path: root/chromium/content/browser/site_info.cc

// Copyright 2021 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "content/browser/site_info.h"

#include "base/containers/contains.h"
#include "base/debug/dump_without_crashing.h"
#include "base/strings/string_split.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/origin_agent_cluster_isolation_state.h"
#include "content/browser/renderer_host/render_process_host_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/site_instance_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/webui/url_data_manager_backend.h"
#include "content/public/browser/content_browser_client.h"
#include "content/public/browser/site_isolation_policy.h"
#include "content/public/browser/storage_partition_config.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
#include "net/base/escape.h"
#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"

namespace content {

namespace {

using WebUIDomains = std::vector<std::string>;

// Parses the TLD and any lower level domains for WebUI URLs of the form
// chrome://foo.bar/. Domains are returned in the same order they appear in the
// host.
WebUIDomains GetWebUIDomains(const GURL& url) {
  return base::SplitString(url.host_piece(), ".", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE,
                           base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
}

// Checks if the `url` is a special case WebUI URL of the form
// chrome://foo.bar/. Such URLs will employ LockURLs based on their TLD (ie
// chome://bar/). This will allow WebUI URLs of the above form with common TLDs
// to share a process whilst maintaining independent SiteURLs to allow for
// WebUIType differentiation.
bool IsWebUIAndUsesTLDForProcessLockURL(const GURL& url) {
  if (!base::Contains(URLDataManagerBackend::GetWebUISchemes(), url.scheme()))
    return false;

  WebUIDomains domains = GetWebUIDomains(url);
  // This only applies to WebUI urls with two or more non-empty domains.
  return domains.size() >= 2 &&
         std::all_of(domains.begin(), domains.end(),
                     [](const std::string& domain) { return !domain.empty(); });
}

// For WebUI URLs of the form chrome://foo.bar/ creates the appropriate process
// lock URL. See comment for `IsWebUIAndUsesTLDForProcessLockURL()`.
GURL GetProcessLockForWebUIURL(const GURL& url) {
  DCHECK(IsWebUIAndUsesTLDForProcessLockURL(url));
  WebUIDomains host_domains = GetWebUIDomains(url);
  return GURL(url.scheme() + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator +
              host_domains.back());
}

// URL used for the site URL and lock URL in error page SiteInfo objects.
GURL GetErrorPageSiteAndLockURL() {
  return GURL(kUnreachableWebDataURL);
}

GURL SchemeAndHostToSite(const std::string& scheme, const std::string& host) {
  return GURL(scheme + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator + host);
}

// Strings used to encode blob url fallback mode in guest site URLs.
constexpr char kNoFallback[] = "nofallback";
constexpr char kInMemoryFallback[] = "inmemoryfallback";
constexpr char kOnDiskFallback[] = "ondiskfallback";

// SiteInstances for <webview> guests currently use a special site URL that
// encodes that guest's StoragePartition configuration, including the partition
// name and whether the storage for that partition should be persisted. This
// helper translates a guest's StoragePartitionConfig into a site URL, and
// GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite below performs the opposite translation.
// The format for a guest site URL is:
// chrome-guest://partition_domain/persist?partition_name
// The `partition_domain` (i.e., the site URL's host) identifies the guest's
// embedder.
//
// TODO(alexmos): Guest site URLs are deprecated and will be removed once
// <webview> guests support site isolation.  See https://crbug.com/1267977.
GURL GetSiteURLForGuestPartitionConfig(
    const StoragePartitionConfig& storage_partition_config) {
  DCHECK(!storage_partition_config.is_default());
  std::string url_encoded_partition = net::EscapeQueryParamValue(
      storage_partition_config.partition_name(), false);
  const char* fallback = "";
  switch (
      storage_partition_config.fallback_to_partition_domain_for_blob_urls()) {
    case StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kNone:
      fallback = kNoFallback;
      break;
    case StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kFallbackPartitionOnDisk:
      fallback = kOnDiskFallback;
      break;
    case StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kFallbackPartitionInMemory:
      fallback = kInMemoryFallback;
      break;
  }
  return GURL(
      base::StringPrintf("%s://%s/%s?%s#%s", kGuestScheme,
                         storage_partition_config.partition_domain().c_str(),
                         storage_partition_config.in_memory() ? "" : "persist",
                         url_encoded_partition.c_str(), fallback));
}

// Opposite of GetSiteURLForGuestPartitionConfig. Converts the provided site
// URL of a <webview> guest into a StoragePartitionConfig.  The return value
// indicates whether the translation succeeded.
bool GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(
    BrowserContext* browser_context,
    const GURL& site,
    StoragePartitionConfig* storage_partition_config) {
  if (!site.SchemeIs(kGuestScheme))
    return false;

  // The partition name is user supplied value, which we have encoded when the
  // URL was created, so it needs to be decoded. Since it was created via
  // EscapeQueryParamValue(), it should have no path separators or control codes
  // when unescaped, but safest to check for that and fail if it does.
  std::string partition_name;
  if (!net::UnescapeBinaryURLComponentSafe(site.query_piece(),
                                           true /* fail_on_path_separators */,
                                           &partition_name)) {
    return false;
  }

  // The host must contain an ID for the guest's embedder (e.g., packaged app's
  // ID or WebUI host).
  CHECK(site.has_host());

  // Since persistence is optional, the path must either be empty or the
  // literal string.
  bool in_memory = (site.path() != "/persist");

  *storage_partition_config = StoragePartitionConfig::Create(
      browser_context, site.host(), partition_name, in_memory);

  // A <webview> guest inside an embedder needs to be able to resolve Blob URLs
  // that were created by the embedder (such as a Chrome app). The embedder has
  // the same partition_domain but empty partition_name. Setting this flag on
  // the partition config causes it to be used as fallback for the purpose of
  // resolving blob URLs.
  //
  // Default to having the fallback partition on disk, as that matches most
  // closely what we would have done before fallback behavior started being
  // encoded in the site URL.
  StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode fallback_mode =
      StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kFallbackPartitionOnDisk;
  if (site.ref() == kNoFallback) {
    fallback_mode = StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kNone;
  } else if (site.ref() == kInMemoryFallback) {
    fallback_mode =
        StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kFallbackPartitionInMemory;
  } else if (site.ref() == kOnDiskFallback) {
    fallback_mode =
        StoragePartitionConfig::FallbackMode::kFallbackPartitionOnDisk;
  }
  storage_partition_config->set_fallback_to_partition_domain_for_blob_urls(
      fallback_mode);

  return true;
}

}  // namespace

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateForErrorPage(
    const StoragePartitionConfig storage_partition_config,
    bool is_guest) {
  return SiteInfo(GetErrorPageSiteAndLockURL(), GetErrorPageSiteAndLockURL(),
                  false /* requires_origin_keyed_process */,
                  false /* is_sandboxed */, storage_partition_config,
                  WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(), is_guest,
                  false /* does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop */,
                  false /* is_jit_disabled */, false /* is_pdf */);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateForDefaultSiteInstance(
    BrowserContext* browser_context,
    const StoragePartitionConfig storage_partition_config,
    const WebExposedIsolationInfo& web_exposed_isolation_info) {
  // Get default JIT policy for this browser_context by passing in an empty
  // site_url.
  bool is_jit_disabled = GetContentClient()->browser()->IsJitDisabledForSite(
      browser_context, GURL());

  return SiteInfo(SiteInstanceImpl::GetDefaultSiteURL(),
                  SiteInstanceImpl::GetDefaultSiteURL(),
                  false /* requires_origin_keyed_process */,
                  false /* is_sandboxed */, storage_partition_config,
                  web_exposed_isolation_info, false /* is_guest */,
                  false /* does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop */,
                  is_jit_disabled, false /* is_pdf */);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateForGuest(
    BrowserContext* browser_context,
    const StoragePartitionConfig& partition_config) {
  // Traditionally, site URLs for guests were expected to have a special value
  // that encodes the StoragePartition information. With site isolation for
  // guests, however, this is no longer the case, and guests may use regular
  // site and lock URLs, and the StoragePartition information is maintained in
  // a separate SiteInfo field.  See https://crbug.com/1267977 for more info.
  //
  // Thus, when site isolation for guests is not used, set the site and lock
  // URLs to the legacy value.  Otherwise, leave them as empty for now; this
  // function is called when a guest SiteInstance is first created (prior to
  // any navigations), so there is no URL at this point to compute proper site
  // and lock URLs.  Future navigations (if any) in the guest, will follow the
  // normal process selection paths and use SiteInstances with real site and
  // lock URLs.
  GURL guest_site_url =
      SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSiteIsolationForGuestsEnabled()
          ? GURL()
          : GetSiteURLForGuestPartitionConfig(partition_config);

  return SiteInfo(
      guest_site_url, guest_site_url, false /* requires_origin_keyed_process */,
      false /* is_sandboxed */, partition_config,
      WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(), true /* is_guest */,
      false /* does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop */,
      false /* is_jit_disabled */, false /* is_pdf */);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::Create(const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
                          const UrlInfo& url_info) {
  // The call to GetSiteForURL() below is only allowed on the UI thread, due to
  // its possible use of effective urls.
  DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
  return CreateInternal(isolation_context, url_info,
                        /*compute_site_url=*/true);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateOnIOThread(const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
                                    const UrlInfo& url_info) {
  DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
  DCHECK(url_info.storage_partition_config.has_value());
  return CreateInternal(isolation_context, url_info,
                        /*compute_site_url=*/false);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateInternal(const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
                                  const UrlInfo& url_info,
                                  bool compute_site_url) {
  GURL lock_url = DetermineProcessLockURL(isolation_context, url_info);
  GURL site_url = lock_url;

  // PDF content should live in JIT-less processes because it is inherently less
  // trusted.
  bool is_jitless = url_info.is_pdf;

  absl::optional<StoragePartitionConfig> storage_partition_config =
      url_info.storage_partition_config;

  if (compute_site_url) {
    DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
    site_url = GetSiteForURLInternal(isolation_context, url_info,
                                     true /* should_use_effective_urls */);

    BrowserContext* browser_context =
        isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context().ToBrowserContext();
    is_jitless =
        is_jitless || GetContentClient()->browser()->IsJitDisabledForSite(
                          browser_context, lock_url);

    if (!storage_partition_config.has_value()) {
      storage_partition_config =
          GetStoragePartitionConfigForUrl(browser_context, site_url,
                                          /*is_site_url=*/true);
    }
  }
  DCHECK(storage_partition_config.has_value());

  if (url_info.url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme)) {
    return CreateForErrorPage(storage_partition_config.value(),
                              /*is_guest=*/isolation_context.is_guest());
  }
  // We should only set |requires_origin_keyed_process| if we are actually
  // creating separate SiteInstances for OAC isolation. When we do same-process
  // OAC, we don't do that at present.
  // TODO(wjmaclean): Once SiteInstanceGroups are fully implemented, we should
  // be able to give spOAC origins their own SiteInstance.
  // https://crbug.com/1195535
  OriginAgentClusterIsolationState requested_isolation_state =
      url_info.requests_origin_agent_cluster()
          ? OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateForOriginAgentCluster(
                url_info.requests_origin_keyed_process())
          : OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated();

  bool requires_origin_keyed_process = false;
  if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsProcessIsolationForOriginAgentClusterEnabled()) {
    auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
    requires_origin_keyed_process =
        policy
            ->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
                isolation_context, url::Origin::Create(url_info.url),
                requested_isolation_state)
            .requires_origin_keyed_process();
  }

  // If there is a COOP isolation request, propagate it to SiteInfo.
  // This will be used later when determining a suitable SiteInstance
  // and BrowsingInstance for this SiteInfo.
  bool does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop =
      url_info.requests_coop_isolation();

  // Note: Well-formed UrlInfos can arrive here with null
  // WebExposedIsolationInfo. One example is, going through the process model
  // prior to having received response headers that determine the final
  // WebExposedIsolationInfo, and creating a new speculative SiteInstance. In
  // these cases we consider the SiteInfo to be non-isolated.
  //
  // Sometimes SiteInfos are built from UrlInfos for the purpose of using
  // SiteInfo comparisons. Sometimes we only want to compare some attributes and
  // do not care about WebExposedIsolationInfo. These cases should not rely on
  // the default WebExposedIsolationInfo value. Callers should specify why it is
  // appropriate to disregard WebExposedIsolationInfo and override it manually
  // to what they expect the other value to be.
  return SiteInfo(site_url, lock_url, requires_origin_keyed_process,
                  url_info.is_sandboxed, storage_partition_config.value(),
                  url_info.web_exposed_isolation_info.value_or(
                      WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated()),
                  isolation_context.is_guest(),
                  does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop, is_jitless,
                  url_info.is_pdf);
}

// static
SiteInfo SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
                                    const GURL& url) {
  return Create(isolation_context, UrlInfo::CreateForTesting(url));
}

SiteInfo::SiteInfo(const GURL& site_url,
                   const GURL& process_lock_url,
                   bool requires_origin_keyed_process,
                   bool is_sandboxed,
                   const StoragePartitionConfig storage_partition_config,
                   const WebExposedIsolationInfo& web_exposed_isolation_info,
                   bool is_guest,
                   bool does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop,
                   bool is_jit_disabled,
                   bool is_pdf)
    : site_url_(site_url),
      process_lock_url_(process_lock_url),
      requires_origin_keyed_process_(requires_origin_keyed_process),
      is_sandboxed_(is_sandboxed),
      storage_partition_config_(storage_partition_config),
      web_exposed_isolation_info_(web_exposed_isolation_info),
      is_guest_(is_guest),
      does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_(
          does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop),
      is_jit_disabled_(is_jit_disabled),
      is_pdf_(is_pdf) {}
SiteInfo::SiteInfo(const SiteInfo& rhs) = default;

SiteInfo::~SiteInfo() = default;

SiteInfo::SiteInfo(BrowserContext* browser_context)
    : SiteInfo(
          /*site_url=*/GURL(),
          /*process_lock_url=*/GURL(),
          /*requires_origin_keyed_process=*/false,
          /*is_sandboxed*/ false,
          StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context),
          WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated(),
          /*is_guest=*/false,
          /*does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop=*/false,
          /*is_jit_disabled=*/false,
          /*is_pdf=*/false) {}

// static
auto SiteInfo::MakeSecurityPrincipalKey(const SiteInfo& site_info) {
  // Note: `does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_` is intentionally
  // excluded here, as a difference solely in that field should not cause a
  // different SiteInstance to be created.  A document that has been
  // site-isolated due to COOP should still share a SiteInstance with other
  // same-site frames in the BrowsingInstance, even if those frames lack the
  // COOP isolation request.
  return std::tie(site_info.site_url_.possibly_invalid_spec(),
                  site_info.process_lock_url_.possibly_invalid_spec(),
                  // Here we only compare |requires_origin_keyed_process_| since
                  // we currently don't create SiteInfos where
                  // |is_origin_agent_cluster_| differs from
                  // |requires_origin_keyed_process_|. In fact, we don't even
                  // have |is_origin_agent_cluster| in SiteInfo at this time,
                  // but that could change.
                  // TODO(wjmaclean): Update this if we ever start to create
                  // separate SiteInfos for same-process OriginAgentCluster.
                  site_info.requires_origin_keyed_process_,
                  site_info.is_sandboxed_, site_info.storage_partition_config_,
                  site_info.web_exposed_isolation_info_, site_info.is_guest_,
                  site_info.is_jit_disabled_, site_info.is_pdf_);
}

SiteInfo SiteInfo::GetNonOriginKeyedEquivalentForMetrics(
    const IsolationContext& isolation_context) const {
  SiteInfo non_oac_site_info(*this);
  if (requires_origin_keyed_process()) {
    DCHECK(process_lock_url_.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme));
    non_oac_site_info.requires_origin_keyed_process_ = false;

    // TODO(wjmaclean): It would probably be better if we just changed
    // SiteInstanceImpl::original_url_ to be SiteInfo::original_url_info_ and
    // use that to recreate the SiteInfo with origin keying turned off. But
    // that's a largish refactor in its own, since it would require making all
    // SiteInfo creation go through SiteInfo::CreateInternal.
    // We'll do the following for now and do the refactor separately.
    // The code below creates a simple non-origin-keyed equivalent for this
    // SiteInfo by (1) Converting the process lock to its equivalent by either
    // seeing if it has a command-line isolated-origin it should use, and if not
    // then just using GetSiteForOrigin to convert it, and (2) doing the same
    // for the SiteUrl, but only if the SiteUrl and ProcessLockUrl match
    // prior to the conversion, otherwise leave the SiteUrl as is.
    auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
    url::Origin result_origin;
    // We need to make the following call with a 'null' IsolationContext,
    // otherwise the OAC history will just opt us back into an origin-keyed
    // SiteInfo.
    if (policy->GetMatchingProcessIsolatedOrigin(
            IsolationContext(BrowsingInstanceId(0),
                             isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context(),
                             isolation_context.is_guest()),
            url::Origin::Create(process_lock_url_),
            false /* origin_requests_isolation */, &result_origin)) {
      non_oac_site_info.process_lock_url_ = result_origin.GetURL();
    } else {
      non_oac_site_info.process_lock_url_ =
          GetSiteForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(process_lock_url_));
    }
    // Only convert the site_url_ if it matches the process_lock_url_, otherwise
    // leave it alone. This will only matter for hosted apps, and we only expect
    // them to differ if an effective URL is defined.
    if (site_url_ == process_lock_url_)
      non_oac_site_info.site_url_ = non_oac_site_info.process_lock_url_;
  }
  return non_oac_site_info;
}

SiteInfo SiteInfo::SandboxedClone() const {
  SiteInfo sandboxed_copy(*this);
  sandboxed_copy.is_sandboxed_ = true;
  return sandboxed_copy;
}

SiteInfo& SiteInfo::operator=(const SiteInfo& rhs) = default;

bool SiteInfo::IsSamePrincipalWith(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  return MakeSecurityPrincipalKey(*this) == MakeSecurityPrincipalKey(other);
}

bool SiteInfo::IsExactMatch(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  bool is_match =
      site_url_ == other.site_url_ &&
      process_lock_url_ == other.process_lock_url_ &&
      requires_origin_keyed_process_ == other.requires_origin_keyed_process_ &&
      is_sandboxed_ == other.is_sandboxed_ &&
      storage_partition_config_ == other.storage_partition_config_ &&
      web_exposed_isolation_info_ == other.web_exposed_isolation_info_ &&
      is_guest_ == other.is_guest_ &&
      does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_ ==
          other.does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_ &&
      is_jit_disabled_ == other.is_jit_disabled_ && is_pdf_ == other.is_pdf_;

  if (is_match) {
    // If all the fields match, then the "same principal" subset must also
    // match. This is used to ensure these 2 methods stay in sync and all fields
    // used by IsSamePrincipalWith() are used by this function.
    DCHECK(IsSamePrincipalWith(other));
  }
  return is_match;
}

auto SiteInfo::MakeProcessLockComparisonKey() const {
  // As we add additional features to SiteInfo, we'll expand this comparison.
  // Note that this should *not* compare site_url() values from the SiteInfo,
  // since those include effective URLs which may differ even if the actual
  // document origins match. We use process_lock_url() comparisons to account
  // for this.
  //
  // TODO(wjmaclean, alexmos): Figure out why including `is_jit_disabled_` here
  // leads to crashes in https://crbug.com/1279453.
  return std::tie(process_lock_url_, requires_origin_keyed_process_,
                  is_sandboxed_, is_pdf_, is_guest_,
                  web_exposed_isolation_info_, storage_partition_config_);
}

int SiteInfo::ProcessLockCompareTo(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  auto a = MakeProcessLockComparisonKey();
  auto b = other.MakeProcessLockComparisonKey();
  if (a < b)
    return -1;
  if (b < a)
    return 1;
  return 0;
}

bool SiteInfo::operator==(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  return IsSamePrincipalWith(other);
}

bool SiteInfo::operator!=(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  return !IsSamePrincipalWith(other);
}

bool SiteInfo::operator<(const SiteInfo& other) const {
  return MakeSecurityPrincipalKey(*this) < MakeSecurityPrincipalKey(other);
}

std::string SiteInfo::GetDebugString() const {
  std::string debug_string =
      site_url_.is_empty() ? "empty site" : site_url_.possibly_invalid_spec();

  if (process_lock_url_.is_empty())
    debug_string += ", empty lock";
  else if (process_lock_url_ != site_url_)
    debug_string += ", locked to " + process_lock_url_.possibly_invalid_spec();

  if (requires_origin_keyed_process_)
    debug_string += ", origin-keyed";

  if (is_sandboxed_)
    debug_string += ", sandboxed";

  if (web_exposed_isolation_info_.is_isolated()) {
    debug_string += ", cross-origin isolated";
    if (web_exposed_isolation_info_.is_isolated_application())
      debug_string += " application";
    debug_string += ", coi-origin='" +
                    web_exposed_isolation_info_.origin().GetDebugString() + "'";
  }

  if (is_guest_)
    debug_string += ", guest";

  if (does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_)
    debug_string += ", requests coop isolation";

  if (is_jit_disabled_)
    debug_string += ", jitless";

  if (is_pdf_)
    debug_string += ", pdf";

  if (!storage_partition_config_.is_default()) {
    debug_string +=
        ", partition=" + storage_partition_config_.partition_domain() + "." +
        storage_partition_config_.partition_name();
    if (storage_partition_config_.in_memory())
      debug_string += ", in-memory";
  }

  return debug_string;
}

std::ostream& operator<<(std::ostream& out, const SiteInfo& site_info) {
  return out << site_info.GetDebugString();
}

bool SiteInfo::RequiresDedicatedProcess(
    const IsolationContext& isolation_context) const {
  DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
  DCHECK(isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context());

  // If --site-per-process is enabled, site isolation is enabled everywhere.
  if (SiteIsolationPolicy::UseDedicatedProcessesForAllSites())
    return true;

  // If there is a COOP header request to require a dedicated process for this
  // SiteInfo, honor it.  Note that we have already checked other eligibility
  // criteria such as memory thresholds prior to setting this bit on SiteInfo.
  if (does_site_request_dedicated_process_for_coop_)
    return true;

  // Always require a dedicated process for isolated origins.
  auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
  if (policy->IsIsolatedOrigin(isolation_context,
                               url::Origin::Create(site_url_),
                               requires_origin_keyed_process_)) {
    return true;
  }

  // Require a dedicated process for all sandboxed frames. Note: If this
  // SiteInstance is a sandboxed child of a sandboxed parent, then the logic in
  // RenderFrameHostManager::CanUseSourceSiteInstance will assign the child to
  // the parent's SiteInstance, so we don't need to worry about the parent's
  // sandbox status here.
  if (is_sandboxed_)
    return true;

  // Error pages in main frames do require isolation, however since this is
  // missing the context whether this is for a main frame or not, that part
  // is enforced in RenderFrameHostManager.
  if (is_error_page())
    return true;

  // Isolate PDF content.
  if (is_pdf_)
    return true;

  // Isolate WebUI pages from one another and from other kinds of schemes.
  for (const auto& webui_scheme : URLDataManagerBackend::GetWebUISchemes()) {
    if (site_url_.SchemeIs(webui_scheme))
      return true;
  }

  // Let the content embedder enable site isolation for specific URLs. Use the
  // canonical site url for this check, so that schemes with nested origins
  // (blob and filesystem) work properly.
  if (GetContentClient()->browser()->DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(
          isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context().ToBrowserContext(),
          site_url_)) {
    return true;
  }

  return false;
}

bool SiteInfo::ShouldLockProcessToSite(
    const IsolationContext& isolation_context) const {
  DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
  BrowserContext* browser_context =
      isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context().ToBrowserContext();
  DCHECK(browser_context);

  // Don't lock to origin in --single-process mode, since this mode puts
  // cross-site pages into the same process.  Note that this also covers the
  // single-process mode in Android Webview.
  if (RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process())
    return false;

  if (!RequiresDedicatedProcess(isolation_context))
    return false;

  // Legacy guest processes without site isolation support cannot be locked to
  // a specific site, because those guests always use a single SiteInstance for
  // all URLs they load. The SiteInfo for those URLs do not match the SiteInfo
  // of the guest SiteInstance so we skip locking these guest processes.
  if (is_guest_ && !SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSiteIsolationForGuestsEnabled())
    return false;

  // Most WebUI processes should be locked on all platforms.  The only exception
  // is NTP, handled via the separate callout to the embedder.
  const auto& webui_schemes = URLDataManagerBackend::GetWebUISchemes();
  if (base::Contains(webui_schemes, site_url_.scheme())) {
    return GetContentClient()->browser()->DoesWebUISchemeRequireProcessLock(
        site_url_.scheme());
  }

  // Allow the embedder to prevent process locking so that multiple sites
  // can share a process.
  if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldLockProcessToSite(browser_context,
                                                              site_url_)) {
    return false;
  }

  return true;
}

bool SiteInfo::ShouldUseProcessPerSite(BrowserContext* browser_context) const {
  // Returns true if we should use the process-per-site model.  This will be
  // the case if the --process-per-site switch is specified, or in
  // process-per-site-instance for particular sites (e.g., NTP). Note that
  // --single-process is handled in ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost.
  const base::CommandLine& command_line =
      *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
  if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kProcessPerSite))
    return true;

  // Error pages should use process-per-site model, as it is useful to
  // consolidate them to minimize resource usage and there is no security
  // drawback to combining them all in the same process.
  if (is_error_page())
    return true;

  // Otherwise let the content client decide, defaulting to false.
  return GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldUseProcessPerSite(browser_context,
                                                                site_url_);
}

// static
StoragePartitionConfig SiteInfo::GetStoragePartitionConfigForUrl(
    BrowserContext* browser_context,
    const GURL& url,
    bool is_site_url) {
  if (url.is_empty())
    return StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context);

  if (url.SchemeIs(kGuestScheme)) {
    StoragePartitionConfig storage_partition_config =
        StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(browser_context);
    // Guest schemes should only appear in site URLs.
    DCHECK(is_site_url);

    // This should only ever see guest site URLs generated within SiteInfo, so
    // it shouldn't ever fail.
    bool success = GetGuestPartitionConfigForSite(browser_context, url,
                                                  &storage_partition_config);
    DCHECK(success);

    return storage_partition_config;
  }

  return GetContentClient()->browser()->GetStoragePartitionConfigForSite(
      browser_context, url);
}

void SiteInfo::WriteIntoTrace(perfetto::TracedValue context) const {
  auto dict = std::move(context).WriteDictionary();
  dict.Add("site_url", site_url());
  dict.Add("process_lock_url", process_lock_url());
  dict.Add("requires_origin_keyed_process", requires_origin_keyed_process_);
  dict.Add("is_sandboxed", is_sandboxed_);
  dict.Add("is_guest", is_guest_);
}

bool SiteInfo::is_error_page() const {
  return site_url_ == GetErrorPageSiteAndLockURL();
}

// static
GURL SiteInfo::DetermineProcessLockURL(
    const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
    const UrlInfo& url_info) {
  // For WebUI URLs of the form chrome://foo.bar/ compute the LockURL based on
  // the TLD (ie chrome://bar/). This allows WebUI to continue to differentiate
  // WebUIType via SiteURL while allowing WebUI with a shared TLD to share a
  // RenderProcessHost.
  // TODO(tluk): Remove this and replace it with SiteInstance groups once the
  // support lands.
  if (IsWebUIAndUsesTLDForProcessLockURL(url_info.url))
    return GetProcessLockForWebUIURL(url_info.url);

  // For the process lock URL, convert |url| to a site without resolving |url|
  // to an effective URL.
  return GetSiteForURLInternal(isolation_context, url_info,
                               false /* should_use_effective_urls */);
}

// static
GURL SiteInfo::GetSiteForURLInternal(const IsolationContext& isolation_context,
                                     const UrlInfo& real_url_info,
                                     bool should_use_effective_urls) {
  const GURL& real_url = real_url_info.url;
  // Explicitly map all chrome-error: URLs to a single URL so that they all
  // end up in a dedicated error process.
  if (real_url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme))
    return GetErrorPageSiteAndLockURL();

  if (should_use_effective_urls)
    DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);

  GURL url = should_use_effective_urls
                 ? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(
                       isolation_context.browser_or_resource_context()
                           .ToBrowserContext(),
                       real_url)
                 : real_url;

  // Navigations to uuid-in-package: URLs served from Web Bundles [1] require
  // special care to use the origin of the bundle rather than the
  // uuid-in-package: URL, which lacks any origin information.
  // [1] bit.ly/subresource-web-bundles-doc
  // TODO(acolwell): Update this so we can use url::Origin::Resolve() for all
  // cases.
  url::Origin origin;
  if (url.SchemeIs(url::kUuidInPackageScheme) &&
      real_url_info.origin.opaque()) {
    auto precursor = real_url_info.origin.GetTupleOrPrecursorTupleIfOpaque();
    if (precursor.IsValid()) {
      // Use the precursor as the origin. This should be the origin of the
      // bundle.
      origin = url::Origin::CreateFromNormalizedTuple(
          precursor.scheme(), precursor.host(), precursor.port());
    } else {
      origin = url::Origin::Resolve(url, real_url_info.origin);
    }
  } else {
    origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
  }

  // If the url has a host, then determine the site.  Skip file URLs to avoid a
  // situation where site URL of file://localhost/ would mismatch Blink's origin
  // (which ignores the hostname in this case - see https://crbug.com/776160).
  GURL site_url;
  if (!origin.host().empty() && origin.scheme() != url::kFileScheme) {
    // For Strict Origin Isolation, use the full origin instead of site for all
    // HTTP/HTTPS URLs.  Note that the HTTP/HTTPS restriction guarantees that
    // we won't hit this for hosted app effective URLs (see
    // https://crbug.com/961386).
    if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsStrictOriginIsolationEnabled() &&
        origin.GetURL().SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
      return origin.GetURL();

    site_url = GetSiteForOrigin(origin);

    // Isolated origins should use the full origin as their site URL. A
    // subdomain of an isolated origin should also use that isolated origin's
    // site URL. It is important to check |origin| (based on |url|) rather than
    // |real_url| here, since some effective URLs (such as for NTP) need to be
    // resolved prior to the isolated origin lookup.
    auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
    url::Origin isolated_origin;
    if (policy->GetMatchingProcessIsolatedOrigin(
            isolation_context, origin,
            real_url_info.requests_origin_keyed_process(), site_url,
            &isolated_origin)) {
      return isolated_origin.GetURL();
    }
  } else {
    // If there is no host but there is a scheme, return the scheme.
    // This is useful for cases like file URLs.
    if (!origin.opaque()) {
      // Prefer to use the scheme of |origin| rather than |url|, to correctly
      // cover blob:file: and filesystem:file: URIs (see also
      // https://crbug.com/697111).
      DCHECK(!origin.scheme().empty());
      site_url = GURL(origin.scheme() + ":");
    } else if (url.has_scheme()) {
      // In some cases, it is not safe to use just the scheme as a site URL, as
      // that might allow two URLs created by different sites to share a
      // process. See https://crbug.com/863623 and https://crbug.com/863069.
      //
      // TODO(alexmos,creis): This should eventually be expanded to certain
      // other schemes, such as file:.
      if (url.SchemeIsBlob() || url.scheme() == url::kDataScheme) {
        // We get here for blob URLs of form blob:null/guid.  Use the full URL
        // with the guid in that case, which isolates all blob URLs with unique
        // origins from each other.  We also get here for browser-initiated
        // navigations to data URLs, which have a unique origin and should only
        // share a process when they are identical.  Remove hash from the URL in
        // either case, since same-document navigations shouldn't use a
        // different site URL.
        if (url.has_ref()) {
          GURL::Replacements replacements;
          replacements.ClearRef();
          url = url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
        }
        site_url = url;
      } else {
        DCHECK(!url.scheme().empty());
        site_url = GURL(url.scheme() + ":");
      }
    } else {
      // Otherwise the URL should be invalid; return an empty site.
      DCHECK(!url.is_valid()) << url;
      return GURL();
    }
  }

  return site_url;
}

// static
GURL SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(const url::Origin& origin) {
  // Only keep the scheme and registered domain of |origin|.
  std::string domain = net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry(
      origin, net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
  return SchemeAndHostToSite(origin.scheme(),
                             domain.empty() ? origin.host() : domain);
}

}  // namespace content