless networks are vulnerable by a strong attack referred to as the wormhole
attack. A Wormhole attack is often discovered with relative ease, however preventing one is tough. Establishes a
wormhole or tunnel through that data will transfer quicker than it may on the first network.When setting up a
wormhole, an attacker will disrupt routing to direct packets through the wormhole employing a technique
referred to as selective forwarding. Within the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one
location within the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to different location, and retransmits them there
into the network. The wormhole attack will form a serious threat in wireless networks, particularly against
several ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. To set up a wormhole
Secret tunnel created by Wormhole attack
Normal Node
Data Packet
Malicious Node
S
d
D
f
b
a
g
e
c

attack, an aggressor places two or a lot of transceivers at completely different locations on a wireless network as
shown in “Fig. 3a” & “Fig. 3b”.
We can easily see in fig 3a and 3b. When network is not affected by wormhole attack, the data packet
would have followed the path S-a-b-c-d-D, while when network is affected by wormhole attack the data packet
is transmitted by a secret tunnel(S-M1-M2-D), which is high speed link between two malicious nodes that
perform malicious activity in the network.
III. RELATED WORK
A wide variety of wormhole attack mitigation techniques are proposed for specific types of networks:
sensor networks, static networks, or networks wherever nodes use directional antennas. During this section, we
have a tendency to describe and discuss such techniques, commenting on their usability and also the chance of
their use normally ad-hoc network. Yih-Chun Hu propose a solution to wormhole attacks for ad-hoc networks
within which they present a general mechanism, known as packet leashes, for detection and, so defensive
against wormhole attacks, and additionally he gave the thought of a particular protocol, called TIK, that
implements leashes and topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it's not possible for these approaches
to detect some wormhole topologies. [6]
Saurabh Gupta [7] et al introduce new protocol WHOP network. Once the route discovery, source node
initiates wormhole detection process within the established path that counts hop distinction between the
neighbors of the one hop away node within the route. The destination node detects the wormhole if the hop
distinction between neighbors of the nodes exceeds the suitable level. Our simulation results show that the
WHOP is sort of wonderful in detection wormhole of enormous tunnel lengths.
Author[8] were introduced new objective is to prevent potential kinds of routing attacks are wormhole
and rushing attack on location- primarily based geocasting and forwarding (LGF) routing protocol in Mobile
Ad-hoc Network (MANET). The LGF protocol has proposed to the enforced in real MANET workplace that
integration by global Positioning System (GPS)-free covered location tracking system with Geocast-enhanced
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (GAODV). Additionally wormhole and rushing attack are going to be
generating the prevention techniques in LGF protocol and additionally realize the impact of attacks to beat the
potential solutions. For Simulation of LGF protocol and attacks has been work done by GloMoSim-2.03 (NS)
network simulator.
The approach is employed directional antenna to find and prevent the wormhole attack [9]. The
technique is assumed that nodes maintain correct sets of their neighbors. So, an attacker cannot execute a
wormhole attack if the wormhole transmitter is recognized as a false neighbor and its messages are neglected.
To estimate the direction of received signal and angle of arrival of a signal it uses directional antennas.
This theme works providing two nodes are communication with one another, they receive signal at opposite
angle. However this theme is unsuccessful only if the attacker placed wormholes residing between two
directional antennas.
Statistical analysis scheme [10] is predicated on relative frequency of every link that is an element of the
wormhole tunnel which is appears within the set of all obtained routes. This techniques is use to discover
uncommon route selection frequency by victimization statistical analysis detected and can be employed in
distinguishing wormhole links. This technique doesn’t needs any special hardware or any changes in existing
routing protocols. It doesn't need even the aggregation of any special information, since it uses routing data
that's already accessible to a node the most plan behind this approach resides within the fact that the ratio of any
link that's a part of the wormhole tunnel, are going to be a lot of higher than different traditional links.
To mitigate the wormhole attack in mobile ad hoc network, cluster primarily based technique is
projected in [11]. During this approach clusters are formed to discover the wormhole attack. The complete
network is split into clusters. These clusters will either be overlapped or disjoint. Member nodes of cluster pass
the data to the cluster head and cluster head is no appointive dynamically. This cluster heads maintains the
routing info and sends aggregative information to all or any members inside cluster. During this theme, there's a
node at the intersection of two clusters named as guard node. The guard node has equipped with power to
observe the activity of any node and guard the cluster from doable attack. The network is additionally divided
into outer layer and inner layer. The cluster head of outer layer has the responsibility of informing all nodes of
the inner layer regarding the presence of the malicious node.
To prevent and observe the wormhole attack most typical approach is mentioned in [10] and [12],
referred to as packet leashes mechanism. During this paper, they're conferred two forms of leashes: geographic
leashes and temporal leashes additionally given an authentication protocol. The authentication protocol is
known as TESLA [12] with instant key revealing and this protocol, to be used with temporal leashes. In,
geographic leashes every node access GPS information and supported loose clock synchronization. Whereas
temporal leashes need a lot of tighter clock synchronization (in the order of nanoseconds), however don't tightly
depend upon GPS information and temporal leashes that are enforced with a packet expiration time. The

observation of this scheme is geographic leashes are less economical than temporal leashes, due to broadcast
authentication, wherever precise time synchronization isn't easily possible. Raj palSingh Khainwar et al were
given new method which detects malicious nodes and works without modification of routing protocol; consider
a hop-count and time delay analysis from the user’s point of view without any special environment assumptions.
The Research work is simulated in OPNET [13].
Khalil et al. [14] introduces LITEWORP within which they used the notion of guard node. The guard
node will discover the wormhole if one in its entire neighbor is behaving maliciously. The guard node could be
a common neighbor of two nodes to discover a legitimate link between them. During a sparse network however,
it is not always attainable to search out a guard node for a specific link.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
This paper proposes a reactive routing approach for improving process delay time in previous research
study. It is hybridized techniques of time synchronization with WHOP (Wormhole Attack Detection Protocol
using Hound Packet), which is based on DSR [15] can efficiently found wormhole in the network and also the
nodes that were making the wormhole. In this technique first sender send RREQ packet to destination node.
This RREQ packet has destination node address and packet send time. When this packet arrived at the
destination node then calculates the average delay time of packet that is:-
End to end delay = Packet receiving time - Packet sending time
Average delay time = End to end delay/no. of hop count
If this average delay time is not greater than 10 ms (that is take as threshold value), therefore route is
not affected by malicious activity or wormhole attack. We consider this route for data transmission or if the
average delay time is greater than 10 ms than in WHOP, a hound packet will be send after the route has been
discovered using DSR routing protocol, the hound packet are processed by each node except nodes who were
concerned in route from source to destination throughout path established. The preliminaries of the protocol are
as follows:-
4.1 PRELIMINARIES
The Principal of WHOP is to take the help of others nodes (nodes who were not involved in path) after
the path has been discovered to found worm hole in the network. Again In path discovery, the protocol uses
DSR RREQ packet to find the path from source to destination, RREQ packet being broadcasted by all other
node except the destination node. Each node replying back RREP to source node must store its identity into
RREP packet. After the source node receives RREP packet, it creates packet called Hound Packet, before
forwarding this packet source node computes its Message Digest (MD) and signed the MD with own private key
and attached this information with hound packet.
4.2 RREP PACKET
WHOP modifies the packet structure of RREP packet shown in Fig 4. In WHOP protocol, each node
stores its identity into RREP packet while sending it to the sender node using backward entry in the routing
table. In this way the source node would have the information of each and every node which forms the route to
the required destination node.
Type R A Reserved Prefix Size Hop Count
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence Number
Source IP Address
Life Time
Address [1] = Destination IP Address
Address [2] = Intermediate Node IP Address
…………………………………………
Address [n] = Source IP Address
Figure 4 RREP Packet Format
4.3 HOUND PACKET
The "processing bit” (P.B) can either be 0 or 1, initially all are 0, represents neighbor node of the entry
has been visited or not, its value will only be set by the neighbor node of that entry. "Total hop count” field in
the packet is used to prevent the packet looping in the network forever, if the value of this field reaches 20
(assuming source and destination would not be more than 20 hops far ) then the node will not forward it and
drop the packet.

Type Flags Reserved Total Hop Count
Destination IP Address
Destination Sequence No.
Originator IP Address
Originator Sequence No.
Add [n-1] Process Bit Count to reach next hop
Add [n-2] Process Bit Count to reach next hop
Add [2] Process Bit Count to reach next hop
Last Hop
Figure 5 Hound Packet Format
"Count to reach next hop” (CRNH) represents the hop distinction between neighbors of one hop
separated node, its value are increment by every node for the primary node entry whose processing bit is zero in
the data packet. For identify the freshness of the hound packet utilized “Sequence Number" concept; node will
cache the foremost recent sequence number packet whereas the previous has been discarded. Every node can
cache the hound packet for threshold time to let the destination node discover wormhole within the route if exist
at intervals that time. Nodes who receives hound packet first increments the CRNH field for the first node entry
whose P.B is 0, second checks if any of the node listed in the hound packet is its neighbor then set all P.B in the
packet till the node entry to which it is a neighbor otherwise forward it. Each node also checks if CRNH field in
the packet for every entry in the packet are larger than the cached values than dropped the hound packet,
otherwise update the smaller CRNH field value in the cache and broadcast the packet by incrementing the
CRNH of corresponding entry in the packet.
The different hound packets received at destination node. Here destination node performs calculation
on the received values of hound packet to detect wormhole in the pre-formed path between itself and sender.
Destination node create table for each entry of hound packet, as it receives new hound packet, receiver adds one
new row in each table.
Figure 6 Hound Packet Processing
Figure 6 shows an example where source node S sends the Hound packet to each of its neighbor where
node A will drop the packet because its identity included in the packet. When node C receives the hound packet
founds it is the neighbor of node A, so it increments the CRNH field by 1 and set the P.B for the node entry A in
the packet and forward the packet to node E. Node E founds it is also neighbor of node A but P.B for node A is
already set then it increments the CRNH of entry M1. Similarly when node B gets the hound packet founds it
does not have any node listed in the hound packet as its neighbor, it then increments the CRNH of the first entry
in the packet whose P.B is zero i.e. Node entry A. and broadcast the hound packet. Node J receives the packet,
founds it is the neighbor of entry A and M1 then it increments the CRNH field of entry A and set all P.B in the
packet till the node entry to which it is a neighbor i.e. M1. Similarly, Hound packet entry will be updated by
each node in the network and destination node will receive multiple hound packets with different values.
4.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
WHOP is very secure protocol against any malicious activity being done by node under scan of hound
packet. Hidden wormhole attack cannot be doable in WHOP as a result of if node hides its identity whereas
forwarding RREQ or RREP, the node who receives such packet once it, would discard the packet as a result of it
might not realize the last hop entry within the packet as its adjacent node. So, malicious node must expose its
identity while forming the route from source node to destination node. Figure 7 shows m1 is a malicious node
forming wormhole with m2 in the path.

Figure 7 Security Analysis
When node C receives hound packet from previous neighbor, it will find node m1 as its one hop
neighbor then node C broadcast the hound packet along with message digest (MD) of the packet encrypted by
its private key. As other nodes receives the hound packet they will first decrypt the MD by node C public key,
second compute the MD of the received hound packet then compare the result. Node will process the hound
packet if comparison result is equal otherwise drop the hound packet.
Figure 8 Actual Hop difference
If malicious node m1 try to forward the packet then, it would not forward packet with its own identity
in the last hop field of hound packet because its neighbor would discard such packet? Consider Figure 7 If m1
has information about node B that it is a neighbor of node A to whom it is a neighbor node then it may send
erroneous hound packet to node A with last hop entry in the packet contain node B identity but at node A
message digest comparison will be failed because m1 do not know the private key of node B and node A use
public key of node B to decrypt the attached message digest.
4.5 PITFALLS OF THE PROTOCOL
WHOP has major pitfall describes more illustratively in Fig 7 shown below. Suppose the path between Node A
and B are part of route connecting source and destination node and they are not forming any wormhole.
Figure 7 Pitfall of WHOP Protocol
Node A and B are also connected by path 1 (A-P-Q-R-S-T-B) and path 2 (A-M1-M2-B) respectively
by their neighbors, while hound packet is traversing it would find both path 1 and path 2 and leads both path
information to the destination node. Then wormhole between (node A and Node B) them would not be detected
but if there is only path 2 exist then node A and B found as malicious nodes forming wormhole.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Simulation can be performed in terms of average End-to-End delay, routing Throughput, Packet
delivery ratio
P
B
Q S
T
A
R
M1
M2

5.1 SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Table1: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Physical Medium Wireless Channel
Terrain area 670*670
Propagation Model Two Ray Ground
Traffic model CBR
Simulator NS 2.34
Simulation time 120
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11
Routing protocol DSR
No. of nodes 50
Queue Length 50
5.2 SIMULATION PERFORMANCE METRICS
The simulation was done to analyze the performance of the networks for various parameters. Different
metrics are used to evaluate the performance of the network under wormhole attack.
5.2.1 Packet Delivery Ratio
The amount of the data packets delivered to the destinations to those generated by the traffic sources.
Packet Delivery Ratio = total data packet received / total routing packet.
5.2.2 Throughput
It is the rate at which a network sends and receives data. It is proportional to a good channel capacity of
network connections and rated in terms bits per second (bit/s).
Throughput = Packet received / amount of forwarded packet (over certain time interval).
5.2.3 End to end delay
It refers to the amount of time taken for a packet to be transmitted across a network from source to
destination
End to end delay D = packet received time – packet send time
5.3 SIMULATION GRAPH & RESULT ANALYSIS
The simulation result in terms of Packet Delivery Ratio Throughput End to end delay in various mode of
network such as:-
 Simulate the Normal network based on DSR routing
 Simulate the Network under affection of wormhole attack.
 Simulate the network under the affection of wormhole attack and (Reactive routing approach) defense
mechanism.
5.3.1. Experiment represents Throughput
5.3.1.1 Graphical representation
Figure 8 Throughput Analysis

5.3.1.2 Comparative Result of Throughput
5.3.2 Experiment represents Packet Delivery Ratio
Figure 9 Packet Delivery Ratios
5.3.2.2 Comparative Result of Packet Delivery Ratio
S. No.
Packet Delivery Ratio
Node DSR DSR +Attacker DSR +Attacker + Defense
1. 10 0.95 0.85 0.94
2. 20 0.90 0.82 0.89
3. 30 0.84 0.76 0.83
4. 40 0.74 0.66 0.73
5. 50 0.73 0.69 0.72
5.3.3 Experiment represents Average end to end delay
Figure 10 Average end to end delays
5.3.3.2 Comparative Result of Average end to end delay
S. No.
Average end to end delay(ms)
1. 10 5 7 5.2
2. 20 8 10 8.5
3. 30 28 34 30
4. 40 42 51 43
5. 50 45 56 47
S. No.
Throughput (kb/s)
1. 10 75 62.32 74.5
2. 20 142 120 140
3. 30 182 160 180
4. 40 244 220 242
5. 50 268 240 260

VI. CONCLUSIONS
This research work analyzed the effects of wormhole attack in Mobile ad hoc networks. This work
implemented a DSR protocol that simulates the behavior of wormhole attack in NS-2. This research have used
very simple and effective way of providing security in DSR routing protocol against wormhole attack that
causes the interception and confidentiality of the ad hoc wireless networks. This paper has overcome the
drawback of previous approach [7] using hound packet to set up a new routing path every time. That causes long
process delay time. The new approach that is hybridized WHOP with time synchronization mechanism to
reduce process delay time has given better performance as compare to old approach.
References
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