What’s wrong with WebSocket APIs? Unveiling vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs.
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This document discusses vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs. It begins with an introduction to the speaker and overview of WebSocket protocols. It then covers specific vulnerabilities like cross-site WebSocket hijacking, authentication issues, and request smuggling through WebSocket connections. The document demonstrates these vulnerabilities through challenges on public sites. It concludes with ideas for further research on WebSocket security.
What’s wrong with WebSocket APIs? Unveiling vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs.
- 1. What’s wrong with w/ WebSocket API? Unveiling vulnerabilities in WebSocket APIs Mikhail Egorov / @0ang3el #HACKTIVITY2019
- 2. # whoami 2 ▪ Security researcher / full-time bug hunter ▪ https://bugcrowd.com/0ang3el ▪ https://hackerone.com/0ang3el ▪ Conference speaker ▪ https://www.slideshare.net/0ang3el ▪ https://speakerdeck.com/0ang3el
- 3. Previous work 3 ▪ https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us- 12/Briefings/Shekyan/BH_US_12_Shekyan_Toukharian_Hacking_Websocket_Slides .pdf ▪ https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and- events/blog/2017/may/wssip-a-websocket-manipulation-proxy/ ▪ https://chybeta.github.io/2018/04/07/spring-messaging-Remote-Code-Execution- %E5%88%86%E6%9E%90-%E3%80%90CVE-2018-1270%E3%80%91/ ▪ https://www.twistlock.com/labs-blog/demystifying-kubernetes-cve-2018-1002105- dead-simple-exploit/ ▪ https://github.com/andresriancho/websocket-fuzzer ▪ https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon9/stable-35-old-tools-new- tricks-hacking-websockets-michael-fowl-nick-defoe
- 5. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 5 ▪ Efficient two-way communication protocol ▪ WebSocket is stateful (HTTP is stateless) ▪ Two main parts: handshake and data transfer
- 6. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 6 ▪ Extensibility: subprotocols and extensions ▪ Subprotocols ▪ https://www.iana.org/assignments/websocket/websocket.xml#subpro tocol-name ▪ Wamp ▪ Stomp ▪ Soap ▪ …
- 7. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 7 ▪ Extensibility: subprotocols and extensions ▪ Extensions ▪ https://www.iana.org/assignments/websocket/websocket.xml#extens ion-name ▪ permessage-deflate ▪ bbf-usp-protocol
- 8. WebSocket protocol – RFC 6455 8 ▪ Origin-based security model (Browser clients) ▪ No authentication ▪ Client must do client-to-server masking
- 9. WebSocket protocol support 9 ▪ Major web browsers ▪ Web servers / Proxies ▪ Apache httpd, Nginx, IIS, … ▪ HAProxy, Traefik, Varnish, Envoy, … ▪ Cloud providers ▪WebSocket API (api gateways) ▪WebSocket proxying (load balancers)
- 10. WebSocket handshake 10 Upgrade request Base64(Random nonce) Protocol version Required HTTP version
- 11. WebSocket handshake 11 Required status code BASE64(SHA1(Sec-WebSocket-Key || CONST ))
- 12. WebSocket data transfer 12 x00 – continuation frame x01 – text frame x02 – binary frame x08 – close frame x09 – ping x0A – pong other values are reserved
- 13. WebSocket data transfer - masking 13 ▪ Masking key is 32-bit long passed inside frame ▪ Client must send masked data ▪ MASKED = MASK ^ DATA (^ - XOR) ▪ Mechanism protects against cache poisoning and smuggling attacks
- 15. WebSocket security for Web Browser 15 ▪ SOP doesn’t work for WebSocket in web browser ▪ Read from WebSocket cross-origin ▪ Write to WebSocket cross-origin ▪ Header Origin should be checked on handshake step (origin-based security model)
- 16. CSWSH 16 ▪ Cookies are used to authenticate upgrade request ▪ Header Origin isn’t checked or checked poorly
- 17. CSWSH 17 ▪ CORS tricks from @albinowax are applicable to WebSocket ▪ https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations- for-bitcoins-and-bounties ▪ Null origin ▪ Pre-domain wildcard ▪ Post-domain wildcard ▪ …
- 18. CSWSH – Null origin 18 ▪ nullorigin.html <iframe src="data:text/html, <script>const socket = new WebSocket('wss://example.com'); </script>"></iframe>
- 20. CSWSH – template for attack 5
- 21. Demo 5
- 22. 22 Authentication / IDOR issues
- 23. Authentication 23 ▪ WebSocket protocol doesn’t offer authentication ▪ Developers have to roll out their own AuthN ▪ It’s secure to check AuthN only during handshake ▪ Common secure implementations ▪ Session cookies ▪ Tokens
- 24. Broken authentication – Case 1 24 ▪ Some ID / GUID is required in Upgrade request ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
- 25. Broken authentication – Case 2 25 ▪ No authentication during handshake step ▪ Some ID / GUID required in API messages ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
- 26. Broken authentication – Case 2 26 ▪ Exposing GraphQL subscriptions w/o AuthN ▪ https://github.com/righettod/poc-graphql#subscriptions- websocket-endpoint-default-enabling ▪ Path /subscriptions
- 27. Insecure Direct Object Reference issues 27 ▪ Strong authentication during handshake step ▪ Some ID / GUID required in API messages ▪ Guess ID ▪ Leak GUID (minor IDOR, …)
- 29. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 29 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Backend /socket.io/ Public WebSocket API
- 30. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 30 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request Backend /socket.io/
- 31. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 31 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request HTTP/1.1 101HTTP/1.1 101 Backend /socket.io/
- 32. Reverse proxying WebSocket connection 32 Client Frontend Reverse proxy Upgrade request Upgrade request HTTP/1.1 101HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket connection direct WebSocket connection Client - Backend Backend /socket.io/
- 33. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 33 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) Private REST API Public WebSocket API Backend /internal /socket.io/
- 34. 34 BackendClient Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Version correctness isn’t checked! Smuggling through WebSocket connection
- 35. 35 BackendClient Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 HTTP/1.1 426HTTP/1.1 426 Response correctness isn’t checked! Smuggling through WebSocket connection
- 36. 36 BackendClient Frontend Reverse proxy (vulnerable) /internal Upgrade request /socket.io/ Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 Upgrade request Sec-WebSocket-Version: 1337 HTTP/1.1 426HTTP/1.1 426 TLS connection direct TLS connection Client – Backend not WebSocket!!! Client can access /internal Smuggling through WebSocket connection
- 37. Challenge – challenge.0ang3el.tk 37 ▪ URL ▪ https://challenge.0ang3el.tk/websocket.html ▪ You need to access flag on localhost:5000 ▪ Seems no one solved
- 38. Challenge – challenge.0ang3el.tk 38 ▪ Frontend ▪ Not disclosed WebSocket reverse proxy ▪ socket.io.js ▪ Proxies only WebSocket API - /socket.io/ path ▪ Backend ▪ Flask, Flask-SoketIO, Flask-Restful ▪ Listens on localhost:5000 only
- 39. challenge1.py
- 41. Vulnerable reverse proxies 41 ▪ Vulnerable ▪ Varnish, Envoy proxy <= 1.8.0, other non-disclosed ▪ Not vulnerable ▪ Nginx, HAProxy, Traefik, others
- 42. Varnish response 42 ▪ WebSocket proxying configuration ▪ https://varnish-cache.org/docs/6.3/users-guide/vcl-example- websockets.html
- 43. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 43 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Private REST API Public WebSocket API & REST API Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health
- 44. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 44 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health example.com GET HTTP/1.1 200
- 45. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 45 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health Only Upgrade: websocket header is checked! POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u=
- 46. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 46 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health attacker.com GET HTTP/1.1 101 HTTP/1.1 101HTTP/1.1 101 Only status code is checked for response! POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u=
- 47. Smuggling through WebSocket connection 47 Client Frontend Reverse proxy (Nginx or another) Backend /internal /api/socket.io/ /api/health HTTP/1.1 101HTTP/1.1 101 TLS connection direct TLS connection Client – Backend not WebSocket!!! Client can access /internal POST /api/health?u= POST /api/health?u= Client-to-Server masking isn’t checked by proxy!!!
- 48. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 48 ▪ URL ▪ https://challenge2.0ang3el.tk/websocket.html ▪ You need to access flag on localhost:5000 ▪ Seems no one solved
- 49. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 49 ▪ Frontend ▪ Nginx as WebSocket reverse proxy ▪ socket.io.js ▪ Proxies only /api/public path (socket.io and healthcheck) ▪ Backend ▪ Flask, Flask-SoketIO, Flask-Restful ▪ Listens on localhost:5000 only
- 50. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 50 ▪ Nginx config
- 51. Challenge2 – challenge2.0ang3el.tk 51 ▪ REST API - healthcheck
- 52. Challenge2.py 5
- 54. Vulnerable reverse proxies 54 ▪ Almost all proxies are affected ▪ But exploitation is limited ▪ External SSRF is required that returns status code ▪ …
- 56. Discovering WebSocket API 56 ▪ Monitor Upgrade requests ▪ Analyze JavaScript files ▪ Try to establish WebSocket connection to each URL ▪ …
- 57. 57 Conclusion
- 58. Ideas for further research 58 ▪ Security of WebSocket subprotocols ▪ More smuggling techniques ▪ HTTP/2 and WebSocket ▪ …